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In troduGlion.
The r : thod c f  .approach i r  the following;
rescay i c  by wap c f  "the conQTvU: fact** o f  o^n^rshin ,  rathor  
than o f  any preconce ived  choon^. I t  b o g in s  th e r e f o r e  ^ i th  a 
i>eycholo,;l : ai aralj«i^3 o f  owarrrihip a j  a f a c t o r  o f  Character.  - 
Vo^r tho IrrpulsG to  appropriate  e x t e r n a l  thirg.", common to  
z:T) lind animale ,  aoone to g iv e  un tho s im p l e s t  b eg in n ings  
o f  o t n c r s h ip .  A c c r v a r le c r  o f  i t s  m a n i f e s ta t io n  on both  
Icvcîio o f  x i f e ,  w h i le  i t  furn iah os  ground fo r  ^ t l tr ib ut in g  an 
i n c t i n c t i v c  basa» >o ownership ,  ehowo a lc o  the inadequacy  
o f  thiR r cthod as an c:; p i  an at  ion  o f  human conduct.  For tho 
f a c t o r  o f  the  a<?lf which e n t e r :  in to  any r a n i f e e t a t i o n  o f  
appropr ia t ion  on the human l e v e l  makes i t  im p o ss ib le  to reduce 
i t  to torr.c o f  rare  im pulse .  It  l e  noroover as a f a c t o r  in  
the (ironlh  o f  the s e l f  tha t  the primary va lu e  c f  ownership ,  
ae opposed to zero a p p ro p r ia t io n ,  c o n s i s t s .  For in  extending 
the  bounds of the s e l f  beycnd the body I t  becomes tho roans  
by i#hich rran makes h im self  at homo in the world, w h i le  as a 
s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n  i t  i f fo rd a  t h a t  r o c o g r i t i o n  by o th e r s  which 
tho s e l f  roqulroa .
in tho d i s t i n c t i o n  between roa,l o r  p sycho log ica l
II
ard l e g a l  ownership we see  i t  as an e x p r e ss io n  o f  w i l l , which 
im p l ie s  an elomont o f  d e s i r e .  As such i t  i s  a means o f  s y s -  
t o n i t i s i n g  and d i r e c t in g  tho a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the s e l f ,  thus  
c o n tr ib u t in g  to the or ,^anisat ion  c f  the so n t im o n ts ,  which con- 
s t i t u t o  the ch a ra c ter .  In r i s i n g  to  the l e v e l  o f  a sent im en t  
owner hip p ivoc  i t s  f r l l e s t  co n tr ib u t io n  to the charactorp  
tho e t h i c a l  va lue  o f  v;hich depends however on i t s  taking  a 
subordinate  p la ce  in o th e r  sen t im en ts  o f  a h igher  order .  In 
so doing i t  becomes co n tr ib u to ry  to the p ro cess  o f " s o u l -  
raking" by which from tho impulses and omotions tho s e l f  
c r o a te s  a s t a b l e  "world" o f  se n t  in e r t s .
But tho f a c t  o f  ownership which we have boon con­
s i d e r i n g  , in v o lv e s  an underly ing  e t h i c a l  problem o f  r i g h t ,  
and i t  IS the problem o f  the foundation  o f  the r i g h t  o f  
ownership which o c c u p ie s  us in the second part  o f  the o s s a y .  
This IS a q u e s t io n  tha t  has r ece iv ed  the a t t e n t i o n  o f  p h i l o ­
sophers  froc. the time o f  Locke down to  the p res en t  day, and 
our treatment w i l l  th e r e fo r e  take the form o f  a c r i t i c a l  
examination o f  some o f  t h e i r  v iews.  -  In basing the r i g h t  
o f  ownership,  or  property as ho ter n s  i t ,  on the  r i g h t s  o f  
p e r s o n a l i t y ,  Locke determines our method o f  treatment^ the  
air. o f  which i s  to  bring to l i g h t  tho grounds on which the
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r i g h t  o f  o*n$rahip in  based ,  and in so doing to a rr iva  a t  an 
ddequato ccneapt ion  o f  i t s  meaning. For tho idaa c f  owner­
sh ip  i s  insoparab io  from th a t  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  and we can unly  
c r i t i c i s e  a theory o f   ^ roporty in  the l i g h t  o f  tho theory  o f  
p e r s o n a l i t y  which u n d e r l i e s  i t .
An answer to our q u e s t io n  i s  sought  from tho two 
opposing s c h o o l s  o f  Empiricism and Id e a l i s m .  Tho f a i l u r e  o f  
E r p ir ic ia r  to c f f o r  any s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  i s  traced  to  
i l s  uripaiiooov.hicàl con cept ion  o f  tho s e l f  in tcn:.n c f  purely  
e x t e r n a l  r c fa r e n c o ,  and we arc th o r e fo r e  o b l ig e d  to re tr a c e  
our from tho l o g i c a l  c o n c lu s io n  o f  Locko's  h i s t o r i c a l ,
p la in ^  method to  the c r i t i c a l  method o f  Kant, which s o t s  us 
upon tho road to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  treatm ent o f  p o r s o n a l i t y .  
Though the fundajrontal d u a l i s e  o f  h i s  ph ilosophy  p rec lu d e s  
Kant fror  c o n tr ib u t in g  an adequate theory o f  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  he 
l a y s  th3 foundaittona on which F i c h t e ' s  concept ion  c f  property  
1 6  an instrument o f  froed cc  i s  based .  Hogal in tro d u ces  the  
idea o f  prOi :;rty the sphere o f  c z to r n a l  freedom o r  as 
"rcaliaod  w i l l " , and in h i s  t r e a t  wo f in d  the f i r ^ t  adequate  
th c o r io 6  o f  ; c r s o n a l i t y  and  ^ z'o\ $ r t y . Tho s o c i a l  aapoct o f  
tho r ig h t  o f  pro% er ty  i s  crq h as isod  by T. lu Green ,in  h i s  
con cept ion  o f  the corron grcd an a r c r u l a t i v o  p r i n c i p l e .
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Bosanquot co n tr ib u ted  tho fu r th e r  idoa o f  property  
as tho p r i n c i p l e  o f  u n i t y ,  which e a t a b l ia h e a  a corrsspondonco  
botwoon tho inner world o f  tho moral nature and tho o u te r  
world o f  f a c t a ,  thus en a b l in g  the in d iv id u a l  to  make h io  
b e s t  c o n t r ib u t io n  to tho corron good. In t h i s  id ea  o f  owner­
sh ip  aa c o n tr ib u t in g  to  the corron good by p rov id in g  a b a s i s  
o f  u n ity  fo r  tho in d iv id u a l  l i f e  vo  a r r iv e  at  a meaning o f  
ownership which i s  at tho aano time the ground o f  i t s  e t h i c a l  
J u s t i f i c a t i o n .  But our p s y c h o lo g ic a l  a n a l y s i s  led  uc to  J u s t  
t h i s  r e a r in g  o f  ownership as c o n t r ib u t in g  to  the u n i ty  o f  
ch a ra c te r  by tho o r g a n i s a t io n  o f  the  s e n t i r o r t s .  The e t h i c a l  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  ownorshi- i s  thus found to be co n d it io n ed  
by i t s  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  r e a r in g .
The concept ion  o f  property  as s tew ardship  with  
which we concludo ,  s e e r s  to our. up the r e s u l t s  o f  our two­
fo ld  enquiry .  For i t  er^han isos  tho p o s i t i v e  a sp ec t  o f  
ownership as an o b l i g a t i o n  to c o n tr ib u te  to the corron good,  
in which i t s  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s  found, and has moreover the  
c e n t  o f  in c lu d in g  the idea  c f  p ersona l  agency and a c t i v i t y ,  
which wo have soon to be o s s o n t i a l  to ownership .  -  Tho term 
has been rondorod oo f a m i l i a r  to us by the Row T cs ta ro n t  
treatm ent  o f  ownership ,  th a t  to conclude with  i t  r.ay seer
l i k e  ending on a p l a t i t u d e .  But the  va lue  o f  an e t h i c a l  
enquiry doos not l i e  in i t n  a r r iv in g  at any o r i g i n a l  or  
s t a r t l i n g  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  but in tho method ; by which i t  
examinofl q u r n t io r s ,  which to ccrx :n  sense  appear o b v io u s .  
I f  cur enquiry has been guidod by sound p r i n c i p l e s  i t  may 
ther»^fcrc provide a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  b a s i s  for  fu r th e r  t r e a t ­
ment o f  the s u b j e c t .
Chapter  I .
The I n s t i n c t i v e  B a s is  o f  Ownership.
Host o f  the o ld e r  p s y c h o l o g i s t s  ignore the q u e s t io n
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o f  tho b a s i s  o f  ownership,  and Bain and Spencer who dea l  with  
i t ,  do so on ly  in tho b r i e f e s t  and most cursory manner, 
approaching the q u e s t io n  from the s ta n d p o in t  o f  the  em o t io n s . 
Bain does not re co g n ise  an i n s t i n c t i v e  b a s i s  o f  ownership^but  
accounts  fo r  the f e e l i n g s  connected with property  by the  
sense  o f  v a lu e ,  which accrues  from the advantages der ived  
from p o s s e s s io n s *  But a sen se  o f  va lue  presupposes  the  very  
exp er ien ce  which i t  i s  here cade to e x p la in .  The r e a l  ques­
t io n  at i s s u e  i s  obscured,  by i t s  r e d u c t io n ,  in the p h i l o s o ­
phy o f  Bain, to  t o n  s  o f  f e e l i n g .  Spencer regards the lo v e  
o f  property  as an emotion, and accounts f o r  i t  by the  p r i n c i ­
p le  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n .  Constant r e p e t i t i o n ,  as hé p uts  i t ,  s e t s  
up an organ ised  connexion between memory and the s t a t e  o f  
c o n s c io u s n e s s  in which the p ro ce s s  r e s u l t s .  An organ ised  
connexion however, does not in i t s e l f  c o n s t i t u t e  a tendency ,  
and Spencer* s argument presupposes  an o r i g i n a l  im pulse ,  which  
cannot be accounted fo r  by a s s o c i a t i o n ,  s in c e  i t  i s  i t s e l f  
the c o n d it io n  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n .
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I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  o f  a change o f  ou t look  th a t  p ro -  
sont-day  p s y c h o l o g i s t s  t r o a t  ownership under the  heading o f  
tho i n s t i n c t s ,  r a th er  than o f  the em otions .  Experience i s  
no lo n g er  expressed  in terrriS o f  f e e l i n g ,  and the b a s i s  o f  
ownership i s  sought in an impulse to a c t i o n ,  ra th e r  than in 
p le a s u r e .  »îe may d i s t i n g u i s h  two main s e n s e s  in which the  
term i n s t i n c t  i s  understood.  There i s  f i r s t  the  o ld e r  and 
t r a d i t i o n a l  meaning g iven  to  i t  by James, Lloyd Horg an and 
Shand, who regard i t  as an impulse to perform c e r t a in  spe­
c i f i c  k inds o f  a c t io n ,  fo r  the e x e cu t io n  o f  which th e re  i s  
a c o n g e n i ta l  a p t i t u d e .  There are many p o in t s  o f  d i f f e r e n c e  
in t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  v iews;  but th a t  they agree on t h i s  main 
co n ten t io n  may be seen from the fo l lo w in g  q u o ta t io n s :
Shand: "That which i s  i n s t i n c t i v e  i s  not acquired through
" exper ience ,  but i s  due to  in h e r i t e d  endowment." 
I n s t i n c t  i s  "an in h e r i t e d  d i s p o s i t i o n  both to be . 
"exc ited  by c e r t a in  s t i m u l i  and to  respond with  a 
" s p e c i f i c  kind o f  behaviour ."
James: I n s t i n c t  i s  the " fa cu lty  o f  a c t in g  in such a
"way as to  produce c e r t a in  ends,  w ithout  f o r e s i g h t  
"of the ends and without  p rev io u s  educat ion  in the
1.  The Foundations o f  Character ,  p. 181 & 182.
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"performance. . . .  V/ith the presence  o f  a c e r t a in
"organ goes  . . .  almost al?rays a n a t iv e  a p t i tu d e
1
"for i t s  u s e . "
Lloyd Morgan; " I n s t i n c t i v e  behaviour i s  a more or l e s s  com- 
"plex,  organ ic  or b i o l o g i c a l  response to  a more 
"or l e s s  complex group o f  s t i m u l i  o f  e x t e r n a l  and 
" in te r n a l  o r i g i n ,  and i t  i s  as such wholly dépend­
ront on how the organism, and e s p e c i a l l y  the  n e r -
"vous system and brain  c e n t r e s ,  have been b u i l t
2
"through h e r e d i ty ."
The second in t e r p r e t a t i o n  departs  from the t r a d i ­
t i o n a l  v iew ,  in g iv in g  a fa r  wider a p p l i c a t io n  to  the term. 
I t s  c h i e f  exponents  are I r o f .  S tout  and Dr. HcDougall,  in  
whose view the  mark o f  an i n s t i n c t  i s  not " co n g en i ta l  a p t i -  
tudos f o r  e x e c u t in g  movements, but c o n g e n i ta l  d i s p o s i t i o n s
lo a d in g  to  c e r t a in  appropriate  modes o f  behaviour under c e r -
3
t a i n  s p e c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s ."
All the above w r i t e r s  are agreed in regarding  
i n s t i n c t  as an impulse to  a c t io n ;  but they d i f f e r  as to  the  
type o f  a c t io n  to which i t  conforms. James and Lloyd Morgan
1 .  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  Î s y c h o lo g y , Vol.  I I ,  p. 383.
2 .  I n s t i n c t  & Exper ience ,  p. 5 .
3 .  S t o u t ' s  Manual o f  Psychology (1 9 1 4 ) ,  p .  36C.
regard i t  as b o lo r g ir g  to  tho g o r o r a l ,  complex, r e f l e x - 2 . 
S to u t ,  ohand ar.d HcDougall,  on tho o th e r  hard, omphaslsethe  
co n a t iv e  ch a ra c te r  o f  i n s t i n c t i v e  behaviour ,  and regard i t  
as o c o e n t i a l l y  a s t r i v i n g  towards an ond. Row wo nay speak  
o f  an i n s t i n c t i v e  element in ownership ,  whichever o f  those  
th o o r io s  we adopt. Out the c o n g e n i ta l  a p t i tu d e  f o r  s e i z i n g  
and grasping  o b j e c t s ,  which rakos i t s  ap*oaranco in  the  
th ir d  month o f  a c h i l d ' s  l i f e ,  dooo not  g iv e  us a broad 
enough b a s i s  or which to found tho f a c t  c f  ownership; and 
wo have th e r e fo r e  adopted the a l t e r n a t i v e  th e o r y ,  in the  
forr. g iv e r  to i t  by Xrof .  3 t o u t ,  aa being  the roro comp r e -  
honsivo  o f  tho two.
i r o f .  James seems to  havo boon tho f i r s t  to recog­
n is e  "a p r o p r ie ta r y  i n s t i n c t " .  "The beg inning  o f  a c q u i s i -
c K » ldTe>\
t iv o n o c s"  ho sa y s  "arc soon in the impulse which very young ^ 
" d isp la y ,  to  snatch  a t ,  or  bog f o r ,  any o b j e c t  which 
"ploasou th o ir  a t t e n t i o n .  Later when they begin  to s p e a k ,I
"among the f i r s t  words they omphasioo are "me" and "mine". 
"Thoir e a r l i e s t  q u a r r e l s  with each o th e r  are about quo.:- 
, " l i e n s  o f  o w n e r s h ip . . . .Of tho l a t e r  e v o lu t io n  o f  the  
"proprietary  i n s t i n c t  I need not s p e a k . . .  When another  
"io in  p o s s e s s io n  tho impulse to appropriate  tho th ing
5 .
"often turns  to  the impulse to harm h i m . . .  A v a r i e t y  o f  
"the p ro p r ie ta r y  i n s t i n c t  i s  the impulse to form c o l l e c t -  
"ions o f  the sane s o r t  o f  t h in g ."
Via havo here an undoubtedly tru e  account o f  the  
f i r s t  b eg in n in g s  o f  ownership,  as seen in the impulse o f  a 
c h i ld  to s e i z e  any o b je c t  th a t  p l e a s e s  him. But the r e s t  
o f  the paragraph o v e r s t e p s  the bounds s e t  by Janes* own d e f ­
i n i t i o n  o f  i n s t i n c t .  I f ,  as he h o ld s ,  an i n s t i n c t i v e  act  i s  
r e f l e x  in ty p e ,  and i s  c a l l e d  fo r th  by determ inate  sensory  
s t i m u l i , how can there  be an e v o l u t io n  o f  the p r o p r ie ta r y  
i n s t i n c t  in the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  l i f e t i m e ?  Again, the  impulse  
to form c o l l e c t i o n s  has noth ing  o f  the  nature o f  a r e f l e x  
a c t ,  nor has i t  any o f  the d i s t i n c t i v e  marks o f  an i n s t i n c t ,  
as d e f in ed  by James. I t  i s  however the d e f i n i t i o n  ^not the  
d e s c r i p t i o n ,  th a t  i s  at  f a u l t ;  fo r  i t  i s  too narrow to cover  
a l l  the  f a c t s ,  which carry one q u i t é  beyond i t s  intended  
l i m i t s .
• Dr. HcDougall ranks a c q u i s i t i v e n e s s  among those
i n s t i n c t s  which though they  "play but a minor part  in ,
2
"the g e n e s i s  o f  the em otions ,  have im pulses  th a t  are
1 .  P r i n c i p l e s  pf P sych o logy ,  Vol. I I ,  p. 422.
2 .  S o c ia l  P sych o logy ,  p. 82,
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o f  groat  importance fo r  s o c i a l  l i f e H
Ho mentions four c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which d i s t i n g u i s h  i t  as a
true i n s t i n c t :
1.  That i t  i s  almost u n iv e r s a l  among human b e in g s  in
the impulse to  hoard and c o l l e c t .
3 .  That i t  i s  m an ifes ted  among animals in the  blind^  
u n i n t e l l i g e n t  manner th a t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  a true i n s t i n c t
3.  That l i k e  o th e r  i n s t i n c t i v e  impulses i t  i s  l i a b l e  
to  become morbidly ex a g g era ted ,  e.g:^ in the c o l l e c t i n g  mania,
m i s e r l i n e s s  and kleptom ania .
4,  That i t  r ip e n s  n a tu r a l l y  w ithout  t r a i n i n g ,  -  a t
l e a s t  in the form o f  c o l l e c t i n g .
We w i l l  co n f in e  o u r s e lv e s  to  the f i r s t  two p o i n t s  ^
beginning  with the  second, which i s  a q u e s t io n  o f  comparative  
p sych o logy .  On the subhuman l e v e l  the s im p le s t  m a n i fe s ta ­
t i o n s  o f  a c q u i s i t i v e n e s s  can be s t u d ie d ,  w ithout  the compli­
c a t io n s  which obscure i t s  e s s e n t i a l  ch a ra c ter  in man. The 
comparative method has been a p p l ied  to t h i s  s u b je c t  in two 
re ce n t  works, the one a study o f  morbid psychology e n t i t l e d  
L*Origin© de 1* A v a r ic e , by H. Rogues de Pursac,  the o th e r  a 
s o c i o l o g i c a l  study c a l l e d  "Les O r ig in es  n a t u r e l l e s  do l a
1.  S o c ia l  P sy ch o lo g y ,  p. 82.
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PropriGto" by M. R. P o tr u c c i ,  a member o f  the Solvay I n s t i ­
t u t e ,  B r u s s e l s .  M. P e tr u c c i  regards property  or ownership  
as a n a tu ra l  f a c t ,  which e x i s t e d  b e fo re  any l e g a l  o r g a n is a ­
t i o n ,  and which i s  merely sa n c t io n ed  by the  law. I t  i s ,  he 
s a y s , the  r e s u l t  o f  an i n s t i n c t i v e  tendency?^in t h a t  i t  has  
i t s  o r i g i n  in the s t r u c tu r e  o f  m an ,' in  the  forms o f  h i s  
a c t i v i t i e s  and in  h i s  s o c i a l  s e n s e .  The e s sa y  i s  an attempt  
to  t r a c e  the  course  o f  tho e v o lu t io n  o f  p r o p e r ty ,  w ith  a 
view to reducing i t  to  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  t e r n s .  **Je t e n t e r a i  
d*appliquer  a phenomenon s o c i a l  c e t t e  nethode comparative  
qui a donne ta n t  de r é s u l t a t s  fru ctu  eux dans l e s  s c i e n c e s  
b i o l o g i q u e s . ” I t  g iv e s  a s o r t  o f  n a tu ra l  h i s t o r y  o f  
ownership,  beg inning  with the f i r s t  s i g n s  o f  husbandry in 
the  v e g e ta b le  world, and f o l lo w in g  i t s  m a n i f e s t a t io n s  up 
the s c a l e  o f  tho animal world to  man. As a compendium o f  
examples tho es sa y  i s  in v a lu a b le ;  the t r a i t  a c q u i s i t i v e n e s s  
p a s s e s  be fore  us in long p r o c e s s io n  through the v a r io u s  
s t a g e s  o f  animal e v o l u t io n .  We are shown the  f i r s t  beg in ­
n ings  o f  ownership or  p ro p e r ty ,  rooted in the very nature  
o f  t h i n g s ,  because i t  i s  the outcome o f  the organ ism 's  
n e c e s s i t y  fo r  adapting i t s e l f  to i t s  environment. This
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adaptat ion  n e c e s s a r i l y  ta k e s  the  form o f  a p p r o p r ia t in g , an , 
a c t  which i s  thus the f i r s t  determ inant o f  the f a c t  o f  owner­
sh ip  or p ro p er ty .
In the c l o s e  connexion between the c o n s t i t u e n t s  o f  
ownership and the primary need fo r  food we have what we might  
almost c a l l  an a ] ^ i o M  argument for  an i n s t i n c t i v e  b a s i s  o f  
ownership.  I t  i s  a connexion which can never r i g h t l y  bo 
d iv o rc ed ,  and which we meet l a t e r  in Locke's  argument th a t
the r ig h t  o f  property  i s  based on labour .
Row we can ^if we l i k e ^ c a l l  the  impulse to  e a t  an
i n s t i n c t ,  and say th a t  ownership has i t s  r o o t s  in i t .  But
t h i s  vould be g iv in g  the  tern  i n s t i n c t  such an extended  
a p p l i c a t i o n ,  as to  rob i t  o f  i t s  r e a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  There 
i s  no s p e c i a l  kind o f  behaviour u n i v e r s a l l y  connected w ith  
the  ap propr ia t ion  o f  food ,  which marks i t  as an i n s t i n c t ,  
in the accepted  sense  o f  the term. But among some animals  
a s p e c i a l  form o f  appropr ia t ing  food r e s u l t s  in c l e a r l y  
marked l i n e s  o f  behaviour ,  which nay w e l l  have become a 
r a c i a l  in h o r i ta n c o .  This i s  tho h a b i t  o f  s t o r in g  and hoard­
ing fo o d jd isp la y e d  by many an im als .  H. do Pursac t r e a t s  
t h i s  t r a i t  under the heading o f  "épargné", a word only  very  
in adequate ly  rendered by the E nglish  word 'economy.'  He
9 .
draws a t t e n t i o n  to  the p u z z l in g  want o f  order  in which i t  
appears; per example, i t  i s  found among i n s e c t s  and not  
among f i s h e s ,  though th o se  are h igher  in the  z o o l o g i c a l  
s c a l e ,  among rodents  but not among monkeys, and so on.
I t  soom.s to be no in d i c a t io n  o f  mental development,  as at  
f i r s t  s i g h t  one would expect  i t  to be. But t h i s  lack  o f  
order turns  out to  be only apparent,  the ex p la n a t io n  being  
found in the c o n d i t io n s  o f  the a n im al 's  environment and in 
i t s  way o f  l i v i n g .  "Economy" re q u ir e s  the f o l lo w in g  con­
d i t i o n s  fo r  i t s  development in the anir^al world:
1.  That the  animal i s  not migratory in i t s  
h a b i t s .
2 .  That i t  i s  su b jec ted  to t imes o f  recu rr ing  
s c a r c i t y  o f  food.
3 .  That the  food on which i t  s u b s i s t s  i s  o f  a 
kind th a t  lends  i t s e l f  to  s t o r i n g .
These c o n d i t i o n s  account for  the apparently  haphazard way 
in which tho phenomenon i s  d i s t r i b u t e d .  11. de Fursac  
approaches the  s u b je c t  from a s t r i c t l y  b i o l o g i c a l  p o in t  o f  
view; ho s e e s  in the  h a b it  o f  s t o r i n g  food an a p p l i c a t io n  
o f  the law t h a t  governs a l l  b i o l o g i c a l  f u n c t io n s .  To quote
h i s  own words:
"Comme l e s  au tres  f o n c t io n s  b i o l o g i q u e s ,  i*épargné  
" c o n s t i tu e  un modod&daptation a des c o n d i t io n s
1C.
" d 'e x i s t e n c e  doterrinefis; e l l e  appara it  quand l e  m i l i e u
"le rend n é c e s s a i r e . "
The impulse e x p r e s s e s  i t s e l f  in s e v e r a l  ways:
1.  In the  s t o r in g  o f  f o o d - s u p p l i e s  which are  
re so r ted  to  in t im es  o f  s c a r c i t y .
2 .  In the occupation  o f  foed ing-grou n ds .
3.  Wore r a r e ly  in the hoarding o f  o b j e c t s  u n f i t  
fo r  fo o d .
The f o l lo w in g  are a few examples o f  the t r a i t :
1.  The s t o r in g  o f  food s u r p a i e s ,
a. B i r d s . The t o m - t i t  and the common nutcracker  make gran­
a r i e s  in the h o le s  o f  t r e e s  and in rocks .  The b lue  wood­
pecker or n u t - jo b b er  m u l t i p l i e s  h i s  s t o r e s ,  thus d im in ish ­
ing r i s k s  from p i l f e r e r s .  The woodpecker makes l i t t l e
round h o le s  in the bark o f  p in e s  and oaks ,  in each o f  which
2
ho i n s e r t s  an acorn. Rooks havo been knovrn to  carry
o f f  wheat from newly mown f i e l d s  and make d e p o s i t s  o f  i t
3
for  fu ture  use .  Tho butcher bird amasses p r o v i s i o n s  
by impaling h i s  prey on th o rn s .
1 .  L'O rigine  do 1 * A v a r ic e , p. 1C.
2 .  Quoted by U, de Fursac from Journal Nature fo r  Ju ly  2 0 ,1 8 7 4
3 .  See Appendix A.
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b. Mammals. The t r a i t  i s  developed most f u l l y  among r o d en ts .  
The s q u i r r e l  makes h i s  drawer in t r e e s ,  h o le s  and underbushes.
— Sandrats cut  ea r s  o f  corn and drag them,to  t h e i r  burrows. 
\7hat they do ro t  e a t  they thresh  and s t o r e .  As much as a .  
bushel  o f  gra in  w i l l  sometimes bo found in one o f  t h e i r  bur­
rows .  ^ -  F ie ld -m ice  c o l l e c t  r o o t s ,  p o t a t o e s ,  nuts and grain
in t h o ir  h o l e s .  -  The Alpine p ica  makes la r g e  s t o r e s  o f  hay,
2
which i t  covers  with l e a v e s .  -  The mole wounds ea r th  worms 
in such a way as to  p a ra ly se  them, thus p ro v id in g  i t s e l f  w ith  
a s t o r e  o f  frosh  meat. The above, with the  ex c e p t io n  o f  th e  
r o l e ,  belong to  grain  and r o o t - e a t i n g  mammals, and th e s e  fu r ­
n ish  the b e s t  examples o f  a c q u i s i t i v e n e s s .  The rudiments o f  
the  same t r a i t  nay be seen in the  h a b i t s  o f  the j a c k a l ,  the  
f o x ,  the w o lf  and the dog, whc bury t h e i r  su p erf lu ou s ,  b ooty .  
But the nature o f  the food o b v io u s ly  does not lend i t s e l f  to  
a development o f  the t r a i t .  The h a b it  o f  the domestic  dog 
who, w ithout  p rev io u s  e x p e r ie n c e ,  w i l l  go through th e  pre­
tence  o f  burying h i s  bone on the ca r p e t ,  p o in t s  s t r o n g ly  to  
the  prompting o f  an i n s t i n c t i v e  impulse .
2 . The occupat ion  o f  feed in g  grounds.
1 .  O r ig in es  n a t u r e l l e s  de l a  P r o p r ié té .  H. P e t r u c c i ,  p. 138.
2 .  O p e i l ,  p. 139.
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a. Birds': I t  i s  w e l l  known th a t  rob in s  haunt w e l l  d e f ined
l i m i t s  in a gardon, any t r e s p a s s i n g  or which by o th e r  ro b in s
i s  f i o r c o l y  r e s e n te d .  -  Uoorhonc w i l l  take p o s s e s s io n  o f
d i s t r i c t s  in tho v i c i n i t y  o f  w ater ,  from which they w i l l
dr ive  o f f  a l l  members o f  the samo s p e c i e s  and even o th e r  
%
b ir d s .  The Egyptian goose ho lds  sway over an e n t i r e  d i s ­
t r i c t ,  ty r a n n iz in g  over  o th e r  b ird s  and even a t ta c k in g  men.
b. Mammals. Borne dogs m a n ife s t  a s tro n g  p ro p r ie ta r y  i n s t i n c t
in the p r o t e c t io n  they extend to t h e i r  m a s te r ' s  property  as 
\
w e l l  as to h i s  person .  An example o f  t h i s  was.onoe recounted  
to me by an I r i s h  farmer. His land abutted on a rampart road 
from which i t  was d iv ided  by a boundary-d itch .  He t o ld  me 
tha t  h i s  dog would a llow  no s t r a n g e r  to cr o s s  t h i s  d i t c h  a f t e r  
n i g h t f a l l ;  at the same time h i s  p u r s u i t  o f  a t r e s p a s s e r  was 
always conf ined  s t r i c t l y  to  the l i m i t a  o f  h i s  m a s te r ' s  pro­
p e r ty .  My own Airedale  -a s  on bad terms with  a neighbouring  
chow, and waa in the h a b it  o f  p a t r o l l i n g  the f r o n t  o f  the  
house,  ready, should the chow put in an appearance , to  e s c o r t
him to the door o f  h i s  m a s te r ' s  house ,  growling the w h i le  as 
i t
i f  to mako^cloar that  he regarded him as a t r e s p a s s e r .  -  
The sem i-w ild  horses  o f  America go in herds which keep to  w e l l
1 .  O y c i t ,  p. 110.
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dofinod p a s t u r s s ,  oach herd defending i t s  ovin d i s t r i c t  a g a in s t
the in t r u s io n  o f  o t h e r s .
3 .  S to r e s  o f  in c d ib lo  o b j e c t s .
This kind o f  hoarding secr.s to  bo a s o r t  o f  by 
product o f  the impulse vre have been c o n s id e r in g .  Examples 
are found, among jackdaws, m agpies ,  dogs and r a t s ,  a l l  o f  
whom beiong to  the same f a m i l i e s  as those  animals which
hoard fo r  food .^  Two unique in s t a n c e s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  are 
worthy o f  a p a s s in g  r e fe r e n c e  horc ,  though, in the  absence  
o f  s u f f i c i e n t  e v id e n c e ,  i t  i s  im poss ib le  to  dogmatise as to  
t h e i r  o r i g i n  and meaning. We r e f e r  to the b iscach a  and the  
bower bird^mentioned by Darwin in h i s  Voyage o f  the B e a g le .  
The b i s c a c h a ,  in a p p e a ra n c e ' l ik e  a la r g e  r a b b i t ,  c o l l e c t s  
a l l  s o r t s  o f  hard b r ig h t  o b j e c t s  which i t  arranges round
#
the mouth o f  i t s  burrow^while the  bower b ird  b u i l d s  a bower
o f  g r a s s e s  and f lo w e r s ,  which i t  d eco r a te s  with s h e l l s ,
2
s t o n e s ,  e t c .
The above examples o f  hoarding seem .to  us to  p o i n t  
to the e x i s t e n c e  o f  an i n s t i n c t i v e  impulse in the  animals  
concerned . For c e r t a in  c o n d i t io n s  have been shorn to  r e s u l t  
in c e r t a in  appropriate  modes o f  behaviour .  This does not
1. For examples see  Appendix B.
2 .  See Appendix C.
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however in i t s e l f  amount to a proof  th a t  tho samo typo o f  
behaviour in man i s  due to a s i m i l a r  i n s t i n c t i v e  im pulse ,  
though i t  s t r o n g ly  s u g g e s t s  tho p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i t .  The 
argument from comparative psychology  would bo very much 
s trengthened  however, i f  i t  could be shown th a t  the in%)Ulso 
which i s  adm itted ly  i n s t i n c t i v e  among an im als ,  wore the  
product o f  s i m i l a r  c o n d i t io n s  among non . There are in d i c a ­
t i o n s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  s o ,  though the ev id en ce  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  
/
scanty  and at  b e s t  n e g a t iv e  in k ind. For example, the  Terra  
d e l  Puogians and the Bushmen o f  A u s tr a l ia  seer, to  be e n t i r e l y  
la c k in g  in the  im pulse .  On our theory t h i s  would be exp la in ed  
by the f a c t  th a t  they are nomadic_^and l i v e  by hunting and 
f i s h i n g ,  two c o n d i t i o n s  which would m i l i t a t e  a g a in s t  the  
development o f  the i n s t i n c t .
We w i l l  row co n s id er  the c o l l e c t i n g  h a b i t s  o f  
c h i ld r e n ,  which Dr. HeDougall c i t e s  as an argument fo r  the  
i n s t i n c t  o f  a c q u i s i t i v e n e s s  in man. The way in which t h i s  
t r a i t  i s  p laced  in J u x ta p o s i t io n  with the hoarding h a b i t s  
o f  animals i s ,  in our o p in io n ,  very m is le a d in g ;  fo r  i t  sug­
g e s t s  th a t  tho two correspond to  one another and are on a 
par. But t h i s  idea  i s  only  warranted by the s u p e r f i c i a l  
l i k e n e s s  between them, with the r e s u l t  o f  obscur ing  the  tru e
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i s s u e  and o f  m in im is ing  the importance o f  the whole q u e s t io n  
Thoro i s ,  as a m atter  o f  f a c t ,  no exac t  e q u iv a le n t  on the  
hui.an l e v e l  o f  the s q u i r r e l ' s  drawer, or o f  tho s a n d r a t ' s  
s t o r e  o f  nuts  and r o o t s ;  to look fo r  one at  a l l  argues a 
f a i l u r e  to  grasp the e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between tho two 
l e v e l s  o f  l i f e .  Im pulses ,  which may be purely  i n s t i n c t i v e  
in an animal,  arc never found in the same s i m p l i c i t y  on the  
human level^whore they are com plicated  by innumerable o th er  
f a c t o r s .  But i f  we wished to  d i s c o v e r  the outcome o f  t h i s  
impulse in man, i t  would be nearer  the mark to look fo r  i t  
in the Bank o f  England and the Corn Exchange ^than in the  
c o l l e c t i n g  h a b i t s  o f  c h i ld r e n .
I t  i s  usual to la y  s t r e s s  on the u n i v e r s a l i t y  o f  
the h ab it  o f  c o l l e c t i n g  ; and P ro f .  James says  in t h i s  con­
n e c t io n  t h a t ,  out o f  a hundred s tu d e n ts  whom he q u e s t io n e d ,  
only  four or f i v o  had never c o l l e c t e d  anyth ing .  He a l s o  
r e f e r s  to some s t a t i s t i c s  drawn up by S ta n ley  H a l l ,  which 
show th a t  out o f  two hundred and twenty nine s e l e c t e d  boys  
only  n in e te e n  had never made c o l l e c t i o n s .  But ivo cannot  
r o a l l y  i n f e r  much from th e s e ,  or  any o th e r  s t a t i s t i c s ,  a t  
p r e s en t  forthcoming; for  one t h i n g ,  they are too few in  
number to g iv e  ground fo r  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n , and f o r  another ,  
they are a l l  taken from much too s e l o c t e d  a r e a s ,  such as
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b ig  c i t y  s c h o o l s .  Those s t a t i s t i c s  scorn moreover to  p o in t  
to  s u g g e s t io n  and im ita t io n ^ a s  e x p la in in g  a very la r g e  pro­
p o r t io n  o f  c o l l e c t i o n s .  Miss Burk has made an e la b o r a te  
a n a l y s i s  o f  some s t a t i s t i c s  taken from twelve  hundred and 
four teen  c h i ld r e n ,  showing th a t  only e i g h t  per c e n t ,  o f  the  
c o l l e c t i o n s  seem to  have o r i g in a t e d  in any i n i t i a l  impulse  
on the p a rt  o f  the ch i ld re n  th e m se lv es .  She says  "There are
la r g e  b la z e s  which spread ra p id ly  and w id e ly ,  and sm all  b la z e s
1
th a t  s t i l l  a f f e c t  t h o i r  many."
The most s t r i k i n g  d i f f e r e n c e  between the  hoards o f
animals and the  c o l l e c t i o n s  o f  c h i ld r e n ,  i s  seen in the com­
p l e t e  d ivorce  o f  the l a t t e r  from any b i o l o g i c a l  end. In t h i s  
r e s p e c t  they resemble the few in s t a n c e s  o f  p u r p o s e le s s  c o l ­
l e c t i n g  found among b ird s  and ro d en ts .  The ex p la n a t io n  i s  
probably to be found in the  a l t e r e d  c o n d i t io n s  .of l i f e  which 
are duo to human development, e s p e c i a l l y  in the  le n g th e n in g  
o f  the per iod  o f  childhood and o f  dependence, which, by 
removing the pressure  o f  want, has deprived the p r o p r ie ta r y
N. A m iss ionary  with  3C years  ex p er icr c o  among Indian c h i l ­
dren to ld  me she had never seen any s ig n  o f  the  c o l l e c t i n g  
h ab it  among th e s e  ; she h e r s e l f  was in c l in e d  to  a t t r i b u t e  
i t  to t h e i r  extreme p overty .
1.  C. F. Burk : The C o l l e c t i n g  I n s t i n c t  in P ed agog ica l
Sominary, for  1900, p. 187.
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impulse o f  i t s  o r i g i n a l  o u t l o t .  Ihus t h i s  im pulse ,  in r e s ­
ponding to a l t e r e d  c o n d i t io n s  now s e r v e s  new ends,  and has 
ceased to bo pure ly  i n s t i n c t i v e .  The appearance o f  the  
h a b it  o f  c o l l e c t i n g ,  as vro know i t ,  sy n ch ro n ize s  w ith  the  
age o f  g r e a t e s t  s e l f - a s s e r t i o n ,  coming to  i t s  h e ig h t  at  ton .
I t  may w e l l  be that  as the needs o f  the body account fo r
the r i s e  o f  the h a b i t  in i t s  o r i g i n a l  form, so the  needs o f  the
s e l f  c o n tr o l  the form under which i t  i s  now found. For the
f a c t o r  o f  the s e l f  e n te r s  in to  every a sp e c t  o f  the c o l l e c t i n g  
h a b i t .  A c o l l e c t i o n  i s  something in which the c h i ld  f in d s  
s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  i t  i s  noth ing  i f  not p e r s o n a l .  In g iv in g  re in  
to an impulse forged o r i g i n a l l y  fo r  q u i t e  o th er  ends ,  he 
f in d s  an o u t l e t  and a s a t i s f a c t i o n  fo r  the s e l f ,  a t  an age 
when o th e r  channels  fo r  t h i s  impulse are s t i l l  few. I t  i s ,  
in our o p in io n ,  a mistake to found a d i r e c t  argument fo r  the  
i n s t i n c t i v e  b a s i s  o f  ownership on the c o l l e c t i n g  h a b i t s  o f  
c h i ld r e n ,  though they c e r t a i n l y  fu r n ish  c o l l a t e r a l  ev idence  
fo r  i t s  e x i s t e n c e .
TliE INSTINCTIVE LASIS OF Cwî.SÎÎGKIi .
Appendix Rof. to P . 1 0 .
” A Sussex n a t u r a l i s t  t o l l s  ua th a t  rooks hav- boon
krcwn to p lace  wheat in tho grassy  bottom o f  bunches of  heather  
dpd return to n c f l y —sown f i e l d s  for  z e r o .  They have aloC 
been known to d e p o s i t  bar ley  beneath sods cut  out o f  the d i t -  
che;i used fo r  i r r i g a t i o n  purposes in water meadows. Acorns 
arc hid in a more permanent s t o r e ,  the cen tre  o f  a s tun tod  
bush, among tho low branches o f  which g ra s s  has sprung up and 
interwoven: such a s i t e  i s  l i k e l y  to bo swept bare o f  snow by
tho wind at the  time o f  heavy f a l l s  Two rooks a f t e r  making
a good rep a s t  in a garden, d e l i b e r a t e l y  buried four p i e c e s  o f  
broad in four d i f f e r e n t  beds sore  d is ta n c e  apart .  Later  on 
they re tu rn ed ,  dug up t h e i r  food ,  and ato i t . "
( "uotcd froir "Country S ide" ,  Juno 17, 19CB, 
in J .  Chappel's  "Animals %orth Knowing", p. 252. )
Appendix B. Rof. to P. 13.
Ex arm-105 o f  hoard ing .
1. A dog. A dog developed a p a ss io n  fo r  d e l l s ,  from having  
c'arriod one fo r  h i s  ^ i s t r e a a ' s  c h i ld .  Ho would take thorn 
to h i s  k en n e l ,  and o v o n tu a l ly  took to prowling the s t r e e t s  
and s o i  z ing d o l l s  from c h i ld r e n .  "Ho ?as onco known to have* 
four in h i s  k e r n e l .  V.'hcnovor and uhercvor/^a d o l l  in a 
c h i l d ' s  arms ho would s t e a l t h i l y  walk up. to h e r ,  s e i z e  the
p r i z e , and run o f f  with i t  to h i s  k e r n e l ."
CQuoted from the Weekly Telegraph for  April  3 ,1 9 1 0 ,  
in "Animals worth Knowing", p. 35 ,  J .  Chappel .)
3 .  A r a t .  "I found the o u t s id e  ( o f  the n e s t )  to bo composed 
G r l ir o ly  o f  s p ik e s  a l l  l a i d  with symmetry, sc  as to p re s e n t  
the p o in t s  o f  tho r a i l s  outward. In the centre  o f  t h i s  mass 
13 tho n e s t ,  composed o f  f i n e l y  d iv ided  f i o r o s  o f  h e r r -  
packing.  I n t e r l a i d  with tho s p ik e s  were tho following": 
about two dozen k n iv o s ,  f o r k s ,  spoons ,  a l l  the  b u tc h e r ' s  
k n iv es  three  in number; a la r g e  carv ing  fo rk ,  k r i f e  and 
stmol;  s e v e r a l  la rg *  p lugs  o f  t o b a c c o . . .  an o ld  rurso  con­
t a in in g  sore  s i l v o r ,  matches and tobacco;  n ear ly  a l l  the 
IT iu.1 t o o l s  frot tho t o o l  c l o s e t ,  with  s e v e r a l  largo  augurs
. . .  a l l  o f  which must have been tran spor ted  some d i s t a n c e ,  
as they wore o r i g i n a l l y  s to red  in d i f f e r e n t  p arts  o f  the  
h o u s e . . .  The o u t s id e  ca s in g  o f  a s i l v e r  watch was d isposed  
in one part  o f  tho p i l e ,  the g l a s s  o f  the same watch in 
another ,  and the works in s t i l l  another ."
(Quoted in James* Psychology from P. Lindsay’ s 
"Mind in Lower Animals", Vol.  I I ,  pp. 151, 1 5 2 . )
Appendix C. Rof. to  P. 13.
"The Biscacha somewhat resem bles  a la r g e  r a b b i t ,  
but with b ig g er  gnawing t e e t h  and a long  t a i l . . . .  I t  i s  
found as far  South as Rio Negro in l a t .  41, but not beyond.  
. . .  The Biscacha has one very s in g u la r  h a b it  -  namely 
dragging every hard o b je c t  to  the mouth o f  i t s  burrow; 
around each group o f  h o le s  many bones o f  c a t t l e ,  s t o n e s ,  
t h i s t l e s t a l k s , hard lumps o f  e a r th ,  dry dung, e t c . ,  are 
c o l l e c t e d  in to  an i r r e g u la r  heap, which f r eq u e n t ly  amounts
to  as much as a wheelbarrow would c o n ta in .  I was c r e d ib ly
informed th a t  a gentleman, when r id in g  on a dark n i g h t ,  
dropped h i s  watch; he returned in the morning, and by 
search in g  the neighbourhood o f  every b isca c h a  ho le  on the  
l i n o  o f  road, as he ex p ec te d ,  he soon found i t . . .  For what 
purpose i t  i s  done, I am q u ite  unable to form, even the  
most remote co n jec tu r e :  i t  cannot bo fo r  d e fe n ce ,  because  
tho rubbish i s  c h i e f l y  p laced  above the mouth o f  the bur­
r o w . . .  The on ly  f a c t  I know analagous to i t ,  i s  the h a b i t  
o f  th a t  ex traord inary  A ustra l ian  bird the Colodera Macuiata,  
which makes an e l e g a n t  v a u lted  passage o f  tw igs  f o r  p la y ­
ing in ,  and which c o l l e c t s  near the s p o t ,  land and sea  
S h e l i a ,  bones,  and the f e a t h e r s  o f  b i r d s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
b r ig h t l y  coloured on es .  Mr. Gould who has descr ibed  th e se  
f a c t s ,  informs me, th a t  tho n a t i v e s ,  when they l o s e  any 
hard o b j e c t ,  search  the p la y in g  p a s s a g e s ,  and he has known 
a tobacco p ipe  thus recovered ."
(Darvrin’ s Voyage o f  the B ea g le ,  pp. 121, 1 2 2 . )
(Hirn;S'/rorth, 1 0 0 5 . )
Chapter  I I .
The Growth o f  the Concept o f  S e l f
U sefu l  as the comparative method i s  f o r  a g e n e t i c  
study o f  mental phenomena, i t  does not carry us very fa r  i f  
t r e a te d  as a method o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n j f o r  as such i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r i l y  conf ined  to  e x p la in in g  the h igher  development by 
the lower .  The i n s t i n c t  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  we sa y ,  e x p la in s  
the behaviour o f  the sa n d -ra t  and the s q u i r r e l .  But i f  we 
were to  ex p la in  human a c q u i s i t i v e n e s s  in the  same way, we 
should bo ig n or in g  j u s t  those  e lem en ts  in ownership which 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  i t  from anything o f  the kind on the  l e v e l  o f  
animal e x p e r ie n c e .  Now as we have a lready seen the f a c t o r  
o f  the s e l f  has to be reckoned with in even the s im p le s t  
form in which the a c ^ u is i t i -u e  i n s t i n c t  appears among men^ 
and we s h a l l  not a r r iv e  at a true  understanding o f  owner­
sh ip  u n t i l  we have s tu d ie d  i t  in  r e l a t i o n  to the s e l f .  In 
the p resen t  chapter  t h e r e f o r e ,  we s h a l l  b r i e f l y  co n s id er  
the  e f f e c t  o f  ownership on the  concept o f  the s e l f .
In h i s  chapter  on tho p erso n a l  s e l f  in S o c ia l  6 
E th ic a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  in Mental Development P ro f .  Baldwin 
speaks o f  the g ive  and take between the in d iv id u a l  and h i s
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f e l l o w s  as the  d i a l e c t i c  o f  p erso n a l  growth. Ho d i s t i n g u i s h e s  
three  s t a g e s  in t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  whithhe c a l l s  the p r o j e c t i v e ,  
the s u b j e c t i v e  and the  e j e c t i v e .  The f i r s t  i s  th a t  in which 
the c h i ld  becomes c o n sc io u s  o f  o th e r  persons  and d i s t i n g u i s h e s  
between them. The second i s  th a t  by which he t r a n s f e r s  what 
ho has l e a r n t  to  h i s  own exp er ien ce  by means o f  i m i t a t i o n .
At t h i s  s ta g e  the p r o j e c t i v e  s ta g e  becomes s u b j e c t i v e ,  and 
the p e c u l i a r  t r a i t s  which have h i t h e r t o  a ttached  to th e  c h i l d ' s  
ex p er ien ce  o f  o th e r s  now become a p a rt  o f  h i s  own. By a s o r t  
o f  return d i a l e c t i c  t h i s  e x p er ien ce  i l l u m in a t e s  o th e r  s e l v e s ,  . 
and he reads in to  them tho same sense  o f  s e l f ^ w i t h  i t s  v a r ied  
ex p e r ie n c e s  o f  s t r e s s  and s t r a in ^ t h a t  he h im s e l f  has had.
This i s  the e j e c t i v e  s t a g e ,  and c o n s t i t u t e s  the  b i r t h  o f  the  
s o c i a l  s e l f .  This p r o c e s s  from the p r o j e c t i v e  to  the sub­
j e c t i v e  has i t s  analogy in the  l o g i c a l  p r o ce ss  o f  d e f i n i t i o n ,  
by which the connotat ion  o f  a term i s  reached. Both have a 
p o s i t i v e  end, and both imply n e g a t io n .  A term i s  d e f in ed  by 
means o f  e x p l i c i t  s ta te m e n ts ,  or  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  which unfold  
i t s  meaning, and each o f  which has a n e g a t iv e  im p l i c a t i o n ,  
so th a t  in say ing  what a th ing  i s ,  we s e t  i t  over  a g a in s t  
what i t  i s  n o t .  Go a l s o  the p ro ce s s  from the p r o j e c t i v e  to 
the s u b j e c t i v e  has a double a sp ec t  o f  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  and 
the c o n s c io u s n e s s  o f  o t h e r s .  I t  i s  not a t i m e - r e l a t i o n ; but
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one or o th e r  asp ec t  o f  i t  tends  to predominate at d i f f e r e n t  
t im es  in the same i n d i v i d u a l .  The exp er ien ce  o f  ownership  
i s  one o f  many ways in which t h i s  growth o f  the  concept  o f  
s e l f  i s  promoted. Prom t h i s  p o in t  o f  view we may d i s t i n g u i s h  
three a s p e c ts  o f  ownership:
1. As part  o f  the c h i l d ' s  s o c i a l  environment.
2 .  As a f fo r d in g  s o c i a l  r e c o g n i t io n .
3 .  As a p o s i t i v e  experience carry ing  out the
c h i l d ' s  con at ivo  im pulses .
1.  Ownership may bo p a rt  o f  the c h i l d ' s  s o c i a l  environment  
without  a f f e c t i n g  h i s  concept o f  h im s e l f .  For in s ta n c e  he 
may r e c o g n is e  h i s  f a th e r  as owning land or h ouses ,  w ithout  
any sense  o f  p erso n a l  i n t e r e s t .  His ex p er ien ce  o f  ownership  
IS s t i l l  at the p r o j e c t i v e  s t a g e ,  and as a c o n s t i t u e n t  o f  h i s  
s o c i a l  environment i t  has as y e t  awakened no d e s i r e  in him. 
Now there  must always be some r e l a t i o n  however remote between  
d e s ir e  and the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  achievement.  We never r e a l l y  
cry fo r  the  moon; we must at  l e a s t  be able to  imagine an 
o b je c t  as ours before  d e s i r in g  i t  : Thus the  p o s s e s s io n  o f  a
m otor-car  nay never have dawned upon a b o y 's  mind as a pos­
s i b l e  o b j e c t  o f  d e s i r e  fo r  him; but l e t  him hear th a t  h i s  
s c h o o l - f r i e n d  has got one and at once the m atter  ta k es  on an
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e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  complexion. * ï f  John has one,  why should  
not I?" i s  the n a tu ra l  q u e s t io n  th a t  a r i s e s  in h i s  mind; f o r  
John i s  someone with whom ho can compare h im s e l f .  The f i r s t  
e f f e c t  o f  the new knowledge i s  to  awaken d e s i r e ,  and along  
with i t  a sense  o f  c o n tr a s t  between h im s e l f  as a mere pedes­
t r ia n  and h i s  more fo r tu n a te  fr ie n d  d r iv in g  a car .  This  i s  
tho p r o c e s s  from the p r o j e c t i v e  to the s u b j e c t i v e , b y  which 
he t r a n s f e r s  what he f in d s  in h i s  s o c i a l  environment to  h i s  
own e x p er ien ce  ,rea l  or imaginary. I t  ta k es  p la c e  through  
tho medium o f  d e s i r e  and in v o lv e s  the double a sp ec t  o f  s e l f ,  
which we found to bo analagous to  the p r o c e s s  o f  d e f i n i t i o n .  
The f i r c t  h e ig h te n in g  o f  the s e l f  i s  due to  the r e a l i s e d  
co n tr a s t ,a n d  i s  t h e r e fo r e  n e g a t iv e .  But from t h i s  the b o y 's  
thought q u ic k ly  swings to the p o s i t i v e  a sp ec t  o f  a s e l f  t h a t  
owns, and thus o u t s t r i p s  the ac tu a l  and comprehends the id e a l
2 .  A fu r th e r  d i a l e c t i c  i s  in v o lv ed ;  for  the c o n s c io u s n e s s  
o f  s e l f  has a p o s i t i v e  as w e l l  as a n e g a t iv e  c o n te n t ,  which 
im p l ie s  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  o th e r  s o l v e s ,  because i t  i s  mirrored  
in  our thought o f  them. In o th e r  words the s e l f  i s  s o c i a l .
As 1 r o f . James sa y s :  "Properly speaking a man has as many 
" s o c ia l  s o l v e s  as there  are i n d i v i d u a l s  who re c o g n is e  
"him and carry an imago o f  him in t h e i r  minds. To wound
2 2 .A,,
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"any o f  th e se  i s  to wound him." Now the exp er ien ce  o f  
ownership,  or the concept o f - t h o  s e l f  as owner, p ro v id e s  t h i s  
r e c o g n i t io n  which g i v e s  the s e l f  a s o c i a l  a s p e c t .  The c h i l d ' s  
concept o f  an owner, which he has t r a n s fe r r e d  from h i s  s o c i a l  
environment to h im s e l f ,  in c lu d e s  the r e c o g n i t io n  o f  h im s e l f  
by o t h e r s ,  j u s t  as i t  o r i g i n a l l y  included h i s  r e c o g n i t io n  o f  
thorn. And w hi le  there  are some peop le  to whom he s t i l l  s ta n d s  
in the o ld  r e l a t i o n ,  there  are o th e r s  on whom he can impose 
a new one. Or he may have a double r e l a t i o n  with  the  same 
person.  His f a t h e r ,  who has h i t h e r t o  s tood fo r  him as the  
g r e a t l y - t o - b e - r e s p e c t e d  owner, now t r e a t s  him as a person  
with r i g h t s .  Thus ownership has f i l l e d  out h i s  concept  o f  
the c e l f  as r e f l e c t e d  in o t h e r s .  This n e c e s s i t y  fo r  recog­
n i t i o n ,  which i s  a mark o f  the  s o c i a l  s e l f  may be seen in  
the behaviour o f  an ord inary  c h i ld  who has re ce iv ed  a p r e s e n t .  
Almost h i s  f i r s t  impulse i s  to  show i t  to a l l  and sundry,  
and, what o f t e n  lo o k s  l i k e  b o a s t f u l n e s s  in h i s  d i s p la y  o f  a 
p o s s e s s io n  to h i s  l e s s  fo r tu n a te  f r i e n d s ,  i s  r e a l l y  on ly  t h i s  
demand fo r  s o c i a l  r e c o g n i t io n .
.3 .  I t  i s  only  n a tu ra l  th a t  in t h i s  d i a l e c t i c  between "my"
1. P r i n c i p l e s  o f  P sych o logy ,  Vol.  I ,  p. 294 .
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ird "me" tho n e g a t iv e  a sp ec t  o f  ownership should at f i r s t  pro- 
dor.inato, fo r  tho c h i l d ' s  f i r s t  co n sc io u s  r e l a t i o n  to i t  i r  
h i s  s o c i a l  environnent  i s  n e g a t iv e .  He. r c a i ia e o  h i s  fa th e r  
as an owner because ho ray r o t  i n t e r f e r e  w ith  h i s  papers  or  
use h i s  k n i f e  and so o r .  So in Lranoferring tho r e l a t i o n  to  
h im s e l f  he n a tu r a l ly  orp has iaco  the sar.o a s p e c t .  But in the  
actua l  ex p er ien ce  o f  ownership t h i s  i s  by fa r  the l e a s t  im­
portant  a sp ec t .  Much rore  important for  the growth o f  the 
con cert  o f  tho s e l f  i s  the e x p re s s io n  o f  c o n a t iv o  im p u ls e s , 
for  which ownership p r o v id e s .  Those g iv e  the p o s i t i v e  con­
ten t  o f  ownership and ire the m a te r ia l  for  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s .  
One o f  the f i r s t  i r p u l s e s  a c h i ld  shows i s  to  do something  
f i th  an e x t e r n a l  o b j e c t .  His body t s  probably the f i r s t  
o b je c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  to him, and ho w i l l  grasp h i s  toe ind put  
i t  in to  h i s  mouth. At f i r s t  com parat ive ly  b l in d  and almost  
u n d ire c ted ,  h i s  im pulses  tond to ever  g r e a te r  T 'rec is icr . , 
u n t i l  i t  becomes p la i n  to the o b serv er  th a t  the e x t e r n a l  
objectr' are roans by which tho c h i ld  i o  s t r i v i n g  to e x p re ss  
h i r s G l f .  A c e r t a in  se n se  o f  o p p o s i t io n  i s  n ece ssa ry  fo r  
t h i s  development: tho ta b le  i s  hard and r e s i s t s  him, and he 
loarna to adapt h i s  r.ovor.onts a c c o r d in g ly .  Tho c h i l d ' s  
exp er ien ce  rakes  s u f f i c i e n t l y  c l e a r  what c i v i l i s a t i o n  tends  
to obscuro ,  v i z . ,  th a t  our primary r e l a t i o n  to Faturo i s  ore
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o f  o p p o s i t io n .  The e x t e r n a l  world i s  something to  be o v e r -
C /rV  lX  . . ,
come, and wo do not f e e l  at home u n t i l  i t  bears some impress  
o f  our thought .  Lotzo r e f e r s  to  "the profound need o f  s e e in g  
our "own l i f e  r e f l e c t e d  in surroundings which have been
"transformed by o u r s e l v e s . " I t  i s  a need which runs
p a r a l l e l  with our need o f  s e e in g  o u r s e lv e s  r e f l e c t e d  in  
o t h e r s .  Lotzo p o in t s  out th a t  t h i s  becomes p o s s i b l e  when 
l i f e  has a f ix e d  centre^and man has a home and p o s s e s s i o n s  
and a sphere o f  work. In the l i g h t  o f  t h i s  we f ind  an en­
t i r e l y  now meaning in a c q u i s i t i o n ,  one moreover which d i s ­
t i n g u i s h e s  i t  to to  coo lo  from an i n s t i n c t  pure and s im p le .
In the words o f  Lotze "the s p i r i t  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n  i s  th a t  
"which makes ran wish t h a t  the r e s u l t s  o f  h i s  a c t i v i t y  
"should not d isappear with the crowd o f  changing o b j e c t s  
"on which i t  i s  expended, but should gradual ly  accumulate  
"in l a s t i n g  monuments o f  h i s  lab our ,  and p r esen t  in v i s -  
" ib le  and connected form the gain acquired by h i s  l i f e ' s  
"work."
The same need i s  expressed  in the ex p er ien ce  
o f  the in d iv id u a l  as in th a t  o f  the ra ce .  At f i r s t  the c h i ld
1.  Microcosmos, Vol.  I I ,  p. 87 .
2 .  Ib id  Vol.  I I ,  p. 81 .
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i s  hemmod in by h i s  own h o lp l e s s m o s s ; but as l i t t l o  by l i t t l e  
ho l o a m s  to d i r e c t  h i s  movements he o b ta in s  g r e a te r  froedom. 
Tho boundaries  o f  the s e l f  are at f i r s t  und ef in ed ,  p a r t s  o f  
tho b o d /^ a l t e r n a to ly  "me" and "not me", and anything th a t  
becomes a means o f  s e l f —e x p r e s s io n  must at f i r s t  seem l i k e  an 
e x te n s io n  o f  tho s e l f .  E s p e c ia l l y  i s  t h i s  the case w ith  
t o o l s  which seom to extend the bounds o f  the s e l f  almosty
i n d e f i n i t e l y .  Hie use o f  t o o l s ,  as Lotze shov/s, depends on 
the double f e e l i n g  o f  c o n t a c t ,  by which we f e e l  o u r s e lv e s  in  
touch not only  with  the t o o l ,  but with the o b j e c t  w ith  which 
wo are working. By t h i s  means our s e n s e s  seen  to  be sharp­
ened so th a t  a microscope in c r e a s e s  our v i s i o n  and a fo r ce p s
r e f i n e s  our se n se  o f  touch. In tho words o f  Hegel^
•Mechanical f o r c e s ,  weapons, instrum ents  extend the
1
•compass o f  my p o w e r . • Even the crudest  implement has
t h i s  e f f e c t  o f  e n la r g in g  the bounds o f  the s e l f ,  tho c h i ld  
who has d isco v ered  how to  s p la s h  tho water with  a s t i c k  
f o o l s  th a t  ^  i s  doing i t ,  and fo r  the moment the s t i c k  
becomes an e x te n s io n  o f  h im s e l f .  This f e e l i n g  i s  outraged  
when i t  i s  s t e r n l y  taken away from him, fo r  he^being de­
prived o f  a new means o f  o u t l e t  and e x p r e s s io n .
1 .  Philosophy  o f  R ight ,  55 Note.
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The sense  o f  s e l f - e x t e n s i o n  which tho use o f  t o o l s
g iv o s  i s  l i a b l e  to co n sta n t  checks ,  f i r s t  from the im perfec t  
c o n tr o l  o f  the  instrum ent ,  and secondly  from i t s  inadequacy.  
Mon no sooner have learned  the use o f  a t o o l  or  fashioned  
on e ,than  i t  sooms inadequate to ex p ress  t h e i r  th o u g h ts ,  which 
have been enlarged through the use o f  i t .  A boy with h i s  
f i r s t  k n i f e  i s  d e l ig h t e d  to f ind  how e a s i l y  ho can cut ai
% iocG o f  wood in to  c h ip s ,  and fo r  a time the more e x e r c i s e  
o f  c u t t in g  s a t i s f i e s  him and g iv e s  him a new sen se  o f  power. 
As the n o v e l ty  o f  t h i s  p u r s u i t  b eg in s  to  wear o f f ,  ho look s  
round fo r  new ways o f  e x o r c i s i n g  h i s  power and t r i e s  to con­
s t r u c t  something with the help o f  h i s  k n i f e .  At once h i s  
former easy sense  o f  power i s  chocked, as he r e a l i s e s  the  
o p p o s i t io n  o f  the m a te r ia l  and with i t  h i s  own se p a r a te n e s s  
even from the t o o l .  As we s h a l l  see  l a t e r ,  p ro g re s s  in the  
rak ing  o f  tho t o o l  i s  at tho same time progress  in r e a l  
ownership thus the course o f  development i s  a s o r t  o f  d ia ­
l e c t i c  o f  d e f e a t  and conquest ,  which g i v e s  now a n e g a t iv e  
now a p o s i t i v e  sense  o f  s e l f .  I f  the  handling o f  m a te r ia l  
th in g s  wo re accomplished without  any sense  o f  o p p o s i t i o n , t h e  
boundaries  o f  the s e l f  vrould never be d e f in ed ;  i f  on the  
o th e r  hand e f f o r t  wore never crowned with s u c c e s s ,  the  e x t e r ­
nal world would act  only  as a dead w e ig h t ,  crushing s e l f -
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ex p r e s s io n  and i n i t i a t i v e .
Though arguments drawn from tho analogy between the  
development o f  the race and tha t  o f  the in d iv id u a l  are not in 
them se lves  c o n v in c in g ,  f a c t s  seem to su g g e s t  th a t  some r e p e t i ­
t io n  o f  r a c i a l  oxporionce i s  the  b e s t  means o f  p erso n a l  d e v e l ­
opment. The c h i ld  who i s  born in to  a world in which every­
th in g  i s ,  so to speak,  ready-made to h i s  hand, and who t h e r e ­
fore never has any inducement to c r e a te  or mould h i s  surround­
in g s ,  i s  at a g rea t  d isa d v a n ta g e ,  compared with the c h i ld  who, 
though fa r  l e s s  w e l l  equipped, y e t  has scope for  h i s  in v en t ­
ive  and c r e a t iv e  powers. An i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  need fo r  
the in d iv id u a l  to make h i s  own world was g iven  by Mr. Homer 
Lane in one o f  h i s  recen t  l e c t u r e s  in London. A sm all  boy 
o f  f i v e  rece iv ed  a p r e s e n t  o f  a c o s t l y  steam -engine  which was 
the admiration and envy o f  a l l  h i s  e l d e r s .  To the amazement 
and chagrin o f  th e se  he d isp la y ed  no i n t e r e s t  in the  t o y .
Tho mechanism was p e r f e c t ,  i t  had re a l  en g in es  and performed  
wonders; but to  a l l  t h i s  the boy remained wholly i n d i f f e r e n t .  
Mr. Lane at le n g th  undertook to v i n d i c a t e  the  c h i l d ' s  t a s t e ,  
proceed ing  to p u l l  the engine to p i e c e s  and to r e c o n s tr u c t  i t  
on the cru d es t  p a t t e r n .  The boy was a l l  i n t e r e s t  at once ,  
and spent  tho next  few days in the absorbing i n t e r e s t  o f  con­
s t r u c t i o n .  The r e s u l t , from a t e c h n ic a l  p o in t  o f  v i e w , was
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f a u l t y  in tho oxtrome; but the p rocess  had taxed a l l  the  
c h i l d ' s  powers and g iven  him scope fo r  h i s  o n o r g ie s .  - I t  had 
s a t i s f i e d  h i s  need o f  s e e in g  h i s  own l i f e  r e f l e c t e d  in sur­
roundings which had been transformed by h im s e l f .  The p e r f e c t  
engine because i t  o f fored^such  means o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  had 
f a i l e d  to  a t t r a c t  him.
v;e have dwelt  on t h i s  p o in t  a t  some le n g th  ^ because 
there  i s  a v e r y  r e a l  sense  in which a l l  p o s s e s s i o n s  may be 
regarded as t o o l s .  In f a c t  i t  i s  on ly  in so f a r  as they  
r e ta in  the e s s e n t i a l  meaning o f  a t o o l  in a f fo r d in g  a means 
o f  a c t i v i t y ,  th a t  they rea c t  on the s e l f  fo r  good. Ownership 
which has been d ivorced  from a c t i v i t y  not only  f a i l s  to  act  
as a l e v e r  o f  development, but a c t s  as a dead weight  on 
p r o g r e s s .
CHAPTER I I I .  
DEGIBE.
Advocates o f  the  comparative method c f  in t e r p r e t a ­
t i o n  would .demur at  t h i s  in tr o d u c t io n  o f  a new term to  d e s ig ­
n a te  a p r o c e s s  which on the  animal l e v e l  has been ex p la in ed  
by r e fe r e n c e  to an i n s t i n c t i v e  im pulse .  But such a method, as 
we have a lready s a id  and as t h i s  chapter  aims at shewing,  
s l u r s  over the fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n  between human and a n i ­
mal behaviour .  For the r e fe r e n c e  to  the  s e l f ,  which i s  d i s ­
t i n c t i v e  c f  a l l  human behaviour^ makes the  use o f  a new term 
n e c e s s a r y .  The word d e s i r e  seems to  us e x p r e s s iv e  o f  t h i s  
d i s t i n c t i o n ,  fo r  i t  bears  a meaning in  which both impulse and 
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  are combined.
The d i s t i n c t i v e  ch a ra c ter  o f  d e s i r e ,  as in v o lv in g  a 
r e fe r e n c e  to the s e l f ,  i s  emphasised in  T. H. G reen's  account  
o f  i t .
"Desire" he says  " in v o lv e s  a c o n s c io u s n e s s  o f  i t s  o b j e c t s  
"which in  turn im p l ie s  a c o n s c io u s n e s s  o f  s e l f .  In t h i s  con- 
" s c io u s n e s s  o f  o b j e c t s  which i s  a l s o  th a t  o f  s e l f ,  or  o f  
" s e l f  which i s  a l s o  a c o n s c io u s n e s s  c f  o b j e c t s , we have th e  
" d is t in g u i s h in g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  d e s i r e  (a s  we know i t )  as  
"compared with those |p rocesses  o f  th e  animal soul with which
3 0 .
1
"they are apt t c  be con fused ."
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between impulse and d e s i r e  does not  
l i e  in  the  a im le s s n e s s  c f  th e  one and th e  p u r p o s e fu ln e s s  o f
cU-vcehvt e
th e  o th e r .  Both are d i r e c t e d  to an end, and o f  th e  tw c^ is  
more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  im p u ls iv e  a c t io n ,  which responds  
s w i f t l y  to  i t s  s t im u lu s ,  than o f  d e s i r e  which o f t e n  in v o l v e s  
a c o n f l i c t  and a consequent h e s i t a t i o n .  The rea l  d i s t i n c t i o n  
l i e s ,  as we have a lready in d i c a t e d ,  in the  s e l f -  r e fe r e n c e  
which i s  im plied  in  d e s i r e .  4 comparison o f  s i m i l a r  a c t s  on 
tho human and th e  animal l e v e l ,  w i l l  i ’»’'u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o i n t .  
Compare fo r  example tho impulse o f  the  sandrat to  hoard gra in  
and r o o t s ,  and o f  the s q u ir r e l  to s t o r e  n u t s ,  with  the  s c h o o l ­
b o y ' s  impulse  to  c o l l e c t  stamps. The meaning o f  the l a t t e r  i s  
n o t  exhausted  by r e f e r r in g  the  b o y ' s  behaviour to  an i n s t i n c t .  
To the on looker i t  may seen s u f f i c i e n t  e x p l a n i t i c n ,  but i t  
would not en ter  in to  the  b o y 's  own account o f  h im s e l f .  From 
h i s  p o in t  o f  view he i s  making a c o l l e c t i o n  because  i t  ap pea ls  
to him, f o r  one reason or another;  he i s  i n t e r e s t e d  in s t a n a s ,  
or he wants to  have i s  l a r g e  a c o l l ® c t i c n  as the  o th e r  bcys^  
in  th e  c l a s s ,  and so on. Now we have no grounds fo r  a t t r i b u ­
t i n g  a p o in t  o f  view such as i s  im plied  in the  b o y 's  account  
c f  h i s  a c t io n ,  to the s an dr at  and the  s q u i r r e l , ) -------------------- -
I -  Prolegomena o f  E th ic s ,  pav. 118,
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because the  s im pler  ex p la n a t io n  s u f f i c e s  t o  cover a l l  th e  
known f a c t e .  And so we say the s q u ir r e l  and the  sandrat are  
carry in g  out an i n s t i n c t i v e  im pulse ,  w h i le  the  boy i s  f u l ­
f i l l i n g  a d e s i r e ,  #e may ex p ress  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  in another  
way, by saying  th a t  d e s i r e  i s  impulse rais<^d tc  a h igher  pcw- 
e f  by the in to d u c t ic n  o f  th e  f a c t o r  c f  th e  s e l f .
The awakening o f  d e s i r e  i n v o l v e s ,  as we have se en ,  
a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n  in co n s c io u s n e s s  between the  actua l  and 
the  i d e a l .  This  sense  o f  d i f f e r e n c e ,  e . g .  between the  actual  
•me* who goes  on f o o t , and the  id e a l  * me*, who r i d e s  a motor 
c y c l e ,  g i v e s  d e s ir e  i t s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e e l i n g - t o n e .  Locke 
d e s c r ib e s  t h i s  as "uneas iness" ,  a term which w e l l  e x p r e s s e s  
the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between d e s i r e  and i t s  goal o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  
This f e e l i n g - t o n e  i s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  a l t o g e t h e r ,  or even pre­
dominantly p a in f u l ,  as when we d e s i r e  food which we are sure  
o f  being ab le  to g e t .  I t  may even tend to he igh ten  the  gen­
era l  f e e l i n g  o f  the  s e l f , as when a c h i l d  w a it s  f o r  admission  
to  a room which c o n ta in s  h i s  Christmas p r e s e n t s .  The d e la y ,  
i f  no t  unduly p r o tr a c te d ,  on ly  seems to  a cc en tu a te  th e  p l e a ­
s a n tn e s s  in p ro sp e c t .  The n o te  c f  f e e l i n g  which d e s i r e  
s t r i k e s  depends fo r  i t s  tone on the  c h a ra c ter  o f  the  whole  
s i t u a t i o n  to  which i t  b e lo n g s ,  and ranges between th e  extremes  
o f  p le a su re  and pain.  But, p l e a s a n t  or p a in f u l ,  i t  has always
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the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  s t r i v i n g ,  which accompanies de lay  and 
o b s tr u c t i o n  in i t "3 f u l f i l m e n t .  This  i s  the  very o p p o s i t e  to  
the  r e s t  which accrues  upon the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  d e s i r e .
There are some p u r s u i t s  which c e a se  to  be o b j e c t s  
o f  d e s i r e ,  in  proport ion  as the  element o f  d i f f i c u l t y  and 
o p p o s i t io n  i s  removed. Games and s p o r t s  o f  a l l  k inds l o s e  
t h e i r  charm when they are made too  ea sy ,  and th e  same o b ta in s ,  
more or l e s s ,  in ev e ry th in g ,  f e  d e l i b e r a t e l y  in v e n t  o b s t a c l e s  
in  order th a t  th e  goal may appear worth a t t a i n i n g . -  -
—-   This  i s  brought out  in  th e  behaviour o f  P rospère ,
who a t t r i b u t e s  h i s  rough r e c e p t io n  c f  Ferdinand tc  t h i s  very  
m otive ,  when he sa y s ,  in r e f e r e n c e  tc  th e  l a t t e r s  co u r t sh ip  
o f  Miranda:
"This s w i f t  b u s i n e s s  
"I must uneasy make, l e s t  too l i g h t  winning make the  
"prize l i g h t . "
Desire  i s  in  i t s  e s s e n c e  a.form o f  s e l f - a s s e r t i o n ,  
re q u ir in g  o p p o s i t io n  fo r  i t s  develo.iment. Speaking o f  t h i s  
o p p o s i t io n  which the  ex tern a l  world o f f e r s  to  the  s e l f ,  Hegel 
sa y s  : "The m ater ia l  opposes  i t s e l f  to me. Indeed i t s  very  
"nature i s  to  fu r n is h  o p p o s i t io n  to  me. I t  e x h i b i t s  i t s  abs-
" tra c t  independence to my a b s tr a c t  or s e n t i e n t  consciousness"
1 Tempest Act. I .  Gc. ?.
2 Phi losophy  o f  R ight ,  52. N. (Trans, by Dyde, 1 3 9 6 . )
I t  i s  in  cvercominrr t h i s  o p p o s i t io n  t h a t  d e s i r e  reach es  i t s  
f u l l  development. l^hen i t  a t t a i n s  to  f r u i t i o n  with a m ini­
mum c f  o p p o s i t io n  i t  does n o t  develop in to  a system , but re ­
mains r e l a t i v e l y  i s o l a t e d  and w ithout  i n f l u e n c e  on the  s e l f  
as a whole.  There i s  a l i m i t  however, beyond which o p p o s i t io n  
becomes on ly  a hindrance to development. Insuperab le  d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s ,  in which tho  s e l f  f i n d s  no p la ce  fo r  a s s e r t i o n ,  w i l l  
k i l l  d e s i r e ,  or at l e a s t  render i t  u n f r u i t f u l .  I f  we c o n t in ­
ue to i o s i r e  the u n a t ta in a b le  th e  r e s u l t  i s  an impoverishment  
o f  t h e . s e l f ,  because in such a s i t u a t i o n  th e  s e l f  can f in d  no 
ex p r e ss io n  in  any form o f  e f f o r t .  D es ire  must f in d  i t s  f ru ­
i t i o n  in w i l l  and a c t io n ,  and an o b je c t  t h e r e f o r e  which, from 
i t s  very n a tu re ,  o f f e r s  no scope f o r  w i l l  and a c t io n  i s  eo i p ­
s o , a hindrance to  development.
D es ire ,  as here understood,  has a very  wide a p p l i c a ­
t i o n ,  and i s  on ly  l i m i t e d  by the  duration o f  l i f e .  I t  i s  im­
p l i c i t  in  the o p p o s i t io n  between th e  s e l f  and the e x te r n a l  
world, and must be assumed as long as the  s e l f  r e t a i n s  i t s  
d i s t i n c t  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  I t  f i n d s  i t s  f u l l  development and 
f r u i t i o n  in  w i l l  and a c t io n ,  but does n o t  cea se  tc  be d e s i r e  
u n t i l  i t s  end i s  accomplished and the  s e l f  i s  s a t i s f i e d .  A 
complete s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  never reached, because p a r t i c u l a r  
d e s i r e s  are d ir e c t e d  to o b j e c t s  which cannot s a t i s f y  the
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s e l f  as ^ whole.  These may f in d  t h e i r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  and in  
doing sc cea se  t c  e x i s t ;  but D es ire  as such i s  im pl ied  in  
a l l  l i f e ,  fo r  i t  M the  s e l f  in i t s  a s s e r t i o n  and o p p o s i ­
t i o n  t o  the ex ter n a l  world.
D es ire  then cannot be con f ined  to  any one phase or
s ta g e  o f  l i f e ;  i t  forms an i n t e g r a l  part  c f  a l l  l i f e ,  in
which s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  has emerged. But th e r e  are so re  
moments th a t  are more p en etra ted  w ith  d e s i r e  than o th e r s ;
such as when the  mind i s  confronted  w ith  th e  n e c e s s i t y  c f  a
ch o ic e  o f  o b j e c t s .  Nhen t h e s e  are incom patib le  w ith  one an­
o th e r  ve have the s i t u a t i o n  known as  a c o n f l i c t  o f  d e s i r e s .  
Such a c o n f l i c t  i s  p o s s i b l e  because th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  d e s i r e s ,  
though incom pat ib le  with tho s e l f  as i  wholey r e p r e s e n t  d i f f ­
e r e n t  a s p e c t s  o f  i t ,  which have not  been brought i n t o  har­
mony with one another .  Guch a c o n f l i c t  i s  well i l l u s t r a t e d  
by th e  predicament in  which many young men found th em se lv es  
a t  the outbreak o f  the  war, when the c a l l  t c  serve  t h e i r  c c u r -  
t r y  took i  fora  which seemed tc  them to  c o n f l i c t  w ith  a h igh­
er  c a l l .  And oven when th e s e  c o n f l i c t i n g  c la im s  were recon­
c i l e d  in  some form o f  p e a c e - s e r v i c e .  th'  ^ d e s i r e  tc  be in th e  
c o n f l i c t  because o th e r s  were in  i t ,  or s im ply  from l o v e  o f  i t  
might s t i l l  remain. Gome a sp ec t  o f  th e  s e l f  had to  be den ied .  
Again, the  c o n f l i c t  need not be between th e  h igher  and the  
lower s e l f ;  c ircum stances  nay make a l i m i t a t i o n  n e c e s s a r y :
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i Leonardo da Vinci  might d e s i r e  to  be, and at the same time  
have th e  c a p a c i ty  f o r  being a g re a t  p a in t e r ,  seu l  ) tor ,  en g in eer  
and s c i e n t i s t ,  but u n le s s  he draw the  l i n e  somewhere he i s  in  
danger o f  becoming a d i l e t t a n t e .  Thus fo r  d i f f e r e n t  reason s  
d e s i r e s  may be in com pat ib le  with one another ,  and y e t  in  a l l  
o f  them some a sp ec t  o f  the  s e l f  i s  in v o lv e d ,  and the  man can 
t r u l y  say o f  each o b j e c t ,  "I d e s i r e  t h i s " .
- I t  i s  at  t h i s  p o in t  th a t  T. H. Green's  trea tm ent  o f  
d e s i r e  seems open to c r i t i c i s m .  He u s e s  the  word in  two sen­
s e s :  1. As c o n tr a s te d  with motive which i s  in v o lv ed  in  the
tke>na>vs
a c t  o f  w i l l ,  acd which i s  " c o n s t i t u te d  by th e  r e a c t io n  c f ^ s e l f  
'’upon t h e s e ,  ( d e s i r e s  and a v e r s io n s )  and i t s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
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o f  i t s e l f  with  one o f  them. In t h i s  sen se  the ends o f  d e s i r e s
are p o s s i b l e  o b j e c t s  o f  th e  s e l f , but are not  y e t  o b j e c t s  w ith
which th e  s e l f  has ye t  i d e n t i f i e d  i t s e l f .  "It  may very well
"happen" Croon co n t in u e s  "that th e  d e s ir e  which af f e c t s  a
"man most s t r o n g ly  i s  one which he d e c id e s  on r e s i s t i n g .
"In s p i t e  o f  i t s  s t r e n g t h ,  he cannot make i t s  o b j e c t  h i s  
■»
"object ."  2. As tantamount to  motive and win 1 # In t h i s  
sen se  the  d e s i r e s  and a v e r s io n s  r e fe r r e d  to  above, are under­
stood  as "impulses c o n s t a n t ly  at work in  a man, -  the  r e s u l t
1. Prolegomena, par. 113.
3. Ib id ,  par.115.
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o f  h i s  o r g a n i s a t io n ,  o f  h a b i t s . . . e t c .  -  which y*»t do not  amount
to p r i n c i p l e s  o f  imputable " ac t ion ,  or to d e s i r e s  o f  which i t
" i s  sought to r e a l i z e  the o b j e c t s ,  because the  s e l f - s e e k i n g ,
" s e l f -d e te r m in in g  person has n o t  i d e n t i f i e d  h im s e l f  w ith
"any o f  t h e n . " I t  i s  t h i s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  s e l f  w ith
i t s  o b j e c t ,  which i s  the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  mark o f  d e s i r e ,  as
opposed to  impulse or "mere des ire"  which preced es  the ac t  o f
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  "This i s  t c  w i l l , . . . .  But in  the  a c t s  o f  w i l l
man does n o t  ce a se  to  d e s i r e .  Rather he, the  man, f o r  the
f i r s t  time d e s i r e s ,h a v in g  not  done so w h i le  d iv id ed  between the
2
conf l  i c t i n g  i n f l  u ences .  "
That Green c o n s id e r s  the  term d e s i r e  i n a p p l i c a b l e  to  
both c a s e s  i s  e v id e n t ,  from the  d i s t i n c t i o n  he draws in  the l a ­
t e r  p a ssa g e s ,  and th e re  seems l i t t l e  doubt from t h e s e  th a t  tho  
second i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  r e p r e s e n t s  Green's  rea l  view on the  sub­
j e c t .  He could not  admit d e s ir e  ( in  the same s e n s e ) ,  as p re s ­
en t  in  what i s  known as the  c o n f l i c t  c f  d e s i r e s ,  w ithout  en­
dangering the  concept  o f  the u n i ty  o f  the  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  
on which ho l a y s  so much s t r e s s .  For i f  the s e l f  i s  one, how 
can i t  be in v o lv ed  in c o n f l i c t i n g  and incom pat ib le  d e s i r e s ?
But there  Is  a con fus ion  here between the  s ta n d p o in t  o f  meta-
1 Proloromen'3, p. 145.
2 I b id ,  pa.T 145, cp al s o e l4 4
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p h y s i c s  i n i  o f  psychology* The s e l f  im plied  in Green*s u n i t y  
o f  s o l f - c c n s c i o u s n e s s  i s  not  a p sy ch o lo g ic a l  f a c t ,  but a p h i l o ­
so p h ica l  p r i n c i p l e ,  which i s  both a p r e s u p p o s i t io n  and a g o a l .  
As P ro f .  Bosanquet sa y s ,  "In psychology  the  "I" i s  not  the  
"pure or a b s tr a c t  e g o . . .  The "I" in  psychology  i s  always  
"accompanied by co n te n t ,  and t h i s  co n ten t  i s  not  permanent 
*br unchangeable or e s s e n t i a l l y  attached  to the  s e l f . "
The s e l f  as known in  ex p er ien ce  i s  not  a u n i t y  w ithout  change; 
i t  may in c lu d e  now t h i s  new th a t  e lem ent,  according tc  the  
p o in t  o f  view o f  the moment. A c o n f l i c t  o f  d e s i r e s  in  t h i s  
sense  would re p r e se n t  th e  o p p o s i t io n  between th e  d i f f e r e n t  
p o in t s  c f  v iew. From the p o in t  o f  view o f  a iran o f  s c i e n c e  
Leonardo may d e s ir e  to  b u i ld  b r id g e s  and co n s tru c t  aqueducts ,
from th e  p o in t  o f  view o f  the  a r t i s t  he may e q u a l ly  d e s i r e  tc
f i n i s h  th e  Last  Supper. Time makes the completion o f  both im­
p o s s i b l e ,  but he may n e v e r t h e l e s s  d e s i r e  both ,  in  so fa r  as  
both are o b j e c t s  which he p r e s e n t s  to  h im s e l f  as p o s s i b l e  ob­
j e c t s  fo r  the s e l f  ^viewed from d i f f e r e n t  p o in t s  o f  v iew .
This  q ues t ion  o f  the p o in t  o f  view in v o lv e d  in  de­
s i r e  b r in g s  us back to the  statem ent  made above t h a t  the  i s o ­
l a t i o n  o f  d e s i r e  i s  on ly  r e l a t i v e .  A very young c h i l d ' s  be­
haviour may appear t c  c o n s i s t  o f  a s e r i e s  o f  impuls e s  uncon­
n e c ted  with one another; system ind order are however p o ten -
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t i a l l y  p r e s e n t ,  in  sc far  as he r e f e r s  the  o b j e c t  o f  each im­
p u ls e  tc  h im s e l f  and r e c o g n i s e s ,  however v agu e ly ,  t h a t  i t  has 
a meaning f o r  him. And the concept  which he has o f  h im s e l f  i s  
not  exhausted  by any s i n g l e  d e s i r e ;  fo r  in  d e s i r in g  some par­
t i c u l a r  o b je c t  he knows h im s e l f  as ,  at  l 'hast p o t e n t i a l l y ,  des­
i r i n g  some o th e r ,  p o s s i b l y  in com pat ib le  o b j e c t .  I t  i s  t h i s  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  r e f e r r in g  more than one o b je c t  to  th e  s e l f  at  
th e  same t i n e ,  th a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  what we understand by a p o in t  
o f  v iew. -  The popular use  o f  th e  e x p r e s s io n  s i g n i f i e s  some­
th in g  e s s e n t i a l l y  p a r t ia l  and one s id e d ,  which seems -at f i r s t  
s i g h t  to  c o n t r a d ic t  the view put forward h ere .  But as a p a r t  
im p l i e s  the  whole,  so a p o in t  o f  view has r e f e r e n c e  t c  some­
th in g  beyond i t s e l f ,  or i t  would n o t  be a p o in t  o f  v iew. The 
bey who i s  temp{:ed to  p lay  truant  from school f e e l s  the  impul­
se to  be a t em p ta t io n ,  j u s t  because he has o th e r  s i d e s  which  
c o n f l i c t  with the  id ea  o f  h im s e l f  as en joy ing  a h o l id a y .  He 
can c o n t r a s t  h im se l f  as head o f  h i s  form, or as p r e f e c t ,  or as  
anxious to p l e a s e  f i t h e r ,  and so on. The p o in t  o f  view c f  
p la y in g  tru ant  o n ly  emerges in  c o n t r a s t  with th e  o th er  p o s s i b l e  
con cepts  o f  h im s e l f .  We may exp ress  t h i s  in  a paradox by say­
ing that h i s  c o n sc io u s n e s s  o f  d iscord  i s  on ly  due to  t! e mea­
sure c f  mental u n i ty  he has a lready a t t a in e d .  There would be 
no c o n f l i c t  o f  d e s i r e s  i f  there  were not  an under ly ing  u n i t y .
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C o n f l i c t  ensues upon th e  in co m p le ten ess  o f  mental o r g a n is a t io n ;  
but  u n i ty  i s  i m p l i c i t  even in  the most e lementary forms o f  i t .
In h i s  r e c e n t  work "The Foundations o f  Character",
Mr. Shand devotes  a chapter  to th e  "law o f  o r g a n i s a t io n  as i t  
i s  d i s c l o s e d  in  the  mind." In i t  he f i n d s  th e  fundamental law  
u nd er ly in g  a l l  o ther  l a  s o f  ch arac ter -  ."Mental a c t i v i t y "  he 
says  "tends to  produce and s u s t a in  system and o r g a n i s a t io n ."  
But Mr. Ghand does not g iv e  any ex p la n a t io n  o f  t h i s  "organis­
ing a c t i v i t y " ,  beyond t h a t  i t  i s  d ir e c t e d  to ends.  I t  i s  
t h e r e fo r e  shared by animals and human b e in g s  a l i k e ,  and he 
c i t e s  in s t a n c e s  o f  ennui produced in  a c h i l d  by th e  l a c k  c f  
the  op portu n ity  fo r  o r g a n is in g  i t s  a c t i v i t y ,  adding t h a t  the  
c a t ,  whose o rg a n is in g  a c t i v i t i e s  are suspended, "only does
g
n o t  f e e l  ennui,  l i k e  a man, because i t  s l e e p s . " ---------------:—
But, one may ask, i f  the  same fundamental law o f  ch a ra c te r  i s  
p r e s e n t  in  the  mental l i f e  o f  a c a t  as in t h a t  c f  a man, why 
does i t  n e t  express  i t s e l f  in ch arac ter  e q u a l ly  in  both? I t  
i s  tru e  th ere  could  not  be o r g a n i s a t io n  w ithout  d i r e c t i o n  to  
an end, as t h i s  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  animal as well as human 
1-lrf e  a c t i v i t y .  But th a t  does n o t  exhaust the meaning o f  or­
g a n i s a t io n ;  i f  i t  did,  an o rgan ised  l i f e  might c o n s i s t  o f  a 
s e r i e s  o f  im pulsos ,  each d ir e c t e d  to an end. The f a c t  i s
1 Foundations o f  Character,  P. 21.
2 Ib id , '  p. 32.
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t h i t  thoTO i s  no o r c ï n i i ï t i o n ,  und^^r-itind i t ,  cn the  i%b-
hun^n l e v e l .  Or, t c  put i t  in m other  ’.fay, by c r f a n i s a t i o n  ,e 
understand d ir e c t i o n  to  an end, ?ro need another t e r n  to  ex p ress  
t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  on a h igher  I s v e ^ .  f c  are hero speaking from 
the po in t  c f  v i e #  o f  p sychology ,  and must n o t  bo m is le d  by the  
co n cept ion  c f  o r g a n is a t io n  and system with which b i c l o g y  has  
made us f a m i l i a r ,  ^e nay ta lk  c f  the  o r g a n is a t io n  o f  l i f e ,  but  
we must remember th a t  i t  i s  on ly  fo r  the  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s  s u b j e c t  
th a t  such o r g a n is a t io n  e x i s t s .
The p r i n c i p l e  o f  o r g a n is a t io n  thus means more than 
the continued  p u r s u i t  c f  ends; i t  means in i t s  com p le ten ess ,  
the  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  o f  a l l  the  f o r c e s  o f  the  mind. By the  r e f ­
erence to th e  s e l f  as a common c e n tre  the  v a r io u s  im pulses  which 
a r i s e  become r e l a t e d  to one another,  and in  so doing they take  
cn a new ch a ra c ter  and become q u a l i f i e d  by t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  t c  
th e  fho le .  This s y s t é m a t i s a t io n  i s  promoted when th e  same ob­
j e c t  a p p e l le  to d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i n c t s *  as per example, when a 
c h i l d  i s  moved by c u r i o s i t y  and f e a r  by the  s i g h t  o f  something  
s tra n g e  and u n fa m i l ia r .  ffhat r e s u l t s  cannot be ex p la in e d  as 
th e  mere p u l l  o f  th e  two i n s t i n c t s  in  o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n s .  I f  ' 
i t  were no more than th a t  the  c h i l d  woul d be l i k e  the  proverbial  
a s s  between two bundles  o f  hay, p u l led  in two o p p o s i t e  ways at  
once.  Moreover i t  i s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  th e  s t r o n g e s t  i n s t i n c t
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th a t  p r e v a i l s ;  th e  t imid c h i l d  may conquer h i s  f e a r  and appro­
ach the o b j e c t .  I f  he does so .  i t  w i l l  be because th e r e  has 
been some r e fe r e n c e ,  however vaguely  co n ce iv ed ,  to h i m s e l f , as 
courageous or as e x p lo r e r ,  or what n o t .
I f  we are r i g h t  in  h o ld ing  th a t  the p r i n c i p l e  o f  or­
g a n i s a t io n  im p l ie s  a p o t e n t i a l  r e fe r e n c e  t c  the  s e l f  in  a l l  
mental a c t i v i t i e s ,  we hold th a t  we are j u s t i f i e d  in contending  
th a t  the  term i s  in a p p l i c a b le  to the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  animal l i f e .  
The d i f f e r e n c e  between the  o r d e r l i n e s s  o f  a w i ld  animal’ s l i f e  
and the  order o f  a h ig h ly  o rg a n ised  human l i f e  i s  one c f  kind  
and n e t  o f  degree; we cannot th e r e f o r e  agree with  the  s u g g e s t ­
ion  th a t  "This fundamental law o f  ch arac ter  nay be on ly  a gen-  
"eral ex p re ss io n  fo r  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  laws o f  i t s  v a r io u s  
"forms, because everyone o f  then o r g a n is e s  the  a c t i v i t y  o f  
the mind fo r  some end"; ve maintain cn th e  contrary  t h a t  i t  
p o i n t s ,  as Mr. lhand h im s e l f  s a y s ,  "to something deeper and 
more comprehensive." This something i s  noth ing  l e s s  th \n " th e  
one c en tra l  s e l f "  which i s  the  centra l  f a c t  o f  cur p e r s o n a l i t y  
and without  which the  p r i n c i p l e  o f  o r g a n is a t io n  would l a c k  in ­
t e g r a t i o n .  I t  would seem n e c e s sa r y  to  l a y  s p e c ia l  emphasis cn
1 Foundations o f  Character,  ? .  33.
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t h i s  p o in t ;  at  the r i s k  o f  soeming to  labour i t ,  in  view o f  
the f a c t  tha t  n e i th o r  Mr. Shand nor Dr. McDougall soem to  
have any p la ce  for  the •one c e n t r a l  s e l f *  in t h e i r  sy s tem s .  .
The former doos indeed r e f e r  to i t ,  but only  to d e l i b e r a t e l y  
exclude i t  from "the s c i e n c e  o f  character"  which, he sa y s  " w il l  
bo the s c i e n c e  o f  our sen t im en ts  and em ot ions ,  -  o f  th e s e  many
s o l v e s ,  not o f  t h i s  one s e l f   I t  w i l l  l e a v e  out o f  account
the mystery which l i e s  behind them." But the mystery beh ind ,  
though i t  i s  not a p s y c h o lo g ic a l  f a c t ,  seems to us a p resuppos i­
t io n  o f  ch a ra c ter .  I t  i s  not an a b s tr a c t  e n t i t y  empty o f  con­
t e n t ,  but the unity  o f  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  which comprehends a l l  
the many s o l v e s ,  and i s  not exhausted by any o f  them. I t  i s  
both a p r e s u p p o s i t io n  and a g o a l ,  -  a p re s u p p o s i t io n  because  
our p e r s o n a l i t y  i s  never merely the sum o f  the d i s p o s i t i o n s  o f
our emotions and se n t im e n ts ,  -  a g o a l ,  because i t  i s  the end
and consummation o f  c h a ra c te r .
Returning now to the q u es t io n  o f  d e s i r e  in i t s  spec­
i a l  a p p l i c a t io n  to ownership, we may say at the o u t s e t  th a t  
ownership w ithout  d e s i r e ,  -  at  l e a s t  as hero, understood ,  would 
bo an empty fonriula w ithout  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  or e th ­
i c a l  co n ten t .  "If a th in g  i s  to  remain mine th ere  must be a 
continuous  ac t  o f  w i l l , "and " th is  act  r e v e a l s  i t s e l f  through
1 .  Foundations o f  Character ,  p. 66 & 67.
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UGO or proaorvdticn”. Owneroblr in  which d es ire  i s  not l a t e s t  wculi  
ba c f  nc educational o f  moral vaiuo., and would thus contribute  
nothing to  tho aavcjwOiiii.ont c f  character.  By v ir tue  c f  the p r in c ip le  
c f  crgauisauion in the mind, the dovo^cpmont of  des ire  I s  always in  
the d irec t ion  o f  greater systém atisat ion .  Kcw ownersliip contributors 
t c  t h i s  development in  two ways: i t  i s  f i r s t ,  as we have already  
3 0 0 ÏL, U.C goal Cl desire* As such i t  becomes also- i t s  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  
But in^rmuch as  comiilotc s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  never a t ta in a b le ,  i t  bo- 
coi.^cs once more the s ta r t in g  point  o f  des ire  and the source c f  th a t  
"porputual generation c f  passions* ,  which i s  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  of  the  
human mind. In tho f i r s t  case i t  i s  an cad in i t s e l f ,  in  the sec­
ond i t  becomes the naans to wider ends. There i s  no l i n e  c f  s t r i c t  
dcruircation between the two, tho one passing n a tu ra l ly in to  the other.
In an e a r l i e r  passage we referred  to  tho sense o f  unoasi-  
ness  which characterised  d es ire ,  u, term expressive c f  what tho Ger­
mans c a l l  "Trlab". But des ire  iz^Tlos fa r  more di the foG ling-s ido  
than more uneasiness .  I t  invo lves ,  ^otonti&lly  a t  l e a s t ,  the whole 
range o f  t!iO emotions, which enter in to  i t s  systot: in propert ie s  as  
t t . i t  system develops* Thu omctioruil rosponsc which ovTnei'Ship in­
variably ^rcvckos i s  due to and i s  dependent on dosii'e, without  
which i t  would ent ireay  f a i l .  By way o f  i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  l e t  us im- 
a^lne a cM ld for vrhoic .oys had no a t tr a c t io n  whatever. The ^ i f t  
of  a tcy  would mean nothing to such a ch i ld ,  -  he would fo o l  no
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pleasure in i t s  possess ion  and would show no sorrow or anger a t  the  
l o s s  of i t ,  nur would he mai.e any e f f o r t  to recover it*  But where 
desire  i s  resen t ,  ownership tends tc  widen tho range and i n t e n s i t y  
c f  omctipnal response, and so to  a f f e c t  conduct. One o f  the strong­
e s t  arguments fo r  the s n ^ l  holder as aga inst  the large  farmer, i s  
drawn from tho undoubted fa c t  th a t  no hired labourer w i l l  ever g ive  
the lov in g  indiv idual care which i s  necessary for stccro-breeding, 
simply because the animals are not h i s .  Again, the case with  which 
tho h ir e l in g  shepherd w i l l  leave  the sheep i s  proverbial .  “He th a t
i s  an h ir e l in g ,  whose own the sheop are n o t . * . • . • f l e o t h  because he
1
i s  an h ir e l in g ,  and caroth not fo r  the sheep.** The in t e n s i t y  o f
the emotional appeal o f  ownership i s  strong, in  proportion as  wo
id e n t i f y  ourse lves  with the ob jec t  c f  p o ssess io n .  This i s  w el l
i l l u s t r a t e d  in the scene in “Much adc about Nothing* where Loonatc
5*7 led  t c  b e l iev e  that  Here has dishonoured him. I t  i s  the thought
that  she i s  h i s  very own that g ives  the p e cu l ia r  poignancy to  h i s
g r i e f  and wrings from him these  words o f  b i t t e r  p r o te s t
'Jhy lad  1 not with chari tab le  hand 
Took Uiv a beggar's  i s s u e  a t  my gates;
smirchùu thus,  and mir'd with infamy,
I might have sa id  'no part o f  i t  i s  edne.
This shame der ives  i t s e l f  from unknown lo ins' ' !
But zdne, and mine I lo v 'd ,  and mine I p r a i s 'd ,
And mine tha t  I was proud on; mine so much ^
That I myself  was tc  myself not mine, valuing c f  hor.^
1. John. 10. 12, 13.
2. Much Ado about Nothing, Act ITi Sc* 1.
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In souiQ circumstances ownership- tends tc^  q u a x if /  rather  
than I n te n s i fy  a zc t icn .  This i s  so wherever i t  brings with i t  a 
sense of r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  The f a t h e r ' s  joy la  h is  s e n ' s  success  a t  
school may bo tota^crod by tlie knc'a/ioclge th a t  he might have done 
oven b et tor .  The s ig h t  of  a co rn f ie ld  f u l l  of pcppios i s  a joy to  
the a r t i s t ;  but i f  the a r t i s t  bo a lso  the owner of tho f i e l d  h i s  
joy  w i l l  bo disturbed by the r e f l e c t io n  th a t  poppies are tho re­
s u l t  of  peer s o i l  and bad farming.
The comi^arativo secu r i ty  which ownership ensures, g iv e s  
a s t a b i l i t y  tc  emotional rosp&nse. The mind s e t t l e s  down to  a more 
or l e s s  s ta b le  a t t i tu d e  to tho th ings  i t  can c a l l  i t s  own. To do 
not g e t  t i r e d  c f  cur p o sses s io n s  as  wq do of  these  o f  other people.  
There 23 a f lavour, a something unique, about them th a t  makes us 
bear with thorn. "An i l l  favoured thing, s i r ,  but mine own" i s  the  
c l a s s i c  expression of  t h i s  a t t i tu d e  of mind. The c h i ld  who from 
tho bewildering d e l ig h t s  c f  a Christmas tree  r e ce iv e s  a trumpet or  
an engine for ii imself ,  w i l l  concentrate a l l  h i s  joy upon the  g i f t .  
The rag d o l l  which nobody a lso  ad&ires becomes the ob ject  c f  faiths-  
fu l  devotivn. One reason for t h i s  s t a b i l i t y  of  response l i e s  in  
the f a c t  th a t  ownership g iv e s  a means of  o u t l e t  for a c t i v i t y  and or­
ganisat ion;  "mine" moans mino to  experiment with and to  use.
I t  w i l l  h-ro be objected that  we may, as a matter o f  f a c t ,  
own a groat m^ny th ings  which leave  us cold and awaken in us no de-
46.
s ir ed ,  th ings  which have come in to  our possess ion  through no e f f o r t  
on our part,  and which we do not value. The answer to  t h i s  object­
ion i s  twofold: f i r s t  i t  can be shown that many p ossess ion s  which 
we do not consc ious ly  s e t  store  by, assume a wholly new and dispro­
port ionate  value as soon as we are deprived of them. I f  we ask 
which was the true estimate,  that  which we placed upon them when 
we thought them secure, or that  at  which we value them when they 
have boen taken from us, i t  may be answered th a t  in a sense both 
are true, the former representing the actual and the l a t t e r  the  
idea l  value. I t  i s  an old saying that  we never value a thing a t  
i t s  true worth u n t i l  we have l o s t  i t .
for so i t  f a l l s  out.
That what we have we pr ize  not tc  the worth 
Whiles we enjoy i t ,  but being lacked and l o s t ,
Why, then we rack the value, then we f ind  
The v ir tue ,  that  possess ion  would not show us 
Whiles i t  was ours.^
The psychological  accuracy o f  t h i s  l i e s  in  the f a c t  tha t  
habit has so accustomed us to  the possess ion  of th ings ,  th a t  they  
cease to a t t r a c t  our a t te n t io n ,  but pass in to  the background of  
our minds forming part o f  the structure and furniture  c f  our men­
t a l  l i f e .  As such we are not conscious of  th e ir  s ig n i f i c a n c e  to  
the whole, o f  which they form a part ,  and i t  i s  not u n t i l  l o s s  
brings them into the focus of  consciousness,  that  wo r e a l i s e  th e ir
Î .  Much Ado about Nothing, Act IV. Sc. 1.
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contribution  to tho num t o t a l  c f  cur ha.^  ^ inooo. ïïo thon become 
awaro cf  a wrench and c f  a sense c f  the diminution o f  our s e l f ,  and 
wo r e a l i s e  for  the f i r s t  time th a t  the th ings  we had grown used 
to, had not therefore .ceased  to  e x i s t  for  us,  but had become an 
conscious extension o f  ourse lves .  They had become part o f  our out­
look on l i f e ,  colouring our view c f  th ings  a s . t r u ly  as a p a ir  o f  
coloured sp e c ta c le s  a f f e c t s  our v is io n  o f  the physical  world. -  
( In c id en ta l ly  we have here a p a r t ia l  explanation o f  how ownership,  
i f  not touched with imagination, becomes a barrier  preventing uct- 
dorstanding and syci’^ athy between r ich  and poor. ) Both use and sen­
timent h^vo contributed tc  t h i s  se l f - cx ten b io n ;  and through our 
l o s s  we r e a l i s e  how dependent we h^ve been on our r o s s e s s io n s  for  
contact  with tho world, ^ d  hew much value a sso c ia t io n  has given  
to them. But l e s s  does more than bring tc  l i g h t  the value fo r  use 
and sentiment cf  a possession-, i i  s t im ulates  the imagination to  
the discovery of  new p o te n t ia l  values  in the object  o f  cur reg re t .
A dozen p c s s ib lo  ways c f  spending i s h i l l i n g  w i l l  occur to a boy 
who has l o s t  h i s  week's pocket money. The tendency t c  gr ieve  
over a l o s s  i s  akin to the pleasure wo taka in the a n t ic ip a t io n  o f  
an event; we create  an id ea l  value in both cases ,  a value which 




But t h i s  explanation has not quite  disposed o f  the objec­
t io n  ra ised  abuve. Legal ownership i s  not id e n t ic a l  with re 1 or 
psycholog ica l  ownership, the moaning o f  which we havo t r i e d  tc  e lu ­
c idate  in  the foregoing pages. In the eyes of tho law we may be 
tho owners of a thing, while a l l  the time our a t t i tu d e  towards i t  
i s  one c f  negation and of  repudiation of  the r ig h t s  and o b l ig a t io n s  
o f  ownership. The external nature o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  makes anything  
approaching an exact correspondence between ro-1 or psycholog ica l  
and l e g a l  ownership impossible;  but i t  must be the aim c f  a sound 
l e g i s l a t i o n  to approximate the one to  tho other as far as p o s s ib le .  
A le g a l  ownership vrliich has no reference to and i s  divorced from 
i t s  psychologica l  moaning, cannot escape .eventual condemnation.
I t  may appear a t  f i r s t  s ig h t  as i f  there were no recognised con­
nection between the two; but t h i s  i s  contradicted  by a l l  that  has 
yet  been brought to  l i g h t  on the or ig in  c f  property, and by the  
l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  knvwn as p rescr ip t ion .  On i t s  p o s i t i v e  s id e ,  
p roscr ip t ion  i s  the r ig h t  which a ttaches  to  long use of  a thing,  
on i t s  negat ive  s ide ,  i t  means the l o s s  o f  a r igh t  by la p se  o f  
time or d isuse .  I t s  s ig n i f ic a n c e  h..s been c le a r ly  s e t  forth  by 
negol in tho fo l lowing  *^assage: "Prescription does n e t  run coun­
t e r  to  s t r i c t  r ig h t  and i s  net  introduced in to  law merely t c  cut  
"short tho s t r i f e  fhd confusion, which would natura l ly  a r i s e
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"cut of  old Claims. I t  i s  founded ca tho r e a l i t y  of  property, in
"other words upon the n e c e s s i ty  that  the w i l l ,  in order to  keep
“a thing, must manifest  i t s e l f  in  i t . . . . T c  s e t  apart land for  a
"cemetery and then not use i t ,  or tc  s e t  apart land never to  bo
“used, contains  an empty unreal c a p r ic e . . .P r e s c r ip t io n  r e s t s  up-
"on tho supposition th^t I have ceased to lock  upon tho o b jec t  
1
"as mine." For tlxe ^ri&iuive meaning of the i n s t i t u t i o n  i t  i s  
in s t r u c t iv e  to turn to S ir  Henry Maine's "Ancient Law*. Referring  
tc  the p r in c ip le  of Uscaplcn which has descended tc  modern jurispru­
dence under the "name o f  Prescr ipt ion",  he says "It  was a p o s i t i v e  
"rule of the e l d e s t  Roman law, a ru le  e lder  than the Twelve Ta-
"bias,  th a t  commodities which had been uninterruptedly possessed
2"for a cer ta in  period became the property c f  th e 'p o ssesso r .  '
By t h i s  ii*eans V o s s e s s i c n  was converted in to  ownership. " This r o s -  
r c c t  for ^  facto  possess ion  i s  he says stronger in  ear ly  Romm 
than in  modern so c ie ty ,  in which the p r in c ip le  c f  Uscapion
has only rece ived  a re lu ctant  and tardy recognit ion .  ''The resp ect  
of  men fcr  do facto  possess ion  i s  a phenomenon on which jur ispru— 
dence can account for  by i t s e l f ,  but i t  i s  very necessary tc  ronark 
that  "primitive s o c i e t i e s  in adopting tho p r in c ip le  o f  "Uscapion, 
"wore not beset  with any o f  the sp ecu la t ive  doubts and h e s i t a -
1. Philosophy of  Right, P. GO.
B. F. 294, (1000 Murray).
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"tioas  which havo imp jued i t s  reception  among modems. " The 
sp ecu la t ive  b a s is  of  Freecr ip t ioa  i s  s t i l l  a matter o f  hot dic^uÿe 
among lawyers, "and i t  i s  s t i l l  a point  of  the g re a te s t  i n t e r e s t  
"in Fra*.ce and Germany, whether a person who has been cu t  of  
"possession for a s e r i e s  of years i s  deprived c f  h i s  ownership as  
"a penalty  for  h is  n eg lec t ,  or l o s e s  i t  through a summary i n t e r -  
"posit ion  c f  tho law in i t s  des ir*  to have a f i n i s  l i t l u m . But 
"no such scruples  troubled the mind o f  ear ly  Roman s o c ie t y .
"Their ancient usages d i r e c t ly  took away the ownership o f  every-  
"body who had boon out c f  possess ion ,  under cer ta in  circumstances,
5
"during one or two y e a r s ."
I t  i s  Just the absence c f  any sp ecu la t ive  b a s i s  that  
rakes the Roman law so in s t r u c t iv e  for  the purposes c f  our enquiry;  
for  the presumption cn which the p r in c ip le  r e s t s ,  v i z . ,  th a t  own­
ership Implies a c t iv e  use, la y s  bare one o f  the fundamental psy­
cho log ica l  cond it ions  implied in  a r ig h t .  The s e l f  r u s t  in some 
sense p a r t ic ip a te  in an object ,  in ether words the o b je c t s  must be 
tho p o ss ib le  ob jec ts  lT d es ire ,  before a r ig h t  can emerge* Right 
and d es ire  are not on the same plane however, the one being a so­
c i a l  and e th ica l^ th e  other a psychologica l  phenomenon, and they  
therefore  do not proceed pari ^^ssu. A r ig h t  dees not  got i t s
1, P. 224, (1900 Murray).
2. Ancient Law, r . CP5 f f  1 C .
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j u s t i f i c a t i o n  from d es ire ;  a l l  that  i s  hero contended i s  that  de­
s i r e  in the broad sense of s e l f - a f f i r m a t io n  in which i t  has been 
treated  above, i s  a necessary condit ion  of  those s o c ia l  r e l a t i o n s  
which c o n s t i tu te  the r ight ,  o f  ownership. The Roman genius grasped 
t h i s  centra l  p r in c ip le  and gave expression to  i t  in the i n s t i t u t i o n  
o f  P rescr ip t io n ,  which i s  based on the assumption that ,  a t  bottom, 
" p ro p e r ty . . i s  mine only by v ir tu e  o f  my having put my w i l l  in to
o
i t . "  Neglect  or desert ion  was therefore  held tc  be tantamount to  
a withdrawal o f  the w i l l ,  and so a contrad ict ion  of  the conception  
o f  ownership. Thus wo are again brought to the came conclusion with  
which we c losed  the former chapter, that  ownership can never be 
r ig h t ly  divorced from a c t i v i t y .  ' ’ .
3 2. Hegel’ s  t'hixwSwi>hy of Right, P. 65i
C h ap te r  IV.
Ownership and the Sentim ents
I .  A r e fe r e n c e  to tho Sentim ents  has a lready been
im pl ied  in our trea tm ent  o f  the p r i n c i p l e  o f  o r g a n i s a t io n  in  
the  mind. This p r i n c i p l e  i s  seen  in the  tendency o f  d e s i r e  
to form a system , and i ^  f i n d s  i t s  f u l l e s t  e x p r e s s io n  in the  
d eve lopm ent , in which the f o r c e s  o f  the  mind are c e n t r a l i s e d  
and d ir e c t e d  to an o b j e c t .  Before d i s c u s s i n g  the q u e s t io n  
o f  ownership in r e l a t i o n  to the  s e n t im e n t s ,  i t  w i l l  be n e c e s ­
sary to  g iv e  some account o f  the  concept ion  o f  ch a r a c te r  as 
a system o f  s e n t im e n ts .  This must o f  n e c e s s i t y  s t a r t  from 
Ur. Shand*3 treatm ent  o f  the s u b j e c t ;  fo r  i t  i s  to him th a t  
v#o owe the con cept ion  o f  ch a ra c te r  as a system o f  se n t im e n ts  
The debt which psychology  owes to him in t h i s  m atter  i s  
exp ressed  by Dr. McDougall in  the f o l lo w in g  words;
"Wo owe to Mr. A. P. Shand the r e c o g n i t io n  o f  f e a t u r e s
*
"of our mental c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  a most important k in d ,  
"that have been s t r a n g e ly  over looked  by o th e r  p s y c h o lo -  
" g i s t s ,  and the a p p l i c a t io n  o f  the word ’ s e n t im e n ts '  to  
"denote f e a t u r e s  o f  t h i s  k ind ."
1 . .  S o c ia l  Psychology  (1915 E d i t i o n ) ,  p .  122.
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The rapid acceptance  o f  Mr. 3hand*s con cept ion  o f  a sent im ent  
i s  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  the  need which h i s  treatm ent  o f  the  " a f f e c t ­
iv e  a sp ec t  o f  mental p r o c e s s e s "  has met. Th is  need fo r  some 
"Leitfadon" through the  t a n g le  o f  the emotions and f e e l i n g s  
has been expressed  by P r o f .  James, in a passage  which has
become a c l a s s i c  :
"U nfortunate ly  th ere  i s  l i t t l e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  w r i t i n g  about
"the emotions which i s  not merely d e s c r i p t i v e  . . . B u t  as  
"far as s c i e n t i f i c  p sychology  o f  the em otions  g o e s ,  I may 
"havo boon s u r f e i t e d  by too much reading  o f  c l a s s i c  works 
"on tho s u b j e c t ,  but I should as l i e f  read v erb a l  d e a c r ip -  
" t io n s  o f  the rocks on a Kow Hampshire farm as t o i l  through  
"thorn aga in .  They g iv e  nowhere a c e n t r a l  p o in t  o f  view or  
"adequate or g e n e r a t iv e  p r i n c i p l e .  They d i s t i n g u i s h  and 
" r e f in e  and s p e c i f y  in in f in i tu m  w ithou t  ever  g e t t i n g  on 
"tc another l o g i c a l  l e v e l . "
Kow i t  may in  j u s t i c e  be claimed for  Ur. Shand t h a t  
ho has l i f t e d  the whole s u b j e c t  to  "another l o g i c a l  l e v e l " ,  
and has g iven  us "a c e n t r a l  p o in t  o f  view and a g e n e r a t iv e  
p r i n c i p l e "  in h i s  theory o f  the s e n t im e n ts .  As Dr. UcDougall
n
p o i n t s  o u t ,  the  con cept ion  o f  a sen t im en t  en a b le s  us at  once
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"to reduce to order  many f a c t s  o f  the l i f e  o f  impulse and 
" emotion which h i t h e r t o  have been c h a o t i c  and o b scu re ."
In Mr. ohand's own v iew ,  i t  i s  "the d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  
"emotions and the se n t im en ts  which furnishesthat  c e n t r a l
"point o f  view or  g e n e r a t iv e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  which we stand  
2
"in need ."  This  d i f f e r e n c e  " l i e s  in the d i f f e r e n t
"growth o f  t h e i r  o r g a n i s a t io n .  And w h i le  the  l a t t e r  are
"highly  o r g a n is e d ,  tho former may s u b s i s t  at a s ta g e  o f
#
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" r e l a t i v e  i s o l a t i o n  and s i m p l i c i t y . "  I t  i s  not  a quan­
t i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e ,  because the emotions and se n t im e n ts  
cannot be conce ived  in terms o f  q u a n t i ty ;  nor i s  i t  an oppo­
s i t i o n  o f  n a tu r e ,  or  they would exc lude  one another ,  which
I I  r
they do n o t .  The tru e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between them i s  the d i s -  
" t in c t io n  between the same f e e l i n g s  regarded a l t e r n a t i v e l y  
"as i n d i v i d u a l s  and as fona ing  a h igher  o r g a n i s a t i o n ."
This h ig h er  o r g a n i s a t io n  " is  the  p a s s i o n ,  p a s s io n  i s  organ-
4
"ised em otion ."  But p a s s io n  i s  more than o rg a n ised  
emotion " i t  i s  a l s o  o rgan ised  d e s ir e " ;  i t  i s  in  f a c t  "an
1. S o c ia l  P sy ch o lo g y ,  j:. 122.
2 .  Mind. K.S. Vol.  V, p.  215.
3 .  I b id ,  p. 217 .
4 .  I b i d ’ p. 488 & 489.
o rgan ised  system o f  em otions and d e s i r e s . "  The d i f f e r e n c e
IS comparable to th a t  between an a d j e c t i v e  and a s u b s t a n t i v e .  
"The emotions are in a s en se  a d j e c t i v a l  and q u a l i f y  a more 
" s ta b le  f e e l i n g .  Whereas the s p e c i f i c  o r g a n i s a t io n  o f  our  
" s e n t im e n t s , . . . 3 0  f a r  from being  mere a d j e c t i v e s  and q u a l -  
" i fy in g  o th e r  f e e l i n g s ,  -are the  r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  c e n t r e s  
"to*which the f i r s t  a t ta c h  th e m s e lv e s ,  the s u b s t a n t i v e s  o f  
"these a d j e c t i v e s ,  the complex wholes which co n ta in  in 
" th e ir  p o s s i b l e  l i f e - h i s t o r y  the e n t i r e  gamut o f  the  
"emotions." ~
Further ,  "a s e n t im e n t ,  as in t e r p r e te d  from o u t s i d e  
"is  the  thought o f  an o b j e c t  as a permanent th in g  or  
" q u a l i ty .  I t  i s  the i d e n t i t y  o f  thought which r e f e r s  to  
"the sarc  o b j e c t  with i t s  f e e l i n g  tone and c o n a t iv e  t e n d -  
"ency, which p e r s i s t s  through the  em otional  phases  
" ex c ited  in i t . "  This r e fe r e n c e  to  the  same o b j e c t  
which i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  Lr. Shand's th e o ry ,  i s  more f u l l y  
brought to  l i g h t  in Dr. McDougall’ s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a s e n t i ­
ment as "an o rg a n ised  system o f  em otional  d i s p o s i t i o n s
4
"centred about the idea  o f  some o b j e c t . "  A sen t im en t
5 5 .
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1 .  Mind. K.S. Vol.  V, p. 488 & 489
2 .  I b id ,  p. 217 & 216 .
3. I b id ,  p. 224 .
4 .  S o c ia l  P sy ch o lo g y ,  p .  159.
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im p l ie s  a h ig h e r  s ta g e  o f  development than an e m o t io n , not  
because o f  any d i f f e r e n c e  in k ind ,  but because i t  i s  more 
h ig h ly  org a n ise d  and presupposes  the  p resence  o f  i d e a s .
Mr. Shand does not emphasise t h i s  l a t t e r  d i s t i n c t i o n ;  but i t  
seems o f  some importance as f i x i n g  the lower l i m i t  o f  the  
r i s e  o f  a se n t im e n t .  For id ea s  e x i s t  on ly  fo r  the s e l f - d i s ­
t i n g u i s h i n g  s u b j e c t ,  which r e f e r s  i t s  d e s i r e s  and a c t i o n s  to 
i t s e l f .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h e r e f o r e  th a t  a sen t im en t  im p l ie s  r e f ­
erence to a s e l f  which endures through i t s  v a r io u s  em ot iona l  
e x p r e s s i o n s ,  and which i s  not exhausted by a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f
i t s  emotions and d e s i r e s .  Mr. Shand admits the  e x i s t e n c e  o f
1
the  many s o l v e s  o f  our se n t im e n ts  and em otions;  but i t  
would seer, to be a fu r th e r  n ecessa ry  s top  to admit the n e c e s ­
s i t y  for  the p s y c h o lo g ic a l  assumption o f  the  one s e l f  which 
onduros through a l l  i t s  s e n t im e n ts ,  and which i s  n e i t h e r  the  
sum o f  them nor t h e i r  c o n t e n t s .
I f  a sent im ent  be the o r g a n i s a t io n  o f  d e s i r e s  and 
em ot ions ,  i t  f o l l o w s  th a t  anything which h e lp s  to  s tead y  
d e s i r e s  and to  g iv e  s t a b i l i t y  and c o n t i n u i t y  to  the em ot ions ,  
c o n t r ib u t e s  p a r i  passu to  the development o f  a se n t im e n t .
But, though s t a b i l i t y  i s  n e ce ssa r y  to the growth o f  a s e n t i -
1 .  Foundations o f  C haracter ,  p. 67 .
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mont, i t  doos not t h e r e f o r e  fo l lo w  th a t  a s t a b l e  emotion i s  
i d e n t i c a l  w ith  a s e n t i r o n t .  Mr. Shand c r i t i c i s e s  M. R ib o t ’ s  
theory  o f  the  p a s s io n s  on t h i s  ground. " S t a b i l i t y  o f  f e e l ­
in g ,"  he sa y s  "does not s erv e  to transform them in to  p a s s i o n s .  
. . ^  p a ss io n  i s  n e i t h e r  i d e n t i c a l  "with an u n s ta b le  emotion  
^nor .; ith the  most s t a b l e  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  i s e d  f e e l i n g  in to  
"which vre can concc ivo  i t  s u b s id i n g ."   ^ A sen t im en t  can n ever  
bo ex p ressed  in terms o f  any one em otion ,  fo r  an emotion i s  
always the same, whereas a se n t im en t  i s  t h e . p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
many d i f f e r e n t  em otional  a t t i t u d e s  towards the same o b j e c t .  
Therefore to  speak o f  a "sentiment o f  f e a r " ,  as Dr. McDougail 
doos ,  argues a f a i l u r e  to grasp the c r u c i a l  meaning o f  the  
term. In t h i s  con n ect ion  Dr. McDougall sa y s  "we m u s t , then,  
" r e c o g n is e ,  l i m i t i n g  c a s e s  on the s id e  o f  s i m p l i c i t y ,
"sentim ents  formed by the a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  a s i n g l e
2
"emotional d i s p o s i t i o n  ^with the idea  o f  some o b j e c t . "
He accounts  f o r  who r i s e  o f  such a rudimentary sen t im en t  by 
means o f  r e p e t i t i o n  and a s s o c i a t i o n ,  and g i v e s  as an example  
the case o f  a c h i ld  r e p e a te d ly  thrown in to  the s o c i o t y  o f  a 
v io le n t - t e m p e r e d  f a t h e r  who ta k e s  no o t h e r  n o t i c e  o f  him than 
to  s c o l d ,  th r ea ten  and perhaps beat  him. The c h i l d  e x p e r i -
1 .  Mind R.S. Vol.  XVI, p. 483.
2 .  S o c ia l  P sy ch o lo g y ,  p. 164.
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encGs f e a r ,  and r e p e t i t i o n  c r e a t e s  the h a b i t  o f  f e a r ,  u n t i l  
the  idea  o f  h i s  f a th e r  w i l l  throw h i s  f e a r - d i s p o s i t i o n  in to  
a s t a t e  o f  su b -e x c i t e m e n t ;  "the idea  has become a s s o c ia t e d  
with  the  em otion ,"  and "such an a s s o c i a t i o n  c o n s t i t u t e s  a 
rud im entary•sent im en t  th a t  we can on ly  c a l l  a sen t im en t  o f  
f e a r . " ^
Kow t h i s  account o f  the r i s e  o f  a sen t im en t
d i r e c t l y  c o n t r a d i c t s  Dr. Me Doug a l l  ’ s  ovrn d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a 
which
sent im en t  w ith ^ h is  chapter  on the development o f  the s e n t i -  
2
ments opens;  fo r  i t  s u b s t i t u t e s  the p r i n c i p l e  o f  a s s o c i ­
a t io n  fo r  th a t  o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n . There i s  no "organised s y s ­
tem o f  em otional  d i s p o s i t i o n s "  in  the above account ,  on ly  a 
f ix e d  f o a r - d i s p o s i t i o n  s tren g th en ed  by a s s o c i a t i o n .  The 
development by which"the idea  o f  the f a t h e r  becomes capable  
o f  producing the same e f f e c t  as h i s  p r e s e n c e ,"  does not rep­
r e s e n t  the development from an emotion to a se n t im en t .  In 
so far  as i t  i s  true th a t  the thought o f  h i s  f a th e r  throws  
the c h i l d ’ s f c a r - d i s p o s i t i o n  in to  a c o n d i t io n  o f  s u b - e x c i t e ­
ment, which m a n i f e s t s  i t s e l f  as f e a r  on the s l i g h t e s t  occa­
s i o n ,  i t  means that  the c h i ld  i s  reach ing  the p a t h o l o g i c a l  
c o n d i t io n  o f  a f ix e d  idea o f  f e a r  a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  h i s  f a t h e r .
1 .  S o c ia l  P sy ch o lo g y ,  p. 163.
2 .  I b id ,  p. 159.
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nut ar o::otion -.fhiah works urdor a f ix ed  idea  ia  ro t  a s e r t i  
r e n t ,  nor dooa i t  ^:iva ua any d u o  to  tho dcvolcptC-rt o f  
"tho s o r t i r e n t  o f  f u l l  blown hatred" which Dr. i-'cDoucall 
roco^riso^  .10 tho rrobablo  d i r  ax o f  tho s i t u a t i o n .  "Tho 
“sir .plo  s o r t i r e n t  o f  foar" ho sa y s  "created  in the way 
"wo havo ir .a a in c d , w i l l  tend to  d e v e l o p , and w i l l  c o s t
mr e a d i l y  boccrc hate  by tho in c o r r o r a t io n  o f  o th e r
"cirot icnal  d i o * o o i t i c n a .  **  ^ But t h i o  o t a t o c o n t  Ior>or>
1 to force  when i t  i s  understood th a t  to  speak o f  a " s e n t i ­
ment c f  fear"  i c  an o v e r s i r p l i f i c a t i o n  which lo a v e s  the cen­
t r a l  f a c t  u nexp la ined .
Dr. rcO eu ga l l  s u p p l i e s  the  rcrcdp h i r s e l f  in  h i s  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a s e r t i r e n t  as an o rg a n ised  s p s t o r  o f  o r o t i o n s  
about the idea  o f  an o b j e c t .  I t  in not  tho in te n s i ty * , ror  
the durat ion  o f  tho f e a r - d i s p o s i t i o n , nor i t s  a s s o c i a t i o n  
•vith the  idea  o f  the f a t h e r ,  th a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  tho r i s e  o f  
the sen t im en t  o f  h a te .  I t  i c  tho o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  a i l .  the  
v a r io u s  f e e l i n g s  and emotions evoked by the  whole s i t u a t i o n ,  
around the idea  c f  th e .o n e  o b j e c t , - i n  our e x a n p lc f  the  
c h i l d ’ s f a t h e r ,  -  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  a s e n t i r e n t .  There ray  
be no roon in tho c h i l d ’ s  c o n s c io u s r o s s  but t h a t  o f  fo a r  as
I* C i t .  0 0 . r>. 164*
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long as ho ror.ains in h i s  f a t h e r ' s  p re sen ce ;  but out  o f  the
im nediate  presen ce  o f  h i s  tormentor the c h i l d ' s  mind w i l l
r e a c t  in c th o r  ways than th a t  o f  mere f e a r .  The thought o f
h i s  trea tm ent  vn.ll arouse re so n tr .o r t ,  anger,  d i s g u s t ,  a l l  o f
them d ir e c t e d  a g a in s t  tho one o b j e c t .  Those in  th e  course
o f  development,  -  a development which w i l l  be more rap id  in
ir o p o r t i o n  as h i s  f a t h e r ’ s conduct i s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  unkind, -
c o n s t i t u t e  what may be c a l l e d  a sen t im en t  o f  hato .  Without
t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  o f  o r g a n i s a t io n  by which the  mental f o r c e s  are
c o - o r d in a te d ,  the  mind would bo a mere bundle o f  t e n d e n c ie s
with  no in h eren t  bond .of  u n i t y ,  and w ithou t  tho fundamental
b a s i s  o f  order  and co h e s io n .  Mr. Shand em phasises  t h i s  ord er
in h i s  con cept ion  o f  an in nate  bond co n n ec t in g  the primary
,1
emotions with one another and with every  primari? im pulse .
The d ivergen ce  between Mr. Shard and Dr. McDo.ugall 
may be i l l u s t r a t e d  from the d i f f e r e n c e  between the  p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  and o f  ap p erce p t io n .  The o l d e r  .p s y c h o l o g i s t s  
( e . g . ,  Cain in h i s  Senses  and I n t e l l e c t .  ) t r i e d  to  account  
f o r  mental c o n s t r u c t io n  by means o f  a s s o c i a t i o n .  The u l t i ­
mate c o n s t i t u e n t s  o f  the mind were regarded as p a r t i c u l a r  
f e e l i n g s  and ideas^ r e p e l l e n t  u n i t s  w ith  no i n t e r n a l  bond
1.  Foundations o f  Character ,  38.
3 .  Referred to  by S tout  in A n a ly t ic  P sy c h o lo g y ,  V ol .  2 ,  p . 45 .
6 1 .
o f  c o r r e c t i o n .  As Mr. Bradley sa y s  "There i s  no ground con-  
"ron to tho d i f f e r e n t  u n i t e ,  which could s e r v e  as a r e a l  
" b as is  f o r  t h o i r  union.*’  ^ A s s o c ia t io n  ; i s  looked upon 
as a l i n k  between p a r t i c u l a r s ,  and as g i v in g  r i s e  to  mental  
com bination .  That i s  to s a y ,  out o f  a number o f  m utual ly  
r e p e l l e n t  p a r t i c u l a r s ,  a s s o c i a t i o n  was thought in  some way 
to c r e a t e  a u n i t y .  But mere combination i s  not a s y n t h e s i s ,  
and, as P r o f .  S tou t  s a y s ,  "ovory new s y n t h e s i s  r e s u l t s  from
"the fu r th e r  dotort ir .a t ion  o f  a p s y c h ic a l  w h o le , which
2
"in some way a lready  p r e - e x i s t s . "  i r  o th e r  words the  
p o t e n t i a l  u n i ty  o f  the r ind  must be assumed, and the p a r t s  
ex p la in ed  by re fe r e n c e  to  the whole^ard not the whole by 
r e fe r e n c e  to  the  p a r t s .
Though Dr. HcDougall i s  not  g u i l t y  o f  any such  
crude i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the d o c tr in e  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  as i s  
o u t l i n e d  a b ove , h i s  treatm ent  o f  the se n t im e n ts  and em otions  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  s u g g e s t s  a c e r t a i n  rosenblanco  to  i t .  For 
though he r e c o g n i s e s  the growth o f  the sen t im en ts  as "of the
"utmost importance fo r  the  c h a ra c te r  and conduct o f
3
" in d iv id u a l s  and o f  s o c i o t i o s " ,  he s u p p l i e s  us  w ith  no
1. B r a d le y ' s  f r i n c i p l o s  o f  L o g ic ,  p. 276.
2 .  A na ly t ic  P sy ch o lo g y ,  Vol.  I I ,  p. 4C.
3 .  S o c ia l  i s y c h o l o g y ,  150.
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p r i n c i p l e  by which to  understand them as a whole.  He g i v e s  
tho im press ion  th a t  to t r a c e  a f e a t u r e  o f  a sen t im en t  to  i t s  
r o o t - i n s t i n c t  or em otion ,  i s  t c  account fo r  i t  as an c lem ent  
in the s e n t i m e n t , and one r i s e s  from the  p er u sa l  o f  h i s  
S o c ia l  Psychology  w ith  an im press ion  o f  mental l i f e  as a 
bundle o f  i n s t i n c t s ,  im pulses  and ten d e n c ie s^ w ith o u t  any 
in h e re n t  p r i n c i p l e  o f  u n i t y .  This im press ion  i s  s t r e n g t h ­
ened, ra th er  than o t h e r w is e ,  by the diagram (on P. 125) w ith  
which he i l l u s t r a t e s  tho neural  b a ses  o f  the s e n t im en ts  o f  
lo v e  and hate  ; fo r  i t  g i v e s  us no c e n t r a l  r e fe r e n c e  fo r  the  
v a r io u s  neura l  and a f f e c t i v e  d i s p o s i t i o n s  which go to  make 
up the s e n t im e n ts .
Considered as a p r i n c i p l e  o f  grow th , a s s o c i a t i o n  
i s  im p o s s ib le ,  b eca u se ,  as P ro f .  S tou t  has p o in ted  o u t ,  i t  
im p l ie s  a p s y c h o l o g i c a l  atomism.  ^ No s y n t h e s i s  i s  p o s s i b l e  
ex c e p t  on a b a s i s  o f  u n ity  as a fundamental c o n d i t io n  o f  
mental a c t i v i t y .  This  p r e s u p p o s i t io n  determ ines  the form o f  
our ^roblem , and the q u e s t io n  o f  the development o f  a s e n t i ­
ment from an emotion cannot be regarded as a q u e s t io n  o f  how 
a p r i n c i p l e  o f  un ity  i s  introduced in to  e lem ents  which in  
t h e i r  own nature are sep a ra te  and independent .  T h o . 'd is t in c t -
1. A n a ly t ic a l  P sy ch o lo g y ,  Vol.  I I ,  p .  47.
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ion between the  se n t im e n ts  and the em otions i s ,  as wo have 
a lread y  s e e n ,  one o f  degree and r o t  o f  k ind .  Koo%)ing t h i s  in  
mind, we may f in d  in S t o u t ' s  theory  o f  ap percept ion  an e x p la ­
n a t io n  o f  mental growth which we can apply to  the  q u e s t io n  
b e fo r e  u s ,  -  a theory  r o r o o v o r ,  which i s  f r e e  from tho o b j e c t ­
io n s  o f  the a s s o c i a t i o n - t h o o r y . 3y appercept ion  P r o f .  S to u t  
means th a t  “p r o c e s s  by which a r e n t a l  system a p p ro p r ia te s  a 
“now elem ent or  o th e rw ise  r e c e i v e s  a new d e ter m in a t io n ."
I t  i s  the  a t t e n t i o n  p r o c e s s  at i t s  growing p o i n t .  Ha g i v e s  
as an example o f  a p p erce p t iv e  p r o c e s s  the  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  some 
f r e s h  f a c t ,  e . g . ,  o f  a f lo w er  by a b o t a n i s t .  Row a b o t a n i s t  
b r in g s  to h i s  o b s e r v a t io n  o f  f lo w e r s  a mental system in  which 
th e re  i s  a p la c e  fo r  in d i v id u a l  f l o w e r s .  His  ap percept ion  
which b e g in s  w ith  h i s  o b s e r v a t io n  o f  the f lo w er  i s  o n ly  com­
p l e t e d  when he has r e l a t e d  i t  to the  r e s t  o f  h i s  knowledge ; 
and when i t  has become an element In a whole .  In t h i s  way 
the  a l i e n  e lem ent in an o b j e c t  i s  o v e r c o m e a n d  i t  e n t e r s  
in to  a system o f  the mind. Kow i f  we apply t h i s  theory  to  
the  growth o f  tho s e n t im en ts  we should  regard i t  as the  pro­
c e s s  by which new e lem en ts  are.added t o  a lread y  e x i s t i n g  
system s o f  th e  mind. Taking the  example a lread y  g i v e n ,  the
1 .  Cp. I ar t  II  ( c h .  VI,
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sen t im en t  o f  hato would sp r in g  up n a t u r a l l y  and q u ic k ly  by
reason o f  tho very c l o s e  con n ect ion  im pl ied  in the r e l a t i o n  
o f  f a th e r  and c h i l d .  The fa th e r  i s  o r d i n a r i l y  a co n s ta n t  
f a c t o r  i r  a c h i l d ' s  l i f o ;  and one which f o r  th a t  very reason  
en su res  a c e r t a i n  a t t i t u d e  on the  c h i l d ' s  p a r t .  Th is  in  
i t s e l f  g i v e s  us a l l  the  e lem ents  n ece s sa r y  for  the  formation  
';f a s e n t im e n t .  The con ten t  o f  the sen t im en t  w i l l  depend on 
what tho f a t h e r  comes to  stand fo r  in h i s  c h i l d ' s  mind. I f  
he i s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  cr u e l  and i s  th e r e f o r e  always an o b j e c t  
o f  dread and a v e r s io n ,  the o r g a n i s a t io n  o f  the f e e l i n g s ,  to  
which h i s  treatm ent  a p p e a ls ,  w i l l  be rapid and s tro n g  in  pro­
p o r t io n  to the  c l o s e n e s s  o f  the  r e l a t i o n .  I t s  development  
would be delayed  i f  the f a th e r  showed h i r s e l f  kind by f i t s  
and s t a r t s ,  e . g . ,  i f  he were a man g iven  to  frequent  bouts  
o f  d r in k in g ,  but o f  a k in d ly  d i s p o s i t i o n  when so b er .  In th a t  
case  the c h i ld  might lea rn  to dapt h im s e l f  to h i s  f a t h e r ' s  
moods, and i f  h i s  f e a r - d i s p o s i t i o n  was not at any time o v e r -  
s t i m u l a t e d ,  le a rn  to d i s c r im in a te  between " P h il ip  drunk and 
P h i l i p  sober" .  Wherever the  o b j e c t  i s  e q u iv o c a l  and uncer­
t a in  in i t s  ap pea l ,  th ere  we f ind  development c f  a sen t im en t  
s low; the  s im p l e s t  example o f  the r i s e  o f  a sen t im en t  i s  j u s t  
ouch a case c i t e d  by Dr. McDougall where the  o b j e c t  i s  perma-
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ncnt ir*d c o r s i s t o n t  in  i t s  appeal .  But the  u n i ty  which i s  
im plied  in a s e n t im e n t~ i s  a lready  p r e s e n t  in the  r e l a t i o n  
between fa th e r  and c h i l d .  What i s  not y e t  p r e s e n t  i s  a 
s t o i d y  a t t i t u d e  o f  mind, and t h i s  i s  brought about in the  
way d escr ib ed  above.
I I .  We are now in a p o s i t i o n  to c o n s id e r  the  r e l a t i o n
o f  ownership to the  s e n t im e n ts .  This p r e s e n t s  i t s e l f  in  
the form o f  th ree  q u e s t io n s :
1 .  How does ownership c o n tr ib u te  to the  development
o f  the  sen t im en ts?
3 .  Can th ere  be a sen t im en t  o f  ownership?
3 .  I f  30 ,  what i s  i t s  r e l a t i o n  to the o th e r  son t im cnts?  
Kow the f i r s t  q u e s t io n  was a n t i c i p a t e d  in cur treatm ent  o f
ownership and d e s i r e ,  whore ;o saw t h a t  ownership co n tr ib u te d  
to the o r g a n i s a t io n  o f  the mind by the c o n c e n tr a t io n  o f  
d e s i r e ,  as w e l l  as by i t s  expansion  in to  a system p o t e n t i ­
a l l y  capable  o f  in c lu d in g  the  whole range o f  the  em otions .
This idea o f  & d e s i r e  as a system or  u n iv e rse  has been worked 
out by P ro f .  Ivlackenaie in a way th a t  foreshadows L:r. Shand’ s  
co n cep t io n  o f  a se n t im en t .  He u ses  the term somewhat l o o s e l y ,  
but always as i n d i c a t in g  the idea  o f  order  and system . In 
the  narrowest  sense  i t  e x p r e s s e s  the " e t h ic a l  p o in t  o f  view  
o f  the moment" to which a d e s i r e  b e lo n g s .  "The d e s i r e s  o f  a
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"person," he aaya "arc r o t  an i s o l a t e d  phonorrôTtôn^but form an 
"element in  the t o t a l i t y ,  o r ,  as we may s a y ,  the u n iv e r se  
"of h i s  c h a r a c te r ."   ^ Thus the t o t a l i t y  o f  ch a ra c te r  
may comprise many d i f f e r e n t  u n i v e r s e s ,  and in a ch a ra c te r  
th a t  la c k s  u n i ty  and c o - o r d in a t i o n ,  indeed in a l l  but the  
most h ig h ly  o r g a n i s e d ,  some w i l l  be more or l e s s  i n c o n s i s ­
t e n t  with  and c o n tr a d ic to r y  o f  o t h e r s .  This  u n iv e r s e ,  to  
which i n d i v id u a l  d e s i r e s  b e lo n g ,  i s  akin to  Mr. Shand's  
sen t im en t  which o r g a n i s e s  d e s i r e s  and emotions in i t s  s e r ­
v i c e ,  and which may c o e x i s t  w ith  o th e r  more or  l e s s  incom­
p a t i b l e  s e n t im e n ts .  But L r . Ghand’ s sen t im en t  i s  a wider  
term than i r o f .  l !ackenz ie*s  "un iverse" ,  and with  more than 
a purely  e t h i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e ;  i t  i s  the whole p o in t  o f  view  
w ith  r e fe r e n c e  to a c e r t a in  o b j e c t ,  not merely a t  the  moment 
o f  d e s i r e ,  and the  more o rgan ised  a sen t im en t  the more w i l l  
i a so in g  d e s i r e s  take t h e i r  co lo u r  from and be c o n t r o l l e d  by 
i t .  The "universe  o f  d e s ir e "  i s  a more s u b j e c t i v e  term,  
and r i g h t  bo regarded as the mood o f  the  sent im ent^or  the
form g iven  to  i t  by the  s i t u a t i o n  o f  the moment. This  view
i s  su g g es ted  by the i l l u s t r a t i o n  g iven  by P r o f .  lhackcnaio.
He r e f e r s  to the scene in "Love's Labour Lost" where the
announcement o f  the death o f  the  King o f  France b r in g s  to an
1. I'.anuel o f  E t h i c s ,  p. 47.
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end the scene o f  w it  and l e v i t y  and in tr o d u c e s  a new tone o f
s e r i o u s n e s s . "Such a change" he says  "may f a i r l y  be r e fe r r e d
1
to a p assage  from one u n iv erse  to a n o t h e r . " But w hi le  the  
mood changes with  c ircu m stan ces  the sen t im en t  remains the  
same, - . t h e  former l e v i t y  did not imply d i s l o y a l t y  or  want o f  
a f f e c t i o n .  Indeed i t  i s  j u s t  the permanence o f  the  sen t im en t  
which en su res  the change o f  u n iv e r s e .
In the  wider sense  P r o f .  Mackenzie*s u n iv e r s e  s i g ­
n i f i e s  the  s e l f  in one or o th e r  o f  the  many a s p e c t s ;  ho com­
pares  the moral change th a t  takes  p la c e  at  con vers ion  to  the  
t r a n s i t i o n  from a lower to a h igher  u n iv e r s e .  In t h i s  s e n s e  
a u n iv e r s e  i s  tantamount to the e m p ir ic a l  s e l f  which com prises  
w ith in  i t  many s e n t im e n t s ,  changing w ith  t h e i r  growth or  decay  
Thus the sen t im en t  o f  f r i e n d s h ip  may p a ss  from one l e v e l  to  
another in the course  o f  i t s  l i f o - h i s t o r y , each l e v e l  repre­
s e n t in g  a d i f f e r e n t  u n iv e r s e .
p r c l ir . in a r y  to c o n s id e r in g  the  r e l a t i o n  o f  owner­
sh ip  to  the  r e s t  o f  the s e n t im e n ts ,  .îb must ask whether we 
can speak o f  a sen t im en t  o f  ownership.  By t h i s  term we under­
stand the  lo v e  o f  an o b j e c t  as mine, or  as i t  might be e x p r e s s ­
ed the lo v e  o f  "mynoss." This  p o in t  o f  view can be r e a d i ly
1 .  C i t .  O p .  p .  40.
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re c o g n ise d  from e x p e r ie n c e ,  as one th a t  condones the  f a u l t s  
and enhances the a t t r a c t i o n  o f  the o b j e c t ;  but does it^ we may 
a sk ^ r is e  to the  l e v e l  o f  a sentim ent?  In the l i g h t  o f  what 
has boon sa id  o f  the nature o f  a sen t im en t  and o f  the i n f l u ­
ence o f  ownership on the growth o f  the  s e l f ,  we have I t h in k ,  
good reason fo r  regarding  ownership as a s e n t im en t .  For any 
o b j e c t  which i s  capable  o f  s t i m u l a t i n g ,  in s u c c e s s i o n ,  the  
primary emotions o f  f e a r ,  anger ,  j o y ,  sorrow i s  ip so  fa c t o  an 
o b j e c t  o f  a se n t im e n t .  I f  we apply t h i s  t e s t  to an o b j e c t  
regarded as a p o s s e s s i o n ,  we f ind  th a t  i t  f u l f i l s  the r e q u ir e ­
ments o f  a s en t im en t;  f o r  a p o s s e s s i o n  appea ls  to  a l l  the  
primary em otions in tu r n ,  accord ing  to  the  s i t u a t i o n ,  e . g . ,  
joy  in having i t ,  f e a r  at the  thought o f  l o s i n g  i t ,  anger i f  
our enjoyment i s  o b s t r u c t e d ,  sorrow at  th e  l o s s  o f  i t .  Again,  
ownership im p l ie s  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  and the  p resence  o f  
i d e a s ,  f o r  as an ex p er ien ce  i t  means the r e c o g n i t io n  o f  the  
s e l f  as an owner as opposed to  o th e r  s e l v e s , ^  and t h i s  again  
i n v o lv e s  the idea  o f  the o b j e c t  as an o b je c t  o f  p o s s e s s i o n ,  
as "mine" and not "yours."
Thus ownership ,  as opposed to mere p o s s e s s i o n ,  has  
the marks o f ,  and may be ranked a s ,  a true s e n t im e n t ,  fo r  i t
1 .  CP. Chapter I I ,  on Growth o f  Concept o f  S e l f .
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o r g a n i s e s  tho o n o t io n a l  d i s p o s i t i o n s  and d e s i r e s  about the  
idoa o f  an o b j o c t ,  i . o . ,  o f  an o b je c t  regarded as n in e .  Like 
o th e r  son t im on ts  i t  has a l i f e - h i s t o r y . "It i s  gra d u a l ly  
" b u i l t  up, in c r e a s in g  in co m p le x i ty ,  and s t r e n g t h ,  and 
"nay cont inue  to grow i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  or may e n t e r  upon 
"a per iod  o f  d e c l i n e ,  and nay decay s lo w ly  or  r a p i d ly ,  
" p a r t i a l l y  or c o m p le te ly ."   ^ Some attempt has been made 
in e a r l i e r  ch ap ters  to a n a ly se  the p r o c e s s  o f  i t s  f i r s t  emer­
gence above the l e v e l  o f  an i n s t i n c t ,  and \ t g  have seen  that  
t h i s  moment c o i n c i d e s  with the  e a r ly  s en se  o f  s e l f  in  oppo­
s i t i o n  to the n o t - s o l f .  Corresponding to  t h i s  o p p o s i t io n  
there  IS tho sen se  o f  the o b j e c t  as "mine" and t h e r e f o r e  
"not yours" .  Keeping t h i s  f a c t  in v iew ,  we should exp ec t  to  
f ind  th a t  tho sen t im en t  o f  ownership ,  in i t s  comparative sim­
p l i c i t y  and i s o l a t i o n ,  wduld roach i t s  c l imax in th o se  y ea rs  
o f  growth when a c h i ld  i s  most c o n sc io u s  o f  h im s e l f  as a sep­
arate  i n d i v i d u a l ,  -  in o th e r  words during the s e l f - a s s e r t i v e  
ago b efo re  the dawn o f  th o se  o th e r  regarding  se n t im e n ts  which 
mirk the s ta g e  o f  a d o le s c e n c e .  And t h i s  i s  as a m atter  o f  
f a c t  the c a s e ,  fo r  between the ages o f  ten  and tw e lve  the  
sen t im en t  o f  ownership o f t e n  cu lm in ates  in the p a ss io n  fo r
1 .  McDougall 's  S o c ia l  P sy ch o lo g y ,  p. 165.
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c o l l e c t i n g ,  a p a s s io n  which fades  and d i e s  away n a t u r a l l y  at  
a d o le s c e n c e ,  o r ,  i f  i t  s u r v i v e s ,  does so by the in c o r p o r a t io n  
o f  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  f o a t u t o c .  Theue may bo o f  a s e n t im e n ta l  
k in d ,  3 5  in the c o l l e c t i o n  o f  autographs or phctographs ; or a 
c o l l e c t i o n  ray become s c i e n t i f i c .  In e i t h e r  case  tho p a ss io n  
fo r  c o l l e c t i n g  for  i t . :  own rake l o s e s  i t s  p u r i t y ,  becoming sub- 
ord in atzd  to  o thor  ends.  In the m e a n in g le s sn es s  o f  tho la r g e  
r a j o r i t y  o f  unaided c o l l e c t i o n s  wo have as i t  were the c u l - d e -
sac in which, in i t s  unorganised and u n d i s c ip l in e d  forms, th e  
s e n t i r o n t  o f  ownership ray end. Such c o l l e c t i o n s , in  so fa r  a: 
they lack  ary h igher i n t e r e s t  o f  boauty or o rd er ,  ( e . g . ,  such • 
as c i g a r e t t e  ends ,  t a g s ,  e t c . )  r o p re sen t  a b o r t iv e  a ttem pts  a t  
s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n  in a s i n g l e  d i r e c t i o n .
I t  i s  n ec e s sa r y  hero to q u a l i f y  tho a s s e r t i o n  th a t  
ownership can bo regarded as a s e n t i r o n t ,  by sa y in g  th a t  i t  
i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a s u b s id ia r y  sen t im en t  in a mind o f  normal 
development.  This f o r  two re a so n s:  F i r s t l y ,  i t  i s  dependent
on o th e r  ô o n t ir o n to  fo r  i t s  o x i c t o n c c .  I f  an o b j e c t  did not  
dovelo^ a n y  o th e r  source  o f  a t t r a c t i o n  than uhat wo have 
c a l l e d  i t s  myness, i t  vmuld i r o v i t a b l y  l o s e  i t s  i n t e r e s t  a l t o ­
g e th er .  Without sore  i n t r i n s i c  i n t e r e s t  in the o b j e c t ,  beyond 
tha t  o f  i t s  being an o b j e c t  o f  p o s s e s s io n  the sen t im en t  o f  
ownership could not s u r v iv e .  bo may here adapt a phrase o f
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Mr. Ghana's oxprosoivo  o f  tho r e l a t i o n  o f  the emotions to the  
sen t im en ts ,a n d  say tha t  the sentim ent o f  ownership i s  adjec­
tival*. and q u a l i fK so th er  sen t im en ts .  Or aga in ,  borrowing  
from the language o f  l o g i c ,  wo may c a l l  ownership a formal 
sen t im en t ,  dependent fo r  i t s  in c e p t io n  and continued e x i s t e n c e  
on o ther  se n t im en ts .  "Mynoss" i s ,  as i t  wore, tho form ; but  
i t  must r e c e iv e  i t s  content  from othor sontimonts* Tho joy  
o f  a b irthday has "nyncss" for  i t s  form, -  my p a r ty ,  my pre­
s e n t s ,  e t c . ,  -  but the party must bo a s u c c e s s ,  the p r e s e n t s  
must p l e a s e ,  or a l l  the joy w i l l  be o v e r c a s t .  Tho "mynoss" 
o f  an o b je c t  may be compared to the f o o l in g  o f  p lea su r e  which 
q u a l i f i e s  a concrete  ex p er ien ce .
Secondly ,  i f  ownership does not take i t s  p la ce  as 
a s u b s id ia r y  sen t im en t ,  i t  load s  to a ono-s ided  development  
o f  sen t im en ts  o f  an e g o i s t i c  n atu re ,  such as love  o f  w ea lth ,  
a v a r ic e ,  and m i s e r l i n e s s .  In a l l  these  the sentim ent o f  
ownership i s  a dominant e lem ent,  and s e l f  i s  made the s o l e  
end o f  enjoyment, i . o , ,  s e l f  in the sense' o f  i t s  o p p o s i t io n  
to o t h e r s .  This b r in gs  us tc  the quest ion  whothor^sontiment  
o f  ownership i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  e g o i s t i c ,  s in c e  i t s  development  
as an independent f a c t o r  lends  i t s e l f  to the growth o f  o ther
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sen t im en ts  which arc undoubtedly so .  Without ontor ing  in to  a 
d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s io n  o f  egoism and a l t r u ism ,  i t  i s  enough to 
say that  the terms aro abstract ions^and th a t  the d i s t i n c t i o n  
between them i s  only r e l a t i v e .  A pure e g o i s t  or a pure 
a l t r u i s t  would bo an i m p o s s i b i l i t y .  The torms have moreover 
too d i s t i n c t l y  an e t h i c a l  f la v o u r  to  be o f  use in d e s c r ib in g  
the  primary tendency o f  a s imple sentim ent l i k e  th a t  o f  owner­
sh ip .  But as they mark a d i s t i n c t i o n  which i s  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  
as w e l l  as e t h i c a l ,  i t  i s  necessary  to express  t h i s  by another  
p a ir  o f  terms. The terms s e l f - r e g a r d i n g  and o th e r -reg a r d in g  
are here used, as ex p ress in g  the t e n d e n c ie s  which under favour­
ing c ircum stances  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  in to  egoism and a l t r u ism ,  but
which in them selves  are e t h i c a l l y  n e u tr a l .  In t h i s  sense  the 
sentim ent o f  ownership i s  a s e l f - r e g a r d i n g  sent im ent .  The 
favouring  c ircum stances  in which i t  tends towards egoism are,  
as wo have s e e n ,  i t s  unchecked growth and dominance in a 
sen t im en t ,  p a tr io t i s m  i s  s t r o n g ly  coloured by the sent im ent  
o f  ownership; but i s  not th e r e fo r e  n e c e s s a r i l y  e g o i s t i c ;  only  
becoming so when i t s  e s s e n t i a l  "mynoss" becomes a dominant 
e lem ent.
The e x i s t e n c e  o f  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  emotions and impul­
s e s  i s  exp la ined  by Dr. McDougal as due to tho tender emotion
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o f  the  p a ren ta l  i n s t i n c t .  In h i s  view a l l  d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s  
sp r in g s  from the  p aren ta l  i n s t i n c t ,  which "is  accompanied by 
"d strong  and d e f i n i t e  emotion."^ He holds th a t  "in no 
"other way " . . . "is i t  p o s s i b l e  to account for  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  
"beneficence  and moral in d ig n a t io n .  I f  t h i s  view i s  r o j -  
"octed, they remain a paradox and a m irac le  -  t e n d e n c ie s ,  
"mysteriously  implanted in tho human b r e a s t ,  tha t  have no 
"his tory  in the ev o lu t io n a ry  p r o c e s s ,  no analogy and no
" i n t e l l i g i b l e  connect ion  w ith ,  no resemblance to any o f
2
"the o th er  f e a tu r e s  o f  our mental c o n s t i t u t i o n . "
Dr. McDougall seem s'to  us to show an undue anxiety  to ex p la in  
tho source o f  d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s ,  which i s  not f l a t t e r i n g  to  
human nature .  I t  i s  as i f  ho f e l t  i t  to be an ex cep t io n  to 
the r u le ,  and was in hasto  to  f ind a p la ce  for  i t ,  in order  
to bo assured o f  i t s  resemblance t o ,  or analogy with the  
othor  f e a t u r e s  o f  our mental c o n s t i t u t i o n .  But h i s  explana­
t io n  r e p e l s  rather  than a t t r a c t s  one,  fo r  i t  t r i e s  to e x p la in  
an e t h i c a l  value on purely  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  grounds, and i s  an
in s ta n ce  o f  h i s  tendency to o v e r s im p l i fy  a problem. -   -------
Mr. C. w allas  draws a t t e n t io n  to t h i s  " s im p l i f i c a t io n  o f  a 
"complex problem" and p o in t s  out that  " just  as Hobbes and
1.  S o c ia l  P sychology ,  p. 68.  
Ib id ,  p. 79 .*
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"Beritham f i r s t  exp la ined  a l l  s o c i a l  impulses as c a s e s  o f
"the s i n g l e  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  Fear or l a i n ,  and then found
"themselves compelled,  in order to  account for  tho f a c t s ,
"to extend t h e i r  ovfn d e f i n i t i o n  by using words in a
"strainod and non-natural  s e n s e ,  so Dr. McDougall has to
"tw is t  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  of Mothor-Lovo in order to make i t
1
"cover f a c t s  which ho h im se l f  admits." There i s  a
su g g e s t io n  o f  fa ta l i s m  in the idea th a t  " a l t r u i s t i c  conduct
a s i n g l e
o f  every kind" sp r in g s  fronj^omotion, which in turn "deponds 
"upon tho e x i s t e n c e  o f  an i n s t i n c t .  Rare then a ltru ism  
and d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s  dependent on our being born with the  
r ig h t  number o f  i n s t i n c t s ?  I s  i t  not q u i te  con ce ivab le  th a t  
a man might be born without  tho p aren ta l  i n s t i n c t ?  Indeed 
Dr. ticDougall has to t w i s t  h i s  theory to f i t  tho f a c t s  by 
making F ath er - love  a kind o f  d i lu te d  Mother-love which i s  
"transmitted" to members o f  the o ther  sex .  But what c e r t a i n ­
ty  can wo have th a t  t h i s  tran sm iss ion  in v a r ia b ly  takes  p lace?  
And i f  i t  doos not i s  there  then no hope o f  such a person  
over being capable o f  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  conduct? I t  seems n o t ,  
fo r  in a fo o tn o te  to h i s  l a t e s t  e d i t i o n  Dr. McDougall con­
tem plates  Lhe p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a woman being "devoid o f  the
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maternal i n s t i n c t "  and concludes th a t  " r e f l e c t i o n  upon the 
"conduct o f  such a woman w i l l  d i s c o v e r  that  her conduct  
"in a l l  r e l a t i o n s  proceeds from purely  s e l f i s h  t o t i v e s .
From such a p e s s i m i s t i c  view .to turn to the more
hopeful  one that  i t  i s  not the nature o f  the emotion i t s e l f ,
but the nature o f  the o b je c t  around which i t  i s  o rg a n ise d ,
Fth a t  makes i t  e g o i s t i c  or  o th e r w ise .  The o b je c t  in i t s  
turn takes  i t s  ch aracter  from .the wholo o f  which i t  i s  a 
p art .  In t h i s  connexion kr .  Shand r a i s e s  tho quest ion
"how such emotions as fear  and anger -  commonly regarded  
"as e g o i s t i c  or at l e a s t  as bearing on tho p r e s erv a t io n  
"of the in d iv iu u a l^ o r  such uncerta in  emotions as joy  and 
"sorrow -  how these can p o s s e s s ,  both in d i v id u a l l y  and 
" c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  a d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s  apparently  fo re ig n  to 
"their' na tu re ."  His answer 1 3  that i t  i s  not the  
nature ox tho em o t io n , but tho cause which e x c i t e s  i t ,  or  
the  system in which i t  ii> org a n ised ,  that  cakes  i t  d i s i n ­
t e r e s t e d .  And ho adds "The erro r  o f  preceding t h e o r i e s  has
1 .  S o c ia l  p sych o logy ,  p. 71.  Koto.
2 .  Ib id ,  p. 15.
K. Cp. with t h i s  Green's statem ent  that "the r o i l  nature o f  
any act  o f  r i l l  depends on tho p a r t i c u la r  nature o f  the 
o b je c t  in which the person w i l l i n g  for  tho t i r o  seek s  s e l f -  
s a t i s f a c t i o n . "  I r o l o g .  I-ir. 154.
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ft
boon due to the assumption that  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  act ion  i s  the
1
''consequGDCG o f  the p a r t i c u la r  nature o f  sore  emotion."  
ifVe have here what seems to us a much truer  t h e o r y , and one 
that  c a r r i e s  us a great  deal fu r th er  towards an exp lan at ion  
o f  d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s  than that o f  Dr., McDougall. A l t r u i s t i c  
a c t io n  i s  not made to depend upon the exc item ent  o f  a s i n g l e  
emotion and i n s t i n c t ,  but upon the nature o f  the system in  
which the emotions are o rg a n ised ,  and thus "evory emotion
O
has d -potentia l  d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s , "  ' This viow seems to  
o f f e r  a broader and surer  foundation for  a l t r u i s t i c  conduct,  
than one which has to  r e s o r t  to "a vast  e x te n s io n  o f  the  
" f i e ld  o f  a p p l i c a t io n  of  the maternal i n s t i n c t . "  The
parable  o f  the  Good Samaritan i s  c i ted^by Dr. LlcDougall^ as 
an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  the theory tha t  d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s  i s  
e n t i r e l y  due to the exc item ent  o f  tender emotion. But even 
gran t ing  t h i s ,  we are not any nearer to a re a l  ex p la n a t io n .  
Here are three men placed s u c c e s s i v e ly  in the  same s i t u a t i o n ^  
which in two out o f  three  ovokos s e l f i s h  n e g le c t  o f  s u f f e r -
I
ing ,  in the th ird  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  p i t y .  How to exp la in  the
1.  Foundations o f  Character, p. 45.
2 .  Ib id ,  p. 49.
5 .  S o c ia l  Psychology ,  p. 7 3 .
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d i f f e r e n c e  by say ing  that  the s ig h t  o f  s u f f e r i n g  awakened 
tender emotion in the one and not in the o t h e r s ,  lo a v e s  us 
j u s t  where we were, oven i f  wo make the q u i t e  a rb itrary  
assumption that the p r i e s t  and the Lovite  were devoid o f  
the p aren ta l  i n s t i n c t ,  and th e r e fo r e  incapable  o f  tender  
emotion. For the s to ry  doos r o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  imply tha t  
they wore men wholly devoid o f  sympathy; t h e i r  condemna­
t io n  lay  in the f a c t  th a t  t h e i r  p i ty  was not evoked by the  
s i t u a t i o n .  That t h i s  should have been s o ,  was ro t  due to 
any innate  d e f e c t  in t h e i r  mortal c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  such as tho  
absence o f  an i n s t i n c t ,  but to  the narrow system in which 
t h e i r  l i v e s  wore o rg a n ise d ,  a system which l e f t  no room for  
sympathy or duty o u ts id e  i t s  own l i m i t s .  But s e t t i n g  as ide  
the q u es t io n  o f  i t s  o r i g i n ,  tender emotion does not in 
i t s e l f  imply d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s ,  apart from the mental system  
in which i t  i s  o rg a n ised .  A good i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  i s  
found in B a r r ie ' s  "Tommy and G r i z e l ’*, Tommy e x c e l l e d  in  
nothing so much as in h i s  response to  every appeal to  h i s  
tender  emotion. Ho would have outshone the Good Samaritan 
in h i s  m i n i s t r a t i o n s  o f  the wounded t r a v e l l e r .  But he 
would not th e r e fo r e  have been anything but what he was, v i s . ,  
a h ig h ly  r e f in ed  type o f  e g o i s t .  Speaking o f  the manner o f
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h i s  death ,  which shows him in the very worst l i g h t ,  Barrie  
s a y s ,  "Had tho c a s t l e  gone on f i r e  tha t  day while  ho v/as at  
"tea and he per ished  in the flames in a sp lend id  attempt  
"to save the l i f e  o f  h is  enemy (a very probable t h i n g ) ,  
"then you would have f e l t  a l i t t l e  l i k i n g  for  him. Yet 
"he would have been p r e c i s e l y  tho same p erso n . "  ^ I t  i s  
not the nature o f  the emotion in i t s e l f ,  but the nature o f  
the wholejor system, in which i t  i s  incorporated ,  th a t  makes 
i t  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  or o th e rw ise .
Mr. Shand's use o f  tho term " d is in te r e s t e d "  i s
somewhat ambiguous. He a p p l i e s  i t  to a c t io n  "d irected  to
"tho p r es e rv a t io n  or w e l l -b e in g  o f  some o ther  l i f e  than 
2
"our own." This d i s t i n c t i o n  corresponds to th a t  
between the two broadly co n tra s ted  typos o f  system, v i z . ,  
s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n  and p a ren ta l  Icvo .  But t h i s  i s  a psycho­
l o g i c a l  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  not n e c e s s a r i l y  carry ing  an e t h i c a l  
meaning, whereas Mr. Shand e v i d e n t ly  in tends  i t  in an e t h i c a l  
s e n s e .  But the d i s t i n c t i o n  between the s e l f  and o th e r s  i s  
not an ab so lu te  one, and a c t io n s  d iroc tod  towards s e l f - p r e s e r ­
va t ion  are not n e c e s s a r i l y  " in teres ted "  in an e t h i c a l  s en se ;  
in f a c t  they may be in a high degree d i s i n t e r e s t e d ,  as when 
a mother takes  the utmost care o f  her h e a l th ,  for  the sake o f
1 .  Tommy and G r iz e l ,  p. 5C5, 506.'
2 .  The Foundations o f  Character,  p. 45.
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hcr c h i ld r e n .  Tho h igher  ssn t lm sntc  transcord  tho d i s t i n c t i o n ,  
and produce conduct .ïhich i s  tru ly  d i s i r t o r o s t o d ,  not bocausG 
i t  i s  d iroc tod  to the w e lfare  o f  some othor  l i f e  as opposed 
to cur own, but because the end towards which i t  in d ir e c t e d  
lo a v e s  no room for  the thought o f  s e l f ,  as an end apart froir 
the whole. This idea i s  implied when wo speak o f  l o s i n g  our-  
s e l v o s  in a cause ,  and in the words * l o s i n g  o n e 's  l i f e " ,  and 
i s  w e l l  expressed  by F ich lo  in the fo l lo w in g  p a s s a g e : -
‘ Go nach b e s to h t  das v o r n u n L o b o n  darin class die  
"Person in dcr Gatlung c ich  v er^ gcsso ,  ihr  Lebon an 
"das ^Lobon dos Gansen s e t a e ,  unci cs  ihn auL-cpv^ore
ft
" . . .  f i l l s  d i3 ,  was / e r n u n f t ig  aug'-^ieich gut . . .  1 s t  
"so p iobt  G I: T.ur oino Tugcnd, d ie  —  s ic h  s e l b s t  
"so lbor  a i s  Person zw verge i8on, ur.d nur Kin I .a s ter ,
"das —  an s i c k  s o l b r t  zu  dcnkcn." ^
1.  SariLllicho Perko. 13d 7 . 3 .  34,  35.
s o .
We have chosen the t e r r s  " se l f -r e g a r d in g "  and "other  
regarding"; to e l u c id a t e  the p lace  o f  ownership among tho 
other  s e n t im e n t s . They are free  from the above ambiguity and 
mark a d i s t i n c t i o n  o f  degree ,  which i s  not in i t s e l f  an e t h i ­
ca l  ono. A s e l f - r e g a r d i n g  sentim ent as vfe understand i t ,  has 
a primary re feren ce  tc  the s e l f ,  w hi le  an o th er -reg a r d in g  
sentim ent has a primary re fere n ce  tc  o th e r s .  As a sep a ra te  
sent im ent  ownership i s  a s e l f - r e g a r d i n g  sen t im en t ,  f o r ,  as 
we have se en ,  i t s  es sen ce  i s  tho love  o f  'mynoss*. I t  i s  a t  
t h i s  s ta g e  e t h i c a l l y  n e u tr a l ,  and i s  capable o f  s e l f i s h  or 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d  o r i e n t a t i o n .  I t s  e t h i c a l  b ia s  w i l l  depond on 
the nature o f  the sentim ent in which i t  i s  incorporated ,  and 
on i t s  su bserv ience  to the h igher ends o f  tha t  sen t im en t .
I f  i t  becomes su b s id ia r y  to o th er -reg a r d in g  s e n t im e n ts ,  i t  
w i l l  g iv e  i t s  own law ful  co n tr ib u t io n  to the whole. The 
e t h i c a l  importance o f  g iv in g  ownership i t s  r ig h t  p lace  In 
the  sysfor o f  tho sent im ents  can hardly be o v eres t im a ted .
Take fo r  example the sent im ents  o f  f r ie n d sh ip  and p a t r i o t i s m ,  
in to  which tho s o r t i r e n t  o f  ownership undoubtedly e n t e r s .
Kg one can deny i t s  unique c o n tr ib u t io n  to those  sen t im en ts ;  
but they may both become d i s t o r t e d  from t h e i r  true ends ,  i f  
what we have c a l l e d  tho sense  o f  mynoss predominates in them.
The ofXacl  moreover i s  not confined to tho s o r t i r o n t  i t s e l f ,  
f o r  i z  Z'r. Ghand she ur/, every wontimont tonde to r e in fo r c e  
those o th e r  .continente which are compatible with the ends for  
which I t  i s  o rgan ised .  I r o f .  Stout' ex p r e s se s  t h i s  in the 
torn c o -o p e r a t io n ,  by which ho n o in s  tho yrocesa  by %hich a 
r e n t a l . group, in tho e x o r c i s e  o f  i t s  appercept ive  f u n c t io n s ,  
prompts o th e rs  to a s im i la r  a c t i v i t y .  Thus i  f r i e n d s h ip ,  
in which the element o f  ownership has become iTOdominant, 
tends not  only  to l o s e  i t s  true ch a ra c te r ,  but  to r o in fo r ce  
the same elements in o ther  sen t im en ts .  Guch a p ro ce ss  i s  
detr im enta l  to tlie development o f  tho h igher  impersonal  
sontimonts  and tonds to s ta rv e  out o f  e x i s t e n c e  a l l 'those  
i n t e r e s t s  which are not b iassed  in t h i s  p a r t i c u la r  d i r e c t i o n ,  
i s t r i k i n g  example o f  t h i s  i s  the way in which v i o l e n t  s e x ­
ual a t t r a c t i o n  tends tc  drown a l l  the h igher  and more imper­
sonal i n t e r e s t s ,  even when these have o r i g i n a l l y  formed con­
s t i t u e n t  o l c r c n t s  o f  the o r i g i n a l  r e l a t i o n .  S o i l s  g i v e s  
i l l u s t r a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  in "Tho P a ss io n a te  Friends" and in"the  
n e i  M a c h ia v e l l i" ,  in the l a t t e r  he makes h i s  hoco sa y ,
"II i s  cur ious  and Î think a very s i g n i f i c a n t  th ing  that
"since v/e had bacons l o v r r s ,  wo had ta lked  very l i t t l e  
✓
"of the broader th in g s  th a t  had once so s tro n g ly  gripped
our* im agin at ion s ."  And o f  a s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  in
"th.- i aos ionate  Friends", he says  "From tho day that p as -  
‘ s ion  carr ied  us and we became in tho narrower sense  o f  
"tho word lo v o r s ,  a l l  the wider i n t e r e s t s  we had in com— 
"iron, our p o l i t i c a l  i n t e n t i o n s ,  our impersonal schemes,  
"began to pass  out of  our in te r c o u r s e ."   ^ These i l l u s ­
t r a t i o n s  arc r e le v a n t  to our t o p i c ,  s in c e  the d e s ir e  f o r ,  
and the sense  o f ,  p o s s e s s io n  i s  one o f  tho s t r o n g e s t  e lem ents  
in sexua l  a t t r a c t i o n .
I f  WÔ were to  represen t  the development o f  charac­
t e r  as a s t r a i g h t  l i n e  we should g iv e  ownership a p la ce  in ' 
i t ,  f i r s t  as a n eu tra l  s e l f - r e g a r d in g  se n t im en t ,  then as a 
su b s id ia r y  sentim ent in the o th er -reg a rd in g  se n t im e n ts .  As 
•a dominant sentim ent i t  would rep rese n t  a s id e - t r a c k  o f f  
the s t r a i g h t  l i n e  o f  development le a d in g  to the h igher  imper­
sonal s en t im en ts .  Tho e s s e n t i a l l y  persona l  ch aracter  o f  
ownership g iv e s  i t  a p lace  in a l l  those sent im ents  th a t  have 
any re ference  to the s e l f .  But there  are o ther  sent im ents  
In which no such re feren ce  i s  im pl ied ,  and in to  which owner­
sh ip  doos not en te r .  Tho development o f  those sen t im en ts  
p o in t  to the l i m i t a t i o n  o f  ownership, as a fa c to r  in the
1. P. 483.
3 . P. 155.
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development o f  ch arac ter .  I t  has no l e g i t i m a t e  p la c e  in the  
search for  truth  o f  the h ig h e s t  forms o f  r e l i g i o u s  sent im ent;  
the lo v e  o f  o n e ' s  k ind ,  which e x p re sse s  i t s e l f  in the e spou sa l  
o f  a cause ,  i s  f e l t  to be v i t i a t e d  by any re feren ce  to the 
cause as cause .  Even love  and f r i e n d s h ip ,  which belong to
the persona l  se n t im en ts ,  f a i l  o f  t h e i r  h ig h e s t  development, i f  
they do not tend to e l im in a te  the sense  o f  ownership with which 
they undoubtedly beg in .  The same i s  true o f  r e l i g i o u s  s e n t i ­
ment which in i t s  h ig h e s t  forms tends to the repu d ia t ion  o f  a l l  
forms o f  "my" and "thy". The h i s t o r y  o f  r e l i g i o n  abounds in  
examples o f  t h i s  repu d ia t ion  o f  ownership as a h indrance ,  or  at  
l e a s t  as a s u p e r f l u i t y  to  the s p i r i t u a l  l i f e .  The emphasis  
which ownership r i g h t l y  l a y s  on the sep a ra ten ess  o f  in d i v id u a l s  
i s  f e l t ,  at a . c e r t a i n  s t a g e ,  to be a negat ion  o f  thé  u n ity  
which i s  sought a f t e r .  The Lady Poverty o f  S t .  Francis  docs  
not represen t  a mere negat ion  o f  m a te r ia l  w ea lth ,  but a p o s i ­
t i v e  id e a l  o f  freedom. All  myness in v o lv e s  n e g a t io n ,  whereas  
in the  id e a l  o f  S t .  Francis  the b a r r i e r s  o f  the s e l f  are t r a n s ­
cended, and with the breaking down o f  those  ownership l o s e s
i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
The id e a l  o f  S t .  Francis  which s e t s  tho l i m i t  to
. ownership as a f a c t o r  in tho development o f  ch a ra c te r ,  -  an 
id e a l  o f  which he was h im se l f  the embodiment, -  i s  one that
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has i t s  o r i g in  in sound psychology and e t h i c s ,  as w e l l  as 
in r e l i g i o n .  I t  i s  in a t t i t u d e  o f  mind even more than a 
way o f  l i f e .  Without any d i r e c t  connection  with any theory  
of  economics, i t  i s  y e t  o f  paramount importance in an age 
which, l i k e  our own, i n h e r i t s  the t r a d i t i o n  that  economic 
progress  i s  synonymous with s o c i a l  w e l fa r e .  Tho Lady Poverty  
o f  St.  Francis  re p r ese n ts  the l i b e r t y  o f  the s p i r i t  th a t  has  
escaped out o f  the bondage where "things are in the saddle  
-and r ide  mankind", in to  the froodom o f  true s e l f - p o s s e s s i o n .
P A R T  II .
Tho P h i lo s o p h ic a l  B a s is  o f  Ownership.
e e .
P a r t  I I .
Foreword.
3o far  '5fo. hav& bear conoidoring th*? "ccnorotr; fa c t"  
o f  ownership in it£î bearing on ch a ra c ter .  Tho fo l lo w in g  
a n c l io n  tr # a t#  o f  ownership as an a b s tr a c t  r i g h t ,  an aspect  
belonging  to philosophy rather  than psychology .  That a 
p h i lo s o p h ic  treatment o f  ownarahlp which fo l lo w s  a h i s t o r i c a l  
course should not begin  with  A r i s t o t l e ,  whoso c o n tr ib u t io n  
i s  f i r s t  in time by so many co n tu r lo a ,  may soo# an or l e s i o n  
requ ir ing  ex p la n a t io n .  But A r i s t o t l e ' s  method i s  on tho 
l i n o s  o f  an argumontum ad homlrem, and Is  a co n tr ib u t io n  to
tho psychology rather  than to the philosophy o f  ownership.
The form moreover in ahloh tho problem o f  tho r i g h t  o f  
ownor&hip ^raaonto i t a o l f  t c  ua, prcclud&s our beginning  
w ith  A r i s t o t l e .  For h lo  theory Is  baaed on a narrow o l a o s -  
m o r a l l t y ,  in which there i s  no concept ion  o f  the r i r h ta  o f  
tho person auch. Tho problem o f  tho r i g h t s  o f  tho person  
belongs  indeed to rodom  p h i lo so p h y ,  and in»dequate though
Locke'a concept ion  o f  p e r s o n a l i ty  i s ,  ho y e t  c c n tr ib u to s  
t h i s  tc the  c e n tr a l  probXom, tha t  ho ba«oc tho r ig h t  o f
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owrorshlp on tiio r ights  of personality .  I t  i s  therefore  
fror hii': r.ith*r than fro» Aristot le  that otir presort  
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Chapter I .
Ownership and A c t iv i t y : -  Locke.
Locke has been s ty led  the father of English Empiricism, 
and the main tendency of h i s  thought, as i t  was developed l a t e r  by 
Hume, no doubt j u s t i f i e s  the t i t l e .  But he i s  by no means a radical  
Empiricist ,  for he i s  f u l l  of  in co n s is ten c ie s ,  which, i f  followed  
out, would lead in the opposite d irect ion  to Empiricism. For ex­
ample, as a cons is tent  Empiricist he should not have recognised  
any source of certa in ty  in knowledge, except sonse-impressions, and 
in  p la ces  he e x p l i c i t l y  denies any such source. Yet he admits uni­
versal  proposit ions  derived from abstract  ideas.  Again, he f a i l s  
to maintain h i s  th ô s i s  o f  the mind as a "tabula rasa", or "sheet 
’of  white paper", the passive rec ip ien t  of  ideas which come to i t  
from outside;  for he recognises  the' a c t i v i t y  of the mind in i t s
innate faculties^, and powers of r e f l e c t io n  and comparison, speak-
1
ing of "the operations of the mind."
N. The terms r ight  of  ownership and r ight  of property are used 
synonymously throughout the fo l lowing chapters.
N. References in t h i s  chapter are to the Essay on Human Understan. 
ding. (Fraser)
1. Bk. I I .  11.14.
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Further, he proceeds cn the assumption of the *^rincipies of cau- 
1 2 
sa t icn ,  of a necessary connection between ideas ,  and of  the
3
"eternal and unalterable nature of  r ight  and wrong." His
theory of  t^ersonality, with which wo are concerned, betrays the  
same lack of consistency. He has a profound f a i t h  in the worth of  
persons, butho nowhere reaches an adequate conception o f  a free  
and s e l f —direct ing ,  and therefore moral, persona l i ty .  While rcco£>* 
, n i s in g  t h t  personali ty  i iq ; l ie s  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  he i s  carefu l  to  
free  the id e n t i ty  of the person from dependence on id e n t i ty  of 
substance, the nature of  which i s  a mystery wrapped in  sp eculat ive  
obscurity.  Memory i s  for  him the t e s t  and cr i ter io n  of id e n t i ty ,  
and i s  necessary for accountabil i ty .  His or son" i s  a foren s ic  
term, and by r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  he means le g a l  accountabil i ty .  This 
view i s  co n s is te n t  with h is  idoa of  l ib e r t y  as freedom from exter­
nal constra int ,  "a -ower in any agent to do ^r forbear any p a r t i e -  
4
ular act ion ."  Liberty in t h i s  cense i s  the l im i t  of l e g a l  respon­
s i b i l i t y ;  but i t  does net touch the fr inge of the meaning of  moral 
freedom, v#hich can only be guaranteed when the agent i s  shown to be 
the author of  h i s  v o l i t io n ,  as well  as of  h i s  action.
This account of l ib e r t y  dees not indood exhaust Locke's
1. See ÎU to Bk» I I .  20. 1.
2» JL>k* IT* u# 29.
-Qiioted in H- to I I .  20.11.
. I I .  21. 8.
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treatment of  the subject,  for he r a i s e s  the question ”what i s  i t  
th a t  determines the w i l l  in regard to our actions**, to  which he
1
r e p l i e s  th a t  i t  i s  "some uneasiness that a man i s  a t  present under** .
But t h i s ,  in the words of h is  commentator, "makes v o l i t i o n  an i s su e
of the physical system, and man even in the deepest roots  o f  h is
2
being, a part o f  nature. ** Locke approaches the conception of
sp ir i tu a l  freedom most nearly, when he maintains that  the w i l l  has
the power o f  suspending the execution of the many des ires  which
press  upon i t ,  and of judging which of these w i l l  contribute to the  
3
highest  good. This power he admits as an exception, and herein he 
says " l i e s  the l ib e r ty  man has." But even now he has not l i f t e d  
the w i l l  out of the order of natural sequencej for the power to sus­
pend v o l i t i o n  does not prevent one from being, in the end^determined 
by "uneasiness". Locke's person i s  never the author of h i s  v o l i t io n ,  
never the lawgiver.
I t  has seemed necessary thus c r i t i c a l l y  to examine Locke's  
conception of personali ty ,  because, as we sh a l l  see, he bases the  
r igh t  o f  property on the same ground as the r ight  of persona l i ty .
This connexion, which i t  i s  h i s  merit to have been the f i r s t  to  
emphasise, i s  in no way invalidated by the inadequacy of h i s  con­
ception o f  persona l i ty .  Our c r i t i c i s m  i s  directed to show that  
Lockds person cannot be the subject of r ig h ts ,  arid that there
1. I I .  21.31.32.
2. Fraser on Essay in M.2 to I I .  21.31.
5. 11 .21 .48 .
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must there fo re  be an advance upon h is  thought before we can fee l 
th a t  we are on so lid  ground. For tc  base the r ig h t of property  
on the ground of the r ig h t  of p erso n a lity , w ithout a t  the same 
time es tab lish in g  p erso n a lity , i s  to  build  without a foundation.
Locke's treatm ent of property  forms p a r t  of a t r e a t i s e  
on C iv il Government; in  which he p resen ts  h is  construc tive  theory 
of government following on a d es tru c tiv e  c r itic ism  of S ir R. Filmer*s 
theory o f the divine r ig h t of kings. In th i s  se ttin g  we can under­
stand why Locke i s  a t  such pains to  maintain th a t  the world was 
o rig in a lly  given to  men in common. The question which the consider­
ation  of property  ra is e s  fo r him, i s  there fo re  th a t  of showing
"how men might come to  have a property  in  several p a r ts  of th a t
1
which God gave to  mankind in  common." After the manner of h is  time
Locke assumes the f ic t io n  of a s ta te  of natu re , as preceding th a t
of c iv i l  government and socie ty . This s ta te  he describes as one
of "p e rfec t freedom to  order th e ir  ac tions and dispose of th e i r
possessions as they th ink  f i t  w ithin the bounds of the law of na- 
2
t u r e . " I t  i s  a s ta te  of»things p r io r  to  the invention of money,
and im plies abundance of land open to  a l l .  "In the beginning a l l
5
the world was America". What then, he asks in  e f fe c t , gave any 
p a r tic u la r  indiv idual a t i t l e  to  the ownership of an ex ternal 
ob jec t, land or any o ther commodity?
1. T reatise  on C ivil Government : 25.
2. Ib id : 4.
3. Ib id : 49.
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Put in t h i s  concrete form, Locke's question i s  seen to  
bo quite d i s t in c t  from the general question of the nature of  
r ig h t s  in general, which he never r a i s e s ,  any more than he r a i s e s  
that of the p o s s i b i l i t y  of freedom. Locke answers h i s  own quest­
ion by boldly turning i t  back to the more fundamental problem of 
persona l i ty .  Herein l i e s  the value of h is  contribution, a value 
which i s  not impaired by the fa c t  that personali ty  did not present  
problems to him, which seem v i t a l  to la t e r  and more advanced philo ­
sophic thought. "The h i s t o r ic a l ,  p la in  method", here as elsewhere,  
precedes the c r i t i c a l  method. The fundamental property which every 
man p ossesses ,  i s  in h is  own person, says Locke? t h i s  nobody has 
a r igh t  to but himself .  But a r ight  to one's  person im plies  a r igh t  
to control one's  a c t i v i t i e s ,  a truth which a f te r  the lapse  o f  cen­
t u r ie s  s ince Locke, i s  only dimly recognised as yet .  From t h i s  
twofold r ight  he deduces the r ight  of ownership, on the ground 
that by labour a man puts something of himself into a thing, which 
therefore excludes others from the common r ight  to  i t ,  presupposed 
by the f r i c t io n  of a s ta te  of nature. "Labour being the unques- 
"tionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a r ight
to what th a t  i s  once joined to ,  at l e a s t  where there i s  enough,
1
'and as good l e f t  in common for others". Such i s  the g i s t  o f  
Locke's theory, and the r e s t  of h i s  treatment i s  simply an
1. Git .  op. 27.
elaboration of t h i s  central idea.
Locke's assert ion  that  labour g ives  a t i t l e  to property,  
re c e iv e s  from him a twofold q u a l i f i c a t io n .  F ir s t ,  i t  i s  not the 
mere fa c t  of labour that e n t i t l e s  one to c a l l  a thing one's  own; 
i t  must be purposeful labour, d irected to the r ight  use and enjoy­
ment of  a thing. He repudiates a r ight  to sp o i l  or destroy, and 
in so doing recognises the so c ia l  nature of a r ight .  Socondly,
personal r ig h ts  are l im ited  and conditioned by so c ia l  requirements,
%
by a man's enjoyment and use, and by the needs of others.  Right
i s  l im ited  by the power of enjoyment: "every man should have as
1
'much as ho could make use o f ."  Labour accordingly, net only g ives
a t i t l e  to property, i t  also s e t s  a l im i t  to i t .  "A man has no
2
'r igh t  further than h i s  use." We have here in gorm the d i s t in c t io n
l a t e l y  drawn by Prof. Hobhouso between property for use and pro-
5
perty for power. "Measure" says uocke, "did confine every man's
"possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as he might
%
"appropriate to himself without injury to anybody".
Locke does not f a i l  into the modern error of  conceiving  
of labour in abstraction from the indiv idual.  He cannot separate  
the two; a man has a r ight  to  property because h§ so to speak,
1. Civ. Govt. 36.
2. Ib id  57. 3.
5. P r o p e r t y ,  Duties and Rights P. 9» 
Civ. Govt. 30. X.
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a labourer, or to put i t  in  another way, in  so far as he i s  a c t iv e  .
1
"God gave the world to the use of the in d u striou s and ra tio n a l."
"Whatsoever he t i l l e d  and reaped, la id  and made use o f . . . t h a t  was
h is  p ecu liar  r igh t....W h atsoever  he could en c lo se  was a lso
2
h is ."  This view i s  qu ite in  harmony with Locke's theory o f l ib e r ­
ty , which we have already considered, defined as a man's "power
3
’to  do or forbear producing motion in  p arts o f h is  body." R ights, 
l ik e  freedom, are recognised when they are made e f f e c t iv e  in  a c t iv ­
i t y ;  both are external in  o r ig in . A withdrawal of a c t iv i t y  n u l l i f i e s  
both; a man who i s  fe ttered  i s  not free , so he who noglectd  h is  
property ipso facto  f o r f e i t s  h is  r ig h t to  i t .  The explanation of  
t h is  i s  th a t the withdrawal of a c t iv i t y  i s  not merely n ega tive , i t  
i s  a lso  a p o s it iv e  wrong, because labour g iv es  an added value to  
o b je c ts , n eg lec t thus depriving others of p o ss ib le  va lu es.
Locke's theory i s  open to c r it ic ism  from many s id e s . Taken 
l i t e r a l l y  and worked out i t  can be shown to  be im practicab le, and 
to lead  to extreme Socialism  on thê one hand and to extreme Individ­
ualism  on the other. Prof. H astings Rashdall in a m asterly c r i t i -  
cism of i t  draws a tten tio n  to the so c ia l nature of r ig h ts , which 
are m eaningless except as the converse of d u ties; the mere fa c t  of
1. Property, D uties and Rights, P. 9.
2. Ib id , 38
3. Essay I I .  21. IG.
4. See Property I t s  Rights and D uties P. 43 f f .
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a man's having gathered acorns does not la y  on others the moral ob­
l ig a t io n  to starve rather than toueh them. Again labour im p lies  
m ateria l; i s  th a t, he asks, included in the r ig h t, and laay a man 
claim  a maximum of m aterial in return for a minimum of labour?
But when Prof. Rashdall proceeds to  in fer  the weakness of the 
theory from i t s  im p ractab ility , by showing that in actual fa c t  i t  
co n tra d icts  i t s  prem ises, h is  c r it ic ism  seems to  us hardly fa ir .
For Locke's method o f trea tin g  the subject i s  obviously  a n a ly tic  
rather than sy n th etic ; he i s  not p u tting  forward an economic 
theory of property, so much as analysing the e s se n tia l con d ition s  
which u nd erlie  the in s t i tu t io n . That he h im self does not keep 
w ith in  the bounds of a n a ly s is  and tends to  confuse i t  w ith a h is ­
to r ic a l p rocess, does not in v a lid a te  h is  rea l con trib ution . The 
f ic t io n  of a s ta te  of nature, which seemed to  him a necessary  
background, tends to make him s lu r  over the d is t in c t io n , so that
he s l id e s  e a s i ly  from a n a ly s is  to n arrative , confusing the o r ig in  
*
of property with i t s  v a lid ity .
Locke's rea l contribution  l i e s ,  not so much in  any 
reasoned theory of ownership, as in  the pregnant thoughts which 
abound in  h is  treatment of the su b ject. I t  i s  easy to c r i t i c i s e  
h is  a sser tio n  that labour g iv e s  a t i t l e  to  property, but we cannot 
dism iss i t  thus l ig h t ly ,  without ser io u s lo s s  to  o u rse lv es. The
OG.
in tim ate connexion between ownership and a c t iv ity ,  which i s  im­
p lie d  in t h is  statem ent, i s  v i t a l  to  any true economic theory of 
property, as w ell as to a sound theory o f p erso n a lity . We have 
already touched on t h is  in our treatment of ownership in  r e la tio n  
to the s e l f ,  and i t  i s  a thought to which we fin d  o u rse lv es re­
curring again and again. Locke in r e a lity  provides the correction  
for h is  omi error, or a t le a s t  he p o in ts the way th ereto , by ma­
king labour the fundamental property. The r ig h t tc  free  a c t iv i t y  
i s  a man's one inborn r ig h t, a l l  other kinds o f property are sub­
se rv ie n t to th is ,  and i f  ownership can be shown to be necessary  
for the ex erc ise  of th is  inherent r ig h t o f p erso n a lity , we sh a ll  
have gone far to  e s ta b lish  i t s  r ig h t. But here we are beyond the 
range o f Locke's thought, formas we have seen^the deeper modern 
problems of p erso n a lity  had not arisen  for  him, and he a ttr ib u te s  
th ese  p r in c ip le s  vaguely to  a law of nature and o f reason. I t  i s  
not indeed u n til Kant that we begin to get l ig h t  on th ese prob­
lems. ^
I t  i s  as a background to Locke's thought, rather than 
as making any d irect contrioution  to the su b ject that Hobbes i s  o f  
in te r e s t  to  us. S tarting from the same enquiry in to  the b a sis  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  theory, h is  natural b ias and p ra c tic a l aims led  him to  
s ta te  opposite conclusions. As a champion o f absolute monarchy
9 7 .
Hobbes sought to j u s t i f y  the unlim ited au thority  of t ls  Sovereign, 
whereas Locke, seeking to j u s t i f y  the Revolution, was anxious to  
s e t  l im it s  to th at au th ority . Both s ta r t  from the f ic t io n  o f  a 
s ta te  o f nature but th e ir  conception o f i t  d if fé r a  r a d ic a lly . In 
Hobbes* view i t  i s  a s ta te  o f war and la w lessn ess , in  which every  
man socks h is  own good and l i v e s  in  perpetual fear o f being over­
reached by h is  neighbour. What i s  needed to  bring order out o f
1
chaos i s  "a coiumon power tc  keep them a l l  in  awe." Right and 
wrong, ju s t ic e  and in ju s t ic e , have no meaning in  t h is  s ta te , for  
they belong to S ociety , whereas a s ta te  o f nature i s  one o f Sol­
itu d e , and might i s  in  fa c t  the only r ig h t. In ouch a s ta te ,  l i f e ,
o
i f  i t  la s te d , would be " so lita ry , poor, n asty , brutish  and short,"  
But Hobbes goes on to show that i t  i s  one o f  se lf-c o n tr a d ic t io n ,  
the way out of which i s  d icta ted  by both Passion and Reason; by 
P assion , sin ce  Pear, D esire and Hope lead  to  combination for $he 
sake o f  se lf-p reserv a tio n , by Reason, which d iscovers the laws o f  
Nature* Of these the ch ie f  are, 1. Tiiat every man must seek peace,
2 .That men should be ready tc  with some of th e ir  l ib e r ty  for
the sake o f peace. A common coercive power i s  necessary for  such
1. Leviathan. (Clarendon P ress 1909) P. 06,
2. Ib id  f  97.
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a peace, the cx \lf  m :/  to  1 3  by ccîvforririg the r ïg h ta  and p o j-
ers c f  a i l  upon tho porson of one whc sh a ll bo the Sovereign,
In Hobbos' Gords "The only way tc erec t njcii e Ooivncn zccar . + i i^
to confer thoir ycnsr and strength  up\...n one r%n, or u; on one
Asacobly o f sen to  benr th e ir  P2rncn ..?hl# 1%,,.% rani Cnity o f
then c l l  la  one aad the aana Pardon. This dcno, the n lt;tud a
sc united  in cna Person i s  ca lled  •- Ocnmouwe&lth. lîn th a t
1
carrictri t h is  yorsna, i s  caiZod Sovereign. "
Property las ^aciroi' for i t c  ex isten ce  cn tha
cscabl%sh%mao of tha Coz-mcnwa?.! Ih, which ensures the \n \aid lty o f  
covGilan :a, The Govarulgh ;^ L- tha ^nly , cr;soa/ In ...ra veota:
52^ 11 tho r ig h ts  ihd p;ear& c-f hi:' aubjoecj, ia  the t ls a  the
on ly  z'O': 1 vvner, . reccrlb iag  ru le s  1er ^Lut goods vvcr^ , an %% 
cT'-jcy, Thuo ücbbcch cto i'ting  iron u p e t it io n  4.strata- aguimL, 
takes refuge frcr  i t s  consequences in the conception o f  ^ Co:C£vCiv. 
:foolth, 'h ich  I s  v ir tu a l le u ie l  o f the Inlividuc.^ hhars%& Lock# 
who ic n c c lv e c 'o f  the s ta ts  c f  n itvre  uc ..no of oboûiâéca to tlie 
la%3 of n&tcrO; tends to an cotruua in iiv ilu u io u .*  v.hlch in  tW  
and d e f la te  i t s e l f*  lUbbuC* coacep lien  of the person ia id s  no- 
whore, for I t  la  n den ial o f in d iv id ual ripbt%: -tad h is  idea o f  
the GvvoreXgr; the ca ly  yornon js  -% c t u i l i i j in y  conception frc^a 
which ih eio  i c  no urcgrana oxco-t uy réaction .
1. Lovi&tknn* (Ci&ronion froan IDOO) r .  1.31,132*
Chapter I I .
wallon « ^ (y ^  # m m
The C riterion  as Hd .^pinesf: Bontham.
I t  i s  through Hume th a t we pass from Locke to  Bentham, as  
i t  i s  through him from a d iffe r e n t  standpoint, that we sh a ll la t e r  
retrace  our step s to  Kant. Hume's T reatise of Human Nature was for  
Bontham the sta r tin g  p oin t of a new con stru ctive theory o f morals 
and p o l i t i c s .  He describ es the e f f e c t  o f t h is  work upon h im self  
by saying th a t upon reading i t  he f e l t  as though s c a le s  had fa l le n  
from h is  eyos. I t  proved to  him th a t the cause of the people was 
the cause o f v ir tu e , for  "the foundations of a i l  v ir tu e  are la id  in  
u t i l i t y ."  This conception o f u t i l i t y  became the cen tra l fa c t  o f  
Bentham's philosophy, which had for i t s  watchword the phrase, coined  
by Hutcheson, "the g rea test happiness of the g rea te st  number". His 
philosophy i s  unique in having a d ir e c t ly  ^ractic& l aim, v ia . ,  o f  
providing a theory for  a p o l i t ic a l  reform party. In the p r in c ip le  
of u t i l i t y  Bentham thought he had found the true b a s is  o f a l l  l e ­
g is la t io n , the aim of which ho sa id  should be to  procure the max­
imum of p leasure and the minimum of pain, s in ce  p leasure and pain  
are the two sovereign m asters o f mankind.
Bentham repudiated the theory o f natural r ig h ts  prc- 
claimed by the French Revolution, and embodied in  the D eclaration
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o f R igh ts, on the ground th a t they had no foundation  in  f a c t .  He 
stren u o u sly  d en ies  th e e q u a lity  and freedom o f men in r e sp e c t  c f  
r ig h ts ,  a sso r te d  in  th e  f i r s t  A r t ic le ,  say in g  "There are no such 
th in g s  a s  r ig h t s  a n te r io r  to  th e ostab lish m on t c f  government, _ no 
'such th in g  as n atu ra l r ig h t s  opposed tc  le g a l ."  Such an a sse r ­
t io n  he condemns as "dangerous nonsense". R ights are the c r ea tio n  
c f  th e  law , which should have th e  happiness o f the community fo r  
i t s  o b je c t . I f  th ere  are no n a tu ra l r ig h t s  i t  fo llo w s  th a t th ere  
i s .n o  n a tu ra l r ig h t  o f  prop erty: in  Bentham*s own words "property  
i s  e n t ir e ly  the crea tu re  o f  the law ."  I t s  j u s t i f i c a t io n  to  the  
l e g i s l a t o r  l i e n  in  i t s  u t i l i t y .  The theory o f  u t i l i t y  a s the c r i ­
te r io n  o f  moral va lu e p rev en ts  Bentham from g iv in g  any answer to  
tie  q u estio n  f  the ground o f the r ig h t  o f  ownership; fo r  th e  mere 
fa c t  o f u t i l i t y  t e l l s  us noth ing o f the moral va lue o f  an in s t i t u t io n  
But t h i s  does n ot h inder him g iv in g  a very va lu ab le  co n tr ib u tio n  to  
the problem a s  a whole, though i t  i s  o f a p sy c h o lo g ic a l ra th er  than  
a y h ilu so p h ic  1  n atu re. "Property", he sa y s  " is  a foundation  o f  ,
" exp ecta tion  -  th e ex p ec ta tio n  o f  d er iv in g  c e r ta in  advantages
2
"from the th in g  s d d  to  be p o sse sse d . " Though he d en ie s  a n a t-  
u-^al r ig h t  o f  p rop erty , hO y e t  r e c o g n ise s  th a t  such an i n s t i t u t i o n .
1. Works (Bowring) Vol. II  P .500.
2. Ib id . I I .  P. 306.
2. Ib id . I I .  P. 306.
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h . 3  i t s  rootà  in  the nature o f th in g s , and th a t i t  owos i t s  stren g th
to t h i s  f a c t .  The le g a l  r ig h t  o f  yro^^erty i s  based on "a n atu ra l
ex p ec ta tio n  o f en joy ing  c e r ta in  th in g s  -  an o-xpoctation derived
1
from so u rces a n te r io r  t c  th e  law . " Wo may compare t h i s  v d th  
Hobbes* id ea  o f the law s c f  nature a s q u a l i t ie s  th a t d isp o se  men to  
peace and ob ed ien ce . These are n ot in  them selves law s u n t i l  the  
Commonwealth i s  e s ta b lis h e d , when they become a component part c f  
the C iv il  Law. They have no fo r c e , but "they bind to  a d e s ir e  
chat they should take p la c e ."  We h^ve a lread y  seen  in  the former 
s e c t io n , how t h i s  n a tu ra l a x p o cta ticn  con be exp ressed  in  terms 
o f in^pulso and d e s ir e .
R igh ts being the c r ea tio n  c f  the law , i t  should be the aim 
c f  the l e g i s l a t o r  t c  d is t r ib u te  r ig h t s  and th e ir  corresponding  
o b lig a t io n s , w ith  the o b je c t  o f promoting the happiness c f  the  
bvdy p o l i t i c .  How ha., p i n ess  has four c o n s t itu e n ts :  su b s is te n c e ,
O(w
abundance, s e c u r ity  .nd e q u a lity . S ecu r ity , the s in e  qua ncn c f  
the o th e r s , c o n s is t s  in  con fim d n g  th e n atu ra l ex p ec ta tio n  which i s  ] 
a n te r io r  to  law, and as such i s  n ecessary  fo r  human developm ent.
Làîi i s  n o t l im ite d  to  che p rosoa t a s tho anim als are, but i s  sus­
c e p t ib le  o f pain  and p lea su re  in  .a n tic ip a tio n , i . e .  he i s  capable  
o f im agination  and fo r e s ig h t .  T his ca p a c ity  fo r  se e in g  l i f e
1. VLrks (Bowring) Vol. I I .  p . 3CC.
2. % rks Vol. I .  r . 302.
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whole makes i t  n ecessary  fo r  h is  development to  have some sure  
b a s is  o f  reckoning, and a permanent cen tre  o f  re fe re n c e . T h is he
f in d s  in  ow nership, which thus becomes th e b a s is  c f  h is  e x p e c ta t-  ^
io n s , from which he can look  forward and form some "general p lan
of c o n d u c t." "The su c c e s s iv e  moments which compose the duration
o f l i f e  are not l ik e  in su la te d  and independent p o in ts , but become
1
p art o f a continuous whole". Again, he compares ex p ec ta tio n  to
*
a chain which u n ite s  the p resen t and the fu tu r e , -  a mere thread
' 2
in th e  s t a t e  c f  nature, i t  becomes a ca b le  in  th e s ta te  o f  s o c ie ty .
Bentham* s th eory  o f  the d is tr ib u t io n  of w ea lth  has a l l  
the d e fe c t s  c f  h is  p h ilo so p h ic a l system : fo r  he ex p re sse s  exp erien ce  
in  term s o f  p lea su re  and p ain , which he regards as commensurable 
w itli m ater ia l w ealth . Each p o rtio n  c f  w ealth  i s  connected w ith a s sx n  
corresponding p o rtio n  o f  h app in ess, and o f  two in d iv id u a ls , he who 
p o s s e s s e s  the t^rvaLOSt w ealth  w i l l  p o sse s s  the g r e a te s t  h app in ess.
The ^erm c f  tru th  in  t h i s  statem ent l i e s  in  the undoubted f a c t  th a t  
below a c e r ta in  l e v e l  c f  su b s is te n c e  p o s s e s s io n s  add to  happ iness;  
s in c e  happ in ess i s  n e t com patib le w ith penury. Bentham fu rth er  
a p p lie s  the law c f  d im in ish in g  re tu rn s to  h a rd in ess , e x c e ss  of 
which, he sa y s , i s  n o t in  prop ortion  to  e x c e ss  o f  w ea lth . Here
1 . Works.. Vol. I .  p. 3U6.
2. Ib id . p . 502, 009.
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again  th ere  i s  a c er ta in  elem ent o f tru th ; fo r  we are l im ite d  both  
in  our powers o f  enjoyment and in  th e amount which c o n tr ib u te s  to  
our enjo^naent. Happiness may be con ceived  a s roughly fo llo w in g  
Weber's law a s  to  the in t e n s i ty  o f se n sa t io n . But t h i s  i s  a l l  
th a t  can be sa id  in  favour o f Bentham* s view , and h is  manner o f  
p resen tin g  i t  r e v e a ls  the p sy ch o lo g ic a l atomism a t  th e  base o f  
h is  thought. Hedonic exp erien ce  i s  n et separab le  in to  "masses 
"of happiness" , which can be to ld  o f f  a g a in s t  so many "masses o f  
"of w ealth", (whatever may be the ca se  w ith the in te n s i ty  o f  sen­
s a t io n s , ) and q u a n tita t iv e  terms are q u ite  in a p p lic a b le  to  i t .  
Bentham* s  exp ressed  v/ish fo r  a so r t  of m ental thermometer by ' 
which to  guage p lea su re  and p a in , r e v e a ls  h is  fundamental error  
of regard ing  th e  mind a s m easurable. The on ly  way in  which the  
q u estion  o f th e r e la t io n  o f  happiness to  w ealth  perm its o f  being  
p ut, i s  to ask how p o sse s s io n s  can be reg u la ted  and the r ig h ts  o f  
ownership ad ju sted  so as to  promote true developm ent. Bentham*s 
e n t ir e  argument fo r  p roperty  p roceeds by an e s s e n t ia l ly  em p ir i-  
cald^y method, and r e s o lv e s  i t s e l f  in to  the statem ent which, put
in to  the form o f  a sy llo g ism , would run a s fo llo w s:
Whatever i s  conducive to  happiness i s  r ig h t .
P roperty i s  conducive to  happiness (by co n tr ib u tin g  to  the
fou r c o n s t itu e n ts  o f h app in ess)
T herefore Property i s  r ig h t .
As a working h y p o th esis  fo r  a p o l i t i c a l  party  t h i s  might very w e ll  
• p a ss m uster; but even so i t s  miner prem ise i s  always open to
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a tta c k , and th ere  i s  noth ing to prevent a la t e r  Radicalisiri than 
Bentham*3 from su b vertin g  the whole claim  by proving t h i s  f a l s e .
ÏÏO have a lread y  sa id  that Bentham throws no l i g h t  on th e  p h ilosoph ­
ic a l  probaom o f  the nature o f  r ig h t s ,  and the reason i s  c le a r ;  fo r  
th ere  i s  no room fo r  freedom and t-e r so n a lity  in  a p h ilosop h y  which 
c o n fin e s  a l l  human m otives to  s e l f  in t e r e s t  and bounds i t s  a c tio n  
by u t i l i t y .  (N.) Bentham th e re fo re  does n ot p resen t any advance 
upvn Locke in  t h i s  d ir e c t io n , and h is  thorough-going em piricism  
su g g e sts  no f r u i t f u l  x in e  of advance.
K. In tho voluminous iadox to  Bentham*s works th ere i s  no r e f ­
erence to  frwodom in  the p h ilo so p h ic  sen se .
C h apter I I I ,
Caaorshlp a s  a n atu ra l r ig h t : -  Spencer.
In a p o l i t i c a l  a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d  "The Great p o l i t i c a l  
S u p e r stitio n " , Spencer a tta c k s  the theory o f what he c a l le d  the  
d iv in e  r ig h t  o f m a jo r it ie s , a s in  h is  op in ion  more p e r n ic io u s  
than th a t o f th e  d iv in e  r ig h t  o f k in g s , and he b rin gs th e  d i s ­
cu ssio n  down to  the q u estio n  o f th e  r e la t iv e  r ig h t s  o f  th e so­
c ie t y  and i t s  members. "Are the r ig h t s  o f the community," he ask s
" u n iv er sa lly  v a lid  a g a in s t  the in d iv id u a l?  Or has the in d iv id u
1
"ual some r ig h ts  which are v a lid  a g a in st  the community?" He 
c r i t i c i s e s  Bentham*s d en ia l o f n atu ra l r ig h t s  and h is  theory  th a t  
r ig h ts  are the c r ea tio n  o f  th e  law . But he f a i l s  to  p er c e iv e  the  
im p lica tio n  o f Bentham*s argument, v iz .  that law i s  n a tu ra l to  
man and i s  a co n d itio n  o f  h is  l i f e  in  s o c ie t y .  Bentham* s  d en ia l 
of n a tu ra l r ig h t s  was tantamount to  a d en ia l o f the f i c t io n  o f a 
" sta te  o f  nature", in  which man was p r e s o c ia l ,  and h is  r e c o g n it io n  
of a n a tu ra l ex p ec ta tio n  o f  r ig h t s  i s  v ir t u a l ly  an a s s e r t io n  o f  the  
s o c ia l  nature o f man.
S p en cer's method o f  s ta t in g  the q u estion  o f the r e la t io n  
of the in d iv id u a l to  s o c ie ty  i s  in d ic a t iv e  6 f  h is  extreme in d iv id -
1. The Man versu s the S ta te , P. 87*
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His a t t i tu d o  was ivartly the outcome o f  the general p o l i t ­
i c a l  tliought o f  tha day fo r  he shared to the f u l l  the current view  
of L a is se z  f a i r e  as a p o l i t i c a l  maxim. This p o l i t i c a l  in d iv id u a lism  
may seein^at f i r s t  s ig h t ,  in c o n s is t e n t  w ith h is  general p h ilosoph y  
of e v o lu t io n ,  wiuh i t s  organic conception  o f  s o c ie t y .  But th ere  
i s  in  r e a l i t y  no co n tra d ic t io n  between th ose  two trends o f  h is  
thought; the one i s  indeed found to  in v o lv e  the o th er . In h i s  
" P r in c ip le s  o f  Socio logy" e4e . S^.encer works out the analogy be­
tween s o c ie t y  and the in d iv id u a l organism, showing th a t  s o c ie t y ,  
l i k e  an organism, p a s s e s  in  the course c f  development from a sim­
p le  to  a complex s ta g e  o f  s tr u c tu r e ,  the tendency o f  development 
being always in  tha d ir e c t io n  o f  in cr ea s in g  homogeneity and u n ity .  
But Spencer does not s t a r t  from the idea of u n ity , e i t h e r  in  h i s  
conception  o f  the mind, which he regards as composed o f  so many 
i s o la t e d  u n i t s  o f  co n sc io u sn ess  or f e e l in g ,  cr in  h i s  conception  
of s o c ie t y ,  which he t r e a t s  as the aggregate o f  i t s  members. The 
in d iv id u a l and s o c ie t y  are conceived  o f  n;,s ..having separate  n atu res;
he speaks o f  "the o r ig in a l  nature o f  in d iv id u a ls  and the o r ig in a l
1
“nature o f  the s o c ie t y  they form" , and again o f "the induced na-
1
ture o f both", and c la im s r ig h t s  fo r  the in d iv id u a l in  co n tra d is ­
t in c t io n  to  s o c ie t y ,  which he regards as only e x i s t in g  fo r  the
1. P r in c ip le s  o f  S oc io logy , Vol. i .  p. 13.
2. Ib id .  m . 5 .  p. 13.
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b e n e f i t  o i i t s  members. This antagonism between s o c ie t y  and the  
in d iv id u a l was s t i l l  fu r th er  sharpened in  the conception  o f  nat­
ural r ig h t s  a tta ch in g  to  the in d iv id u a l a s  such.
GivGucer'e gesterdl p h ilosophy  i s  a v a s t  attem pt t c  a^^piy 
the p r in c ip le s  o f  e v o lu t io n  t c  the  e n t ir e  range o f l i f e ,  from i t s  
s im p les t  c o n d it io n s  to  i t s  h ig h e s t  m a n ifes ta t io n  in  in d iv id u a l  
and s o c ia l  conduct. C o n s is te n t ly  w ith t h i s  general ai&: he in te r ­
p r e t s  conduct as tho adaptation  o f  a c t s  to  ends, th e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between good and b&d conduct being the d i f f e r e n c e  between su c c e ss  
and f a i lu r e  c f  adjustm ent. J u s t i c e  i s  the  p r in c ip le  o f  the sur­
v iv a l  o f the  f i t t e s t  ap p lied  tc  e t h i c s .  "On the  ^subhusan l e v e l"  
he sa y s  " th is  law h o lds w ithout q u a l i f i c a t io n ,  for  t k a r e . e x i s t s
"no agency by which, (a s )  among a d u lt s ,  th e  r e la t io n  between
2
"conduct and consequence can be in te r fe r e d  with". Human ju s­
t i c e  i s  regarded a s  a development of subhuitiaa j u s t i c e ,  and e t h i c a l l y  ' 
considered , tho law c f  tho su r v iv a l  o f  tho f i t t e s t  " im p lies  th a t
"each in d iv id u a l ought t c  r e c e iv e  the b e n e f i t s  and the e v i l a  o f
3
"his own nature and consequent co n d u ct." As such i t  i s  the ccndi-
t io n  c f  the  malntenanco of l i f e .  J u s t ic e  has a p o s i t i v e  and a nega­
t iv e  a sp e c t ,  both of %hich are expressed  in  the  formula th a t  "Every 
man i s  f r e e  to  do th a t  which he w i l l s ,p r o v id e d  he infringe;!; not the
1. P r in c ip le s  o f  S o c io lo g y , Vol I I .  p. 470.
2. P r in c ip le s  o f  Gtliico, Y. I I .  P. 6 .
3. Ib id ,  Y. I I .  p. 17.
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equal freedom of any o ther  tm n . " P a r t ic u la r  r ig h t s  are the c o r o l l ­
ary o f  the law o f  equal freedom. But freedom, as  Spencer c o n ce iv e s  
of i t ,  i s  freedom from ex tern a l r e s t r a in t ,  the l i b e r t y  to do as  one 
p le a s e s .  My freedom concerns m yself  a lone, except where i t  in fr in ge:  
on someone e l s e * s .  In t h i s  view men are regarded as in  ex tern a l  
r e la t io n  to one another, and as on ly  brought in to  co n ta ct  through  
contending c la im s . I t  t e l l s  us nothing o f  the i n t r i n s i c  nature o f  
freedom as  s e l f -d e te r m in a t io n .  Freedom i s  conceived  o f  q u a n t i ta t iv e .  
±y a s  something which can bo added and su b tracted , in  the  same way 
as s o c ie t y  i s  conceived  o f  as  an aggregate o f  separate  u n i t s .
Sponcer lo o k s  upon the r ig h t  o f  property  as o r i g in a l ly  
dependent on the  r ig h t  o f  the use o f  the earth , "since a i l  m ater ia l  
"'objects capable o f  being owned are in  one way or another obta ined  
""from the ea r th "  Whence i t  fo l lo w s  th a t  a cojiqdete e t h i c a l  j u s ­
t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the r ig h t  o f  -ro p erty  i s  in vo lved  in  the same d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s  as the e t h ic a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  fo r  the r ig h t  to  the  use of  
the ea r th ."  He c r i t i c i s e s  Locke’ s  attempted j u s t i f i c a t i o n  on the  
ground th a tlab ou r cannot e s t a b l i s h  a r ig h t  grea ter  than the pre­
e x i s t in g  r ig h t s  o f  a l l  men. But Locke never claimed t h i s ,  fo r  he 
regarded the  earth  as  "common to  a l l  men", meaning by t h i s  th a t  i t  
was p o t e n t ia l  property , to  be en tered  in to  by labour. A p r e - e x i s ­
t in g  t i t l e  i s  im plied  in  Spencer’ s con ten tion  th a t  th e  consent o f
1. P r in c ip le s  o f  E th ic s ,  V. I I .  p . 94.
n
» Ib id  V. I I .  p. 94.
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a l l  i s  n ecessa ry  to  g iv e  a r ig h t  to  any p a r t .  Regarded in  t h i s  way, 
no moral r ig h t  to  property could over be e s ta b l is h e d ,  and Spencer 
indeed a v o id s  the q u estion , turn ing  i t  o f f  to  the fu r th er  q uestion  
how r i g h t s  have come to  be recogn ised  a t  var iou s s ta g e s  o f  human 
development. Ue enumerates th ree  s ta g e s  of c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  th e  hun­
t in g ,  the sem i-w ild  s e t t l ed and the stage o f  the l e g a l  r e c o g n it io n  
c f  property . In each th e  co n d it io n  of ownership i s  a p o te n t ia l  
c o n tra c t .  "Among th e o ccu p ier s  o f  a t r a c t  who gatte r or catch  the  
"wild p roduc ts  i t  may bs t a c i t l y  a g r e e d  th a t  appropriation
M
1
ach ieved  by anyone s h a l l  be p a s s iv e ly  a ssen ted  to  by the o thers" .
"In tha s e m i- s e t t l e d  s ta g e  the a s se n t  o f  th e  clan  to  o w n e r sh ip . . .
" is  impaled in  the assumption of kindred ow n ersh ip s .. . .  by a l l  
2
" oth ers ."  This p o te n t ia l  c o n tra c t  i s  conceived  as  e v o lv in g  a t
a l a t e r  s t . g e  in to  a c tu a l contractunder the  pressure  o f  s p e c ia l i s a t io n
o f  occup ation . S&,encer co n s id ers  "that we are shown by a survey o f
" fa c ts  which e x i s t in g  p r im it iv e  s o c i e t i e s  p r e s e n t . . . . t h a t  the
"right o f  property i s  o r i g in a l ly  deducib le  from the law o f  equal 
3
"freedom ," and he h o lds  th a t  " recogn it ion  o f the r ig h t  c f  prcp-
"erty i s  o r i g i n a l l y  r e c o g n it io n  o f  the r e la t io n  between e f f o r t  
4
"and b e n e f i t ."  This view fo l lo w s  from h i s  conception  o f  j u s -
1 . P r in c ip le s  o f  E th ics  I I .  p. 95.
2. Ib id .  I I .  p. 96.
3. Ib id . I I .  p. 96.
4. Ib id .  I I .  p . 99.
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t i c o  as  the  law by which each r e c e iv e s  the r e s u l t  o f  h i s  own nature  
and conduct.
The method which Spencer pursues throughout th e  E th ics  
makes h i s  treatm ent o f  property  very unconvincing. For he deduces  
" r e la t iv e " r u le s  from 'the "absolute" aims o f  e v o lu t io n , and in f e r s  
the l a t t e r  h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  assuming th a t  the question  o f  o r ig in  de­
c id e s  a lso  the v a l i d i t y  o f  e t h ic a l  p r in c ip le s .  To g iv e  on ly  one 
example, in  h i s  treatm ent o f  j u s t i c e  he s l i d e s  from the n a tu ra l  
law o f  s e l e c t io n  to  the  e t h ic a l  p r in c ip le  th a t  each man ought to  
r e c e iv e  the  r e s u l t s  o f  h i s  own conduct, assuming e t h ic a l  v a l i d i t y  
on th e  ground o f  natural o r ig in .  Further h i s  q u a n t i ta t iv e  con­
ception  of s o c ie t y  a s  an aggregate o f  separate  u n i t s  le a d s  him in­
to  an impasse in  fa ce  o f  the  r e l a t i v e  r i g h t s ’ o f  the in d iv id u a l  and 
the community* and thus he l e a v e s  th e  problem of the p h ilo so p h ic a l  
ground o f  ownership w ithout s o lv in g  i t .
Reviewing now the h i s t o r i c a l  track  and the p o in t  a t  which 
we have a rr iv ed  in our r e se n t  enquiry, we see  th a t  we have made no 
rea l advance towards a s o lu t io n  o f  the f in a l  problem. The l i n e  o f  
enquiry which Locke pursued le d  in e v i t a b ly  to  the extreme e n ^ ir i -  
cism and s c e p t ic ism  o f Hume, and i t  was on t h i s  b a s is  th a t  Bentham 
e laborated  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  theory . The-inadequacy o f  th e  l a t t e r * s  
co n tr ib u tio n  was due to  the n e c e s s i t y  o f  exp ress in g  i t  in  terms
I l l ,
pu rely  o f  psychology or o f o x tera a l a c t io i i .  He pursued L ocke's  
theory o f  ownership independently  o f any re feren ce  to  the s e l f .  
Spencer re p r e se n ts  some advance upon Bentham in th a t  ho attempted  
to  form ulate a p h ilo so p h ic a l  system on the b a s is  o f  e v o lu t io n .
But i t  was e s s e n t i a l l y  an em pirica l ph ilosophy which on ly  recogn ised  
the s e l f  in  i t s  ex tern a l r e la t io n s ,  and summed up i t s  m otives  in  
terms o f  u t i l i t y .  I t  i s  not along such l i n e s  th a t  we can advance 
to a sound p h i lo so p h ic a l  treatm ent o f r ig h t s ,  and we must th e r e fo r e  
r e tr a c e  our s te p s  to  Hume, or rath er  to  Locke, fo r  h i s  treatm ent c f  
ownership has in  i t  the germ of a more f r u i t f u l  conception . In  
basing the r ig h t  to property on the same ground as the  r ig l i t  to  per­
s o n a l i t y ,  he p o in ted  the way to  a s o lu t io n ,  though he h im se lf  did  
n et gc fu r th er  than the vague con ception  o f  a law c f  Nature and o f
Roason.
C hapter IV .
Ownership and P e r s o n a l i ty ; -  Kant 
— — — — — oOo— — ------—— ,
Sc fa r  we have been co n sid er in g  the problem o f  ownership 
as p resen ted  to  us in  the em p irica l p h ilo so p h ie s  of Locke, Bentham 
and Speacer. Though th e se  have con tr ib u ted  mueh th a t  i s  va lu ab le  
to the  psychology c f  ownership, they  Imve not thrown any l i g h t  on 
the p h i lo s o p h ic a l  problem o f  the r ig h t  o f  property , and we must there­
fore r e tr a c e  our s t e p s  w ith  a view to  f in d in g  a fre sh  s t a r t in g -p o in t  
for our enquiry. The main tendency o f  Locke’ s  thought had been de­
veloped to  i t s  l o g i c a l  con clusion  by Hume, a con clu sion  which, by 
i t s  very thoroughness, made a r e tr o g r e ss io n  necessary  fo r  fu r th er  
progress. Taking h i s  stand on Locke’ s  S cp ir ic ism , Hume transformed  
i t  in to  a ph ilosophy of Scep tic ism . ' Prom Locke’ s  p o s i t io n  o f  ex­
treme i n t e l l e c t u a l  modesty, Hume advanced to  the d en ia l of any ne­
cessary connexion in  nature. The s e l f ,  which Locke had never been 
able to l i f t  above the sequence o f  natural ev e n ts ,  was reduced by
1
Huiue to  "nothing but a bundle or c o l l e c t i o n  o f d i f f e r e n t  p ercep tion s" ,  
and ex p er ien ce  to  a su c c e ss io n  o f  i s o la t e d  im pressions . The w i l l ,  
which Locke had v a in ly  s tru g g led  to  fr e e  from the determinism o f  a 
natural even t, was, in  Hume’ s  view, nothing but the c o n sc io u sn e ss  or
1. T r e a t is e  o f  Human Nature ( 2 nd Ed. S elb y-B lgge) P. 252.
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f e e l in g  o f  o r ig in a t in g  a movement, which i s  determined as su re ly
ar? any n atural phenomenon, such a s  are included  under the law s o f ;;%t
l i g h t  or of motion.
Now i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  in  th e se  v iew s philosophy has a l ­
ready arr ived  at a deadlock, and in  no o ther way than by turn ing  
i t s  s te p s  back to  the s ta r t in g  p o in t  o f  error could sc e p t ic ism  
l 9 êd to  tru th . This n ecessary  return to fundamentals was e f f e c t e d  
by Kant in  h i s  C r i t ic a l  Method, and i t  i s  to  the in f lu e n c e  o f  Hume 
that he a t tr ib u te d  the d ir e c t io n  o f  h i s  thought. "The remembrance 
of David Hume" he says  "was the f i r s t  th in g  which in terru p te d  my
dogmatic slumber, and gave to  my in v e s t ig a t io n s  a q u ite  new d ir e c -  
2
t io n ."  Kant compares the change from the dogmatism o f  e a r l i e r  g 
p h ilo so p h ie s  to h i s  own c r i t i c a l  method, to  the .change in  astron­
omy from the Ptolem aic to  the Copernican system. For th e  essen ce
trKcu-gKt
of the c r i t i c a l  method i s  to  turn^back upon the s e l f ,  a s  the  pre­
su p p o sit io n  of knowledge and o f m orality* Locke and Hume regarded  
id ea s  from an ex tern a l p o in t  o f  view, as  f a c t s  given to  the  mind 
from o u ts id e .  Rant examines knowledge from w ith in , by search in g  for  
the p r e c o n d it io n s  which make knowledge p o s s ib le  fo r  th e  th in k in g  
su b je c t .  H is method i s  th a t  o f  "a c r i t i c a l  re g re ss  to  determine
3
the u lt im a te  grounds of the v a l i d i t y  o f  the p r in c ip le s  o f  Science" • 
"Dogmatism" sa y s  Kant " is  the p o s i t iv e  or dogmatic procedure o f
1. T r e a t ise  of Human Nature ( 2 nd Ed. S elby-B igge) P. 252.
2. Quoted in  Caird’ s  C r i t i c a l  Philosophy, V o l i  P. 185.
3. Ib id . V o l .I .  P. 2.
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reason, w ithout p rev iou s c r i t i c i s m  o f  i t s  own f a c u l ty ,"  and i t  f a i l s  
as an in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  the  u n iv erse , because i t  i s  o n e-s id ed  and 
c a l l s  fo r th  an o p p o s ite  dogmatism, the r e s u l t  o f  which i s  an an tin ­
omy o f  opposing p r in c ip le s ,  ending in  scep tic ism ,
Kant pursued the c r i t i c a l  method throughout h i s  e n t ir e  
philosophy; as in  the C r it iq u e  of pure Reason he had sought to  f in d  
the p r e c o n d it io n s  c f  knowledge, sc in  the C rit iq u e  o f  P r a c t ic a l  Sea­
son he pursues the enquiry in to  the fundamental c o n d it io n s  o f  mo­
r a l i t y .  Such an enquiry was rendered n ecessary  for  him by the  
apparent o p p o s it io n  between the p r in c ip le s  of sc ie n c e  and th o se  o f  
aioi'al and r e l i g i o u s  ex p er ien ce . The va st  ex ten s io n  o f  th e  c la im s  
of s c ie n c e  in  h i s  day seemed to  le a v e  no room for" th e con cep tion s  
of God, Freedom and I c j io r ta l i ty ,  which were in  danger c f  being ex­
p la in ed  away, as w ithout v a l i d i t y .  K ant's aim in  examining the  
p r in c ip le s  underly ing s c ie n c e ,  was t o  determine the l i m i t s  o f  the  
a p p lic a t io n  of i t s  ^ -r in c ip les , w ith a view tc  p r o te c t in g  th e  area  
of Uie moral .ind r e l i g i o u s  l i f e  from i t s  a t ta c k s .  Once free d  from 
in c lu s io n  in  tho c a te g o r ie s  o f  s c ie n c e ,  m o ra lity  and r e l i g i o n  would 
be I'ree to  be t e s t e d  on t h e ir  own ground.
In h i s  treatm ent of co g n it io n  Kant showed that man could  
not be regarded as m erely a natural o b je c t;  fo r  the u n ity  o f  con­
sc io u s n e ss ,  which i s  the ground o f the  e x is te n c e  o f  o b je c t s ,  cannot
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i t s e l f  be an o b je c t ,  and l'ûd i s  more than the ozüpirical ego which
can be exaiLined a s  an o b je c t .  From one p o in t  o f  view he belongs
to the world o f nature, with which hd^connocted through h i s  inu.
p u ls e s  and a p p e t i t e s ;  but, th a t  he i s  not confined  to  th e  world o f
nature, i s  iimplied in  the f a c t  th a t  he a s c r ib e s  h is  a c t io n s  to
h im se lf ,  and c o n ce iv es  o f  h im self  as  the  source of them. “A man"
Vho cannot a c t  excep t under the idea  o f  freedom ," Eant contends " is
1
ju s t  fo r  th a t  reason, in  a p r a c t ic a l  p o in t  o f  view f r e e ."  Man i s  
th e re fo re  by h i s  r a t io n a l ,  s e lf -d e te r m in in g  nature, a member o f  
the world o f  understanding, and a s  such freedom i s  h i s  c h a r a c te r is ­
t i c .  In h i s  d e s ir e  to  ensuee the freedom of the moral s e l f  from 
the determ ination  o f  nature , Rant sharpens the antagonism between 
the world o f  sen se  and the world of understanding, in to  a dualism  
which p erm its  o f  no u lt im a te  r e co n c il ia t io n » - .  In the inner world o f  
tnderstan d ing  man i s  f r e e  from determ ination  by the se n se s .  But on 
the other  hand man cannot a c t  excep t through the world o f  sense in  
which he l i v e s ,  and which i s  su b jec t  ,to determ ination by natu ra l  
laws. As a nouenai s e l f  he i s  determined by Reason a lone.an d  i s ^  ^ j
th e r e fo r e  fro e  from the heteronomy o f  Rature; as  a phenomenal s e l f  
ho i s  su b jo ct  to  im^^uise and d e s ir e .  Rant cannot r e c o n c i le  th e se  
opposing s e lv e s ,  because he cannot conceive how the r a t io n a l  s e l f  
can**tdkQ up" any o f  the d e s ir e s  and motive^-: o f  tho n a tu ra l s e l f ,
1. Theory of E th ics  (Abbott) P. 67.
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w ithout thereby d estroy in g  i t s  freedom. This d i f f i c u l t y  i s  in v o l­
ved in  h i s  whole a t t i t u d e  of p r o te s t  a g a in s t  the Hedonism o f  h i s  
time. To be determined by d e s ir e  seemed to  him a low ering  o f the  
moral standard, and a departure from the idea of duty a s  the c a te ­
g o r ica l im p erative . He does not con sid er  th a t  an impulse which i s  
taken up in to  the s e l f ,  c e a se s  fo r  th a t  very reason to  be a mere
1
iiapulse, s in c e  i t  has been i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  the  ends of the s e l f .
I t  i s  on ly  a s  an impulse i s  thus id e n t i f i e d  th a t i t  r i s e s  to  the
l e v e l  o f  a m otive, and a l i f e  o f  "mere impulse" i f  such were poss­
ib le ,  would be devoid o f  m otives .
Though Kant never succeeded in  e f f e c t in g  a r e c o n c i l ia ­
t io n  between nature and s p i r i t ,  he a ttem p ts/ by means o f  h i s  pos­
t u la t e s ,  to  overcome the antagonism, and he never a l lo w s  i t  to  re­
lax  the  im perative o f  the moral law to mould the inner and ou ter  
nature in1o conform ity with the law of Reason, The same problem, 
under a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  form, p r e se n ts  i t s e l f  in  a p p lied , a s  in
t h e o s r e t ic ,  E th ic s .  The problem of harmonising the two a s p e c ts  of
man* s  nature i s  there seen to  in v o lv e  the problem o f  h i s  r e la t io n  
to e th er  bein gs l i k e  h im se lf .  Kant ex p re sse s  t h i s  double p o in t  o f  
view by say in g  thttman i s  presen ted  to h im se lf  in  "inner and outer  
"sense." In the former a sp ec t  he i s  the su b jec t  of m o ra lity , and 
a law to  h im se lf ,  in  th e  l a t t e r  he i s  brought in to  r e la t io n  w ith
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e th e r s .  I t  i s  w ith man as presen ted  in  t h i s  ou ter  sen se  th a t  th e
law i s  concerned, and the ^^roblem of jurisprudence i s  to  prevent
c o l l i s i o n s  between men, thus a llow in g  each to  e x e r c is e  a freedom con.
s i s t e n t  with the freedom o f  o th e r s .  But a freedom in  which each i s
regarded as an end in h im se lf ,  can only be re ta in ed  i f  each one l i in -
i t s  h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  by the freedom o f  o th ers;  in other words the
r ig h t  o f  freedom which i s  the  inborn and natural r ig h t  o f  man,
c a r r ie s  w ith  i t  the o b l ig a t io n  to  S e l f - l im i t a t io n  by the freedom
of o th e r s .  "The conception  of r ig h t" , says  Kant "as r e fe r r in g  to
a corresponding o b l ig a t io n  which i s  the moral a sp ec t  of i t , . . .  has
regard on ly  to  the  ex tern a l and p r a c t ic a l  r e la t io n  o f  one Person to
another, in  so far  as they have in f lu e n c e  on each e t h e r , . ,  by t h e ir
1
a c t io n s  a s  f a c t s ."  The question  i s  "whether tho a c t io n  o f  one can
harmonise w ith  the  freedom o f  another, according to  a u n iv e rsa l  la w .
Plight th e r e fo r e  comprehends the whole of the c o n d it io n s  under which
the vo lu ntary  a c t io n s  of any one person can be harmonised with the
• 1
a c t io n s  of another, according to  a u n iv ersa l law."
I t  i s  under the  heading of p r iv a te  r ig h t s  th a t  Kant d e a ls  
with the q u estion  o f  property , or, as he terms i t ,  "the ex tern a l  
"thine and mine! "For him a s  fo r  Locke he the person i s  the foun­
dation of a r ig h t  o f  ownership. "Anything i s  mine by r ig h t ,"  he
1. Philosophy o f  Law (H a stie* s  t r a n s . ) P. 45. 
€. m 4 -  P. 61.
117.
says "or i s  r i g h t f u l ly  mine, when I am sc bound up w ith  i t ,  that i f
"any other person should make use o f  i t  w itheut my consent, he
1
"would do me a x cs io n  or in ju ry ."  The innate  r ig n t  to  freedom  
t i v e s  m  the r ig h t  to  demand th a t cxhers should r e fr a in  from in t e r ­
fe r in g  w ith  a th in g , xnto which I have, a s  i t  were, put m yself ,  
cuch a p o s s e s s io n  i s  not dependent on my p h y s ica l co n ta ct  w ith  an 
o b ject;  and may be described  a s  r a t io n a l ,  as  cfposed  to  em p irica l  
p o s s e s s io n .
Kant assumes as  a p o s tu la te  of the P r a c t ic a l  Reason, th a t
"every o b je c t  which i s  w ith in  the range of the fre e  e x e r c is e  of W ill
1 3  a p o s s ib le  mine and th in e ."  and makes a c t i v i t y  the co n d it io n  o f
2
acq u irin g  p o sse s s io n  o f  i t .  The r ig h t  to  an o b je c t  being w holly  
ex te r n a l ,  i t  i s  l im ite d  by and im p lie s  the pcwor c f  com pelling re­
c o g n it io n . Per exemple, I f  a debtor r e fu s e s  to pay me, I have 
l e g a l l y  no "right" to  demand pa^inoat, u n le s s  I have a t  my command 
a power to  enforce  payment. This im p lie s  the e x is te n c e  o f  a C iv i l  
State  as a u th o r ity  to  enforce a r ig h t ,  which i s  the ex p ress io n  o f  
the w i l l  o f  , i l l .  Kant c a l l s  t h i s  the j u r id ic a l  co n d it io n  under
which Thine and Mine are secured , but i s  c a r e fu l  to àay th a t  the
3
law c f  property  must proceed from a uni Led w i l l  a ;^riori, which 
does not presuppose a j u r id ic a l  a c t .  This law ta k es  form in  the
1. Philosophy o f  Law (H a s lie * s  t r a n s . )  P. « ^ 6 /.
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C iv il  S ta te ;  but i t  i s  the duty o f  a l l  to  bring about the  e s ta b ­
lishm en t o f  such a S ta te ,  in  which the r ig h t  of p o sse s s io n  i s  re­
cogn ised . Force as a general ru le ,  i s  on ly  com patible w ith  freedom, 
when i t  i s  employed to  hinder an a c t  in  i t s e l f  a hindrance to  f r e e ­
dom, and i s  th e r e fo r e  a s e l f - c o n t r a d ic t io n .  But i t  may a ls o  be used, 
jknt th in k s  to  bring p ressure  on men to  p ass  from a s t a t e  o f  Nature, 
in which C iv i l  Law does not e x i s t ,  to  a C iv i l  S ta te  in  which r ig h t s  
can be guaranteed.
In answer to  the q u estion , '*What i s  a r e a l  Rlght"?Kant
says "It i s  tho r ig h t  to  a p r iv a te  use o f  a th in g  o f  which I am in
1
p o sse s s io n  in  common w ith  o t h e r s ." The mutual r e la t io n  o f  r ig h t  
and o b l ig a t io n  im plied  in  ownership, can on ly  be conceived  as  p oss­
ib le  on th e  assumption o f  a common c o l l e c t i v e  p o sse s s io n .  There i s  
no such th in g  as  a r ig h t  in  a th in g , and in  no other way than by 
t h i s  r e la t io n  o f  ccmmon p o sse s s io n  can an o b l ig a t io n  a r i s e .  Thus 
i t  i s  o n ly  in  t h i s  ex tern a l way th a t  Kant co n ce iv es  o f  the  " c o l l ­
e c t iv e  w i l l  o f  a l l , "  and i t  i s  ty p ic a l  o f  h i s  whole view o f  s o c ie t y .
We are here faced  with a q uestion  which i s  fundamental to  
our enquiry, v ia .  I s  a system o f  r ig h t s  and o b l ig a t io n s ,  such as  
ownership im p lie s ,  com patible w ith  such a conception  a s  K ant's o f  
the in d iv id u a l  and o f s o c ie ty ?  For, a s  we have seen , K ant's a n x ie ty  
to f r e e  the s e l f  from what he c a l le d  the heteronomy o f the w i l l ,  
led  h ih  to  con ce ive  o f  i t  a s  in  an i s o l a t i o n  which allow ed o f  only  
1. Philosophy o f  Law. P. 8 6 .
119 •
e x ter n a l r e la t io n  with o th ers .  For such a s e l f  the e x i s te n c e  o f  
o th ers  i s  on ly  a c c id e n ta l ,  and th e -h ig h e s t  aim of freedom in  i t s  
ex tern a l a sp ec t  o f  law, i s  to p revent c o l l i s i o n s  between eq u a lly  
froe b e in g s . In t h i s  view, s o c ie t y  can be nothing more than a 
c o l l e c t io n  o f p eop le , e x te r n a l ly  and n e g a t iv e ly  r e la te d  to  one 
another, and i t  i s  hard to seo how the S ta te ,  which Kant recogn ised  
•"^c'-.s^ary to  guarantee the r ig h t s  o f  persons, can be o ther  than  
an in c o n s is te n c y .  I f  a ^erson i s  an end in ,  and a law to ,  h im se lf ,
in other words, i f  he i s  in  h im se lf  a u n iv e r sa l ,  there  e x i s t s  no
common ground between him and h is  f e l lo w s ,  on which to  b u ild  up the  
e s s e n t i a l l y  s o c ia l  r e la t io n s  of r ig h t s  and o b l ig a t io n s .  The p o s s i ­
b i l i t y  o f  such r e la t io n s  can only be based on the f a c t  that men i s  
in  h i s  inmost nature s o c ia l ,  and th a t  the very in d iv id u a l i ty  by 
which he i s  con sc iou s c f  h i s  own independence and o f  h i s  o p p o s it io n  
to o th e r s ,  im p lie s  an underlying u n ity .  We may compare t h i s  view
of the r e la t io n  o f s o c ie t y  and the s e l f ,  w ith  th a t  o f  Hobbes. Wc
saw how Hobbes s t a r t in g  from the idea  o f man in  a s t a t e  o f  nature, 
in which n e ith e r  law nor m ora lity  e x i s t e d ,  advanced to  the concep­
t io n  of the Commonwealth as the on ly  co n d it io n  of peace. The means 
of b rin ging  about such a co n d it io n  are d ic ta te d  to  man by both Rea­
son and P a ss io n . But Hobbes' Commonwealth i s  nothing more than "a 
'comon power to  keep them a l l  in  awe", a power in  which the in d iv id u
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ual merges h i s  r ig h t s  and powers in  the Commonwealth, which i s  t h e /  
only Person, although dependent on the "desire" of the in d iv id u a l  
th at law should p r e v a i l  for  the sake of peace. K ant's  conception  
re p r esen ts  an advance^in th a t  i t  r e c o g n ise s  the in d iv id u a l as  a 
jiperson. But i t  f a i l s ,  l i k e  Hobbes', because, fo r  th e  reason s we 
have a lready mentioned, i t  can o f f e r  no c r i t e r io n  o f  a r ig h t  o th er  
than an ex tern a l one.
Kant and Locke o f f e r  a very in t e r e s t in g  p a r f a le l»  in  ' 
th e ir  treatm ent o f  ownership in  i t s  r e la t io n  to  p e r s o n a l i ty .  For 
both approach the su b je c t  by way o f  p r iv a te  r ig h t s ,  and found the  
r ig h t  of p o sse s s io n  on the inborn r ig h t  to  the freedom of th e  per­
son. Both t r o a t  r ig h t s  a s  e x i s t i n g  between persons considered  a s  
agents , and connect the r ig h t  of property with the a c t i v i t y  of  
the s e l f .  And l a s t l y ,  both assume an o r ig in a l  common ormership, a s  
a p rec o n d it io n  o f a p r iv a te  r ig h t .  But here the l ik e n e s s  between 
them ends, fo r  the in d iv id ua l^ concep tion  of the  person, which they  
share, i s  a t  the same time the ground o f  the sharpest d ivergence  
between them, L ocke's  person f a l l s  short o f  the u n iv ersa l because  
i t  remains an o b je c t ;  K ant's person on the other hand i s  a Univer­
sa l in  i t s e l f .  Thus from t o t a l l y  o p p osite  d ir e c t io n s  they both  
a rr iv e  a t  co n cep tio n s  a t  the s e l f ,  which in v o lv e  a merely ex tern a l  
r e la t io n  to  s o c ie t y .  I t  i s  fu r th er  s ig n i f i c a n t  o f t h e ir  d i f f e r e n t
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fa y s  o f  regarding p e r s o n a l i ty  th a t  w hile  Locke l i m i t s  the r ig h t s  o f  
property by the needs o f  o th e rs ,  Kant should consider  i t s  incompat­
i b i l i t y  with th e  freedom o f  o th e rs .
The p o in ts  o f  d i s s im i la r i t y  between Locke and Kant are  
such a s  we should expect from t h e ir  d if f e r e n c e  o f  ou tlook , -  Though 
th ey  are agreed in  basing the r ig h t  of property on the  r ig h t  o f  per­
sonal freedom, Kant, true to  h i s  c r i t i c a l  method, asks how r ig h t s  
are p o s s ib le ;  w h ile  Locke, eq u a lly  c o n s is te n t  w ith h i s  " h is t o r ic a l ,  
'p la in  method", i s  con ten t to  tcke t h e ir  e x is te n c e  fo r  granted. 
Purther^Kant w i l l  not a llow  th a t  labour in  i t s e l f  g iv e s  a t i t l e  to  
property. "It i s  evident" he says  "that the  f i r s t  m o d if ic a t io n ,  
l im i t a t io n ,  or transform ation  g e n e r a lly  c f  a p ortion  o f  the  s o i l  
cannot o f  i t s e l f  fu rn ish  a t i t l e  to  i t s  a c q u is i t io n ,  s in c e  p o s s e s s ­
ion c f  an a c c id e n t  does not form a ground fo r  le g a l  p o s s e s s io n  o f  
the su bstance . "Rather con verse ly  the in fe re n ce  as to  the Mine 
and Thine must be drawn from ownership o f  the substan ce . Hence one
who has spent labour on a p ie c e  o f  ground th a t  was not a lread y  h i s
1
own, has l o s t  h i s  e f f o r t  to  the former owner." The idea th a t  l a ­
bour g iv e s  a t i t l e  t c  property  must spring , he th in k s , from the pre­
v a i l in g  i l l u s i o n  which le a d s  to  the p e r s o n i f ic a t io n  o f  th in g s ,  by 
which we bind a th in g  to  o u r se lv e s  a s  ours by an immediate r ig h t .
I t  i s  not q u ite  easy to  see  what Kant means here by the d i s t in c t i o n
1. Philosophy o f  Law. P. 97,
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between a cc id en t  and substance; but he would seem to  have in  view  
tha d i f f e r e n c e ,  a lready emphasised between em pirical and r a t io n a l  
p o s s e s s io n .  R ational p o sse s s io n  a t ta c h e s  to  man as a member of  
the world o f  understanding, and, in  R ant's  view, could not be
a f fe c t e d  by an em pirica l f a c t  such as labour. On the other hand,
dependent
we must take in to  account tho f a c t  th a t  Rant does make possessiory\
1
on the a c t i v i t y  o f  the s e l f .
In co n c lu s io n , i t  may w ith  a l l  f a ir n e s s  be m aintained  
that n e ith e r  Kant nor Locke succeed in  e s ta b l i s h in g  the  r ig h t  c f  
property c o n s i s t e n t ly  w ith t h e ir  fundamental views on p e r s o n a l i ty .  
Locke f a i l s ,  becayse a system o f  r ig h t s  an d u t ie s  cannot be foun­
ded on a conception  of the s e l f  which le a v e s  i t  an o b je c t  in  the  
sequence o f  nature. R ights imply moral freedom^and Locke nowhere 
guarantees such freedom to  the in d iv id u a l .  Kant f a i l s  because, in  
h is  ze a l to  ensure freedom^he i s o l a t e s  ÿhs moral person from a l l  
but e x tern a l r e la t io n s  with h i s  f e l lo w s ,  and thus g iv e s  no ground 
on which the s o c ia l  r e la t io n s  o f  r ig h t s  and d u t ie s  can be e s ta b l i s h e d .
I . P hilosophy o f  Laws, F. 61, 82.
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Ownership and C reative  Freedom:- F ich te .  
-------- — O Qo—   — — ---------------------- - ■
F ich te  b u i l t  upon the fou n dation s Which Zant had l a i d ,  
going beyond him however in a c o n s tr u c t iv e  e f f o r t  to  transcend the  
dualism which Kant had regarded as  u lt im a te . This dualism , a s  we 
have seen , pervaded a l l  K ant's thought, appearing^in the  sphere o f  
knowledge^ a s  the a n t i t h e s i s  between sense  and understanding, ma­
t e r i a l  and form,and in  the moral sphere a s  the o p p o s it io n  between 
d e s ir e  and reason. One r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  dualism in  the  reg ion  o f  
morals, was to  regard p rogress  as th e  p ro cess  by which the  elem ent  
of d e s ir e  became crushed ou t, and reason ru led  supreme. F ich te  ad­
m its the apparent dualism in  exp er ien ce , but he h o lds  th a t  i t  i s  
the ta sk  o f  ph ilosoph y to  surmount i t  and to  rev ea l the  e s s e n t i a l  
unity  o f  thought and w i l l .  In h i s  conception  o f  the  Ego as a p r in ­
c ip le  o f  ex p la n a tio n , F ich te  assumes t h i s  u n ity ,  the tr u th  o f  which, 
he sa y s , can on ly  be shown from the system o f  thought which i s  
based on i t .  He found the c lu e  fo r  h is  search in  th e  c o n tr a s t  
drawn by Kant between the a c tu a l and the id e a l  in  Knowledge. S e l f -  
co n sc io u sn e ss ,  as Rant regarded i t ,  was not a c r e a t iv e  p r in c ip le ,  
and the d i f f e r e n c e  between the id e a l  and the a c tu a l was a source o f  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  pessim ism  to  him, which threw him back upon an i r r e c -  
o n c i le a b le  dualism. But F ich te ,  fa s te n in g  on the thought o f  the
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Id e a l ,  saw in  i t  th a t  c r e a t iv e  p r in c ip le  c f  which he was in  search.  
The Idea o f  the Ego, The Ego from which h i s  ph ilosophy s t a r t s ,  i s  
not the  in d iv id u a l  s e l f  o f  K ant's a n a ly s i s ,  but the A bsolute Ego, 
which i s  the  u lt im a te  ground o f in d iv id u a l e x i s te n c e .  I t  i s  both
the goal o f  a l l  the in d iv id u a l ' s  s t r iv i n g ,  and the ground o f  th a t
s t r iv in g ,  a s  i t  i s  the ground o f  the  s e l f - c o n s c io u s n e s s  which i s  
reached in  the  em p irica l s e l f .  In t h i s  r e sp e c t  F ic h t e ' s  concep­
t io n  i s  akin to  the " te los"  o f A r i s t o t l e .  A il  our id e a l s  o f  good­
n ess  and beauty are im perfect e x p r e ss io n s  o f  the Idea, and a t  the
same tim e f a i n t  foreshadowings o f  i t s  r e a l i t y .
1  .
An e te r n a l  outgoing A c t iv i t y ,  in  i t s e l f  one and undivided,
the Ego r e a l i s e s  i t s e l f  by p o s i t in g  an ex tern a l world and becoming
d i f f e r e n t ia t e d  and s e l f - c o n s c io u s  in  the p r o ce ss .  The ex tern a l  
world i s  thus conceived  o f as  developing out o f  the Ego, which re­
q u ires  an o b s ta c le  on which to  break i t s e l f ,  in  order th a t  i t  may 
be r e f l e c t e d  back on i t s e l f .  F ich te  ex p re sse s  t h i s  o p p o s it io n  o f  
the non-Ego to  the Ego in  the word "Anstoss". The in d iv id u a l ,  in  
t h i s  view, i s  regarded as  the r e s u l t  o f  the E go's need to  co n tra ct  
on a s in g le  p o in t  fo r  the  r e a l i s a t io n  o f  i t s  f r e e  a c t i v i t y .  Through 
t h i s  co n tra c t io n  i t  becomes co n sc io u s  o f i t s e l f  in  in d iv id u a l  form, 
and the in d iv id u a l  i s  thus the con tin gen t form o f  the one l i f e ,  
which remains permanent beneath a l l  apparent change. We have in
1. Sammtliche Werka Bd I 248.
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t h i s  con ception  o f  tho Ego as  r e a l i s i n g  i t s e l f  through d i f f e r e n t i a ­
t io n  in to  in d iv id u a ls ,  the germ o f  H e g e l's  conception  o f  the  d ev e l­
opment o f  the N otion.
The s e l f  a s  conceived  by F ich te ,  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a c t iv e ;
a c t i v i t y  i s  indeed i t s  fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  and on ly  in  w i l l .
1
ing does i t  a t ta in  to  s e l f - c o n s c io u s n e s s .  Freedom i s  th e re fo re  
p o stu la te d  as the s in e  qua non o f the  moral l i f e .  But F ic h t e ' s  
freedom d i f f e r s  from R ant's , in  th a t  i t  i s  conceived  as p o s s ib le  
only in  a community. R igh ts , which are d ed ucib le  from freedom, 
have no meaning except in  so fa r  as they imply a p o s i t i v e  r e la t io n  
with o th e r s .  In t h i s  sense  o f  r ig h t s  apart from s o c ie t y ,  F ich te  
d en ies  the e x is te n c e  o f  natural or o r ig in a l  r ig h t s ,  which he re­
gards a s  merely the c o n d it io n s  o f  p e r s o n a l i ty .  A man has r ig h t s  
only in  a community, a s  indeed he can only be thought of a s  o x i s t -
oo
ing in  a community. "Man only  f i r s t  becomes a man among men".
A man's r ig h t  to  freedom th e r e fo re  im p lie s  a l im i t a t io n  by the con­
cep tion  o f the freedom o f  o th e rs .  The f i r s t  r ig h t  deducib le  from 
the r ig h t  to  freedom i s  th t  o f  the con tro l over and d ir e c t io n  o f  
h is  body. Now the e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  e x e r c is e  o f  freedom must be f e l t  
in th e  ex tern a l world, and in  the  demand fo r  the e x e r c is e  o f  o n e 's  
w i l l  in  an ex tern a l sphere, F ich te  find^ the grounds o f  a i l  r ig h t s
1. S a im tlich e  Werke 3d. I ,  20. or Science o f R ights P. 33.
2. Sc. We. 1 . 39 & Science of R ights P. 60.
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of p rop erty . This freedom can only  be e x e r c ise d  in  so fa r  a s  i t  i s  
not in te r fe r e d  w ith , and the on ly  p o s s ib le  source o f  such i n t e r f e r ­
ence i s  in  the  w i l l  o f  o ther  eq u a lly  f r e e  b e in gs . For Nature does  
not change, and i t  i s  on ly  the l im i t a t io n  o f  our knowledge th a t  lim ­
i t s  our co n tro l o f  her fo r c e s ,  and thus makes her seem to  in t e r f e r e
th e
w ith ^ a c t iv i ty  o f the w i l l .
Thus F ich te  bases the r ig h t  o f property on the c o n d it io n s  
o f  p e r s o n a l i ty ,  v iz .  the  fr e e  a c t i v i t y  o f  th e  s e l f ,  which re q u ir e s  
the ex ter n a l world as  a medium fo r  exp ress in g  i t s  purposes. But 
the f r e e  a c t i v i t y  o f  a s e l f  in  a community i s  only p o s s ib le  i f  th ere  
i s  mutual s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n ;  by t h i s  means an equ ilib rium  o f  r ig h t s  
i s  reached; the d isturbance c f  which g iv e s  r i s e  to  the  r ig h t  o f  
coEu^ulsion in  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  tru e  freedom. Through t h i s  mutual 
r e c o g n it io n  o f freedom and r ig h t s ,  p o sse s s io n  i s  transformed in ­
to  property , and the adjustment o f  such r ig h t s  i s  the sphere o f  
law, waich prosupposas a community o f  fr e e  b e in g s .
F ic h t e ' s  e f f o r t  to  transcend th e  u lt im a te  dualism of  
K ant's thought, i s  c l e a r ly  d is c e r n ib le  in  h i s  conception  c f  prop­
e r ty .  Kant, ds Wc have seen , f e l t  the antagonism between sense  
and s p i r i t  to  be insurmountable. F ich te  on the  ccatrary^ in  h i s  con­
cep tion  o f the  in d iv id u a l  l i f e  a s  the means o f  the s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n  
of the Ego, makes the world of sense  the means o f  th a t  s e l f - e x p r e s s ­
ion , in s te a d  of a p r iso n  house of the so u l.  The r ig h t  o f  property  
i s  sim ply th e  freedom to  make the ex tern a l world an instrum ent of
127.
tho w illfh K ant cannot c o n s i s t e n t ly  bring tho r a t io n a l  s e l f  in to  any 
r e la t io n  with tho ex tern a l world, s in c e  i t  i s  on ly  through th e  sen­
s e s  th a t  such co n ta ct  i s  p o s s ib le .  In regarding property  a s  the  
instrum ent of freedom, F ich te  in c lu d e s  the whole o f  the sensuous world  
^nature o f  man in  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  freedom.
In re c o g n is in g  the n e c e s s i t y  o f  s o c ie t y  fo r  p e r s o n a l i ty  
F ich te  r e p r e se n ts  an advance upon Kant. At the  same tim e, th ere  
c l i n g s  to  F ic h t e ' s  manner o f p resen tin g  the problem, much o f  the  
in d iv id u a lism  o f  the e ig h teen th  century. This can be seen in  h i s  
treatm ent o f  freedom as a l im i t in g  conception  in  the r e la t io n  be­
tween p ersons. A r a t io n a l  being regards the person o f  another a s
1
"something whereby the ^ h o r e  o f  h i s  c a u s a l i t y  i s  l i m i t e d . " Free­
dom i s  con ceived  q u a n t i ta t iv e ly ,  as a tta c h in g  to  sep arate  in d iv id ­
u a ls ,  who th e re fo r e  l i m i t  one a n o th er 's  sphere o f  a c t io n .  But i f  
F ich te  has not a rr iv ed  a t  the conception  o f  o b je c t iv e  r i g h t s ,  he 
has n e v e r th e le s s  s e t  our f e e t  upon the r ig h t  road in h i s  conception  
o f  freedom as  s e l f - a c t i v i t y ,  and o f  property a s  the means o f  ex­
p r e s s in g  i t .
I . Science  o f  R ights P. 175.
C h a p to r  VI ' ^
Ownership and O b je c t iv e  Freedom :- H eg e l.
The p h ilo so p h y  o f  Hegel s ta n d s  in  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n  to  
th a t  o f  F ic h t e ,  though h i s  a t t i t u d e  tow ards F i c h t e ,  as ex ­
p r e s se d  in th e  p)rcface to  h i s  Phenomenology o f  M ind, i s  one 
o f  tr e n c h a n t  c r i t i c i s m .  For F ic h te  does not d ev e lo p  th e  id e a  
o f  the  Ego, so  as to  tra n scen d  the  " s u b je c t iv e  phase" o f  
; o r s o n a l i t y ,  and c o n c e iv e s  o f  th e  S e l f  as A c t i v i t y ,  w ith o u t  
fo l lo w in g  o u t  i t s  im p l i c a t io n s  o f  purpose and d evelopm en t.  
H o g c l’ r. c r i t i c i s m  i s  d ir e c t e d  a g a in s t  th e  b a rr e n n ess  o f  t h i s  
conce^:tion o f  th e  Ego, which he r e f e r s  to  as "the s h a p e le s s  
" r e p e t i t i o n  o f  one and the same id e a ,  which i s  a p p lie d  in
"an e x t e r n a l  f a s h io n  to  d i f f e r e n t  m a t e r i a l  The Idea
"which by i t s e l f  i s  no doubt th e  t r u t h ,  r e a l ly  n ev e r g e ts  
"any f u r th e r  th an  J u s t  whore i t .  began, so long as th e
"developm ent o f  i t  c o n s i s t s  in  n o th in g  e l s e  than th e  r e p -
#%
" c t i t i o n  o f  the same form u la ."  And a g a in ,  "the p o s i t i o n  
"which m a in ta in s  th in k in g  to  be m erely  s u b j e c t i v e  t h in k -  
" in g , a b s t r a c t  u n i v e r s a l i t y  as su c h , i s  th e  same bare u n i -  
" fo r m ity ,  i s  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ,  unmoved s u b s t a n t i a l i t y .
1 . i’her»or.enology th e  Wind l È a i l l i g J ,  p . 13, ' T4T
2 . I b id ,  p. 16.
1 2 9 .
The p o in t  o f  d i f f e r e n c e  between F ic h te  and H e g e l ,  c f  
i n t e r e s t  to  our p r e s e n t  e n q u ir y ,  i s  t h a t  which we have i n d i ­
ca ted  betw een th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  A c t iv i t y  and t h a t  o f  p u r p o s iv e  
A c t i v i t y .  I t  was H e g e l ' s  s e l f - im p o s e d  ta sk  to  carry  forward  
th e  c o n c e p t io n  o f  th e  Absolute- which F ic h te  had fo rm u la te d ,  
and to  c o - o r d in a te  and s y s t e m a t i s e  h i s  p r i n c i p l e s .  "The tru th "  
he s a y s  " is  o n ly  r e a l i z e d  in the  fonr; o f  a sy s tem , "^and a g a in ,  
"The t r u th  i s  th e  w hole . The whole how ever, i s  m ere ly  t t e
'  V
th e  e s s e n t i a l  n a tu r e ,  r e a ch in g  i t s  co m p le te n e ss  through th e  
" p ro cess  o f  i t s  own d evelop m en t."  H is p h ilo so p h y  i s  
d i s t i n c t i v e l y  a p h ilo so p h y  o f  d ev e lo p m en t , which i s  regarded  
as th e  p r o c e s s  by which th e  A bso lu te  r e a l i s e s  i t s e l f .  T h is  
p r o c e s s  i s  a movement from the  a b s tr a c t  to  th e  c o n c r e t e ,  from
l-TV
th e  s u b j e c t i v e  to  th e  o b j e c t i v e ,  o r ,  H e g e l ' s ^ t e c h n o lo g y , from 
"Notion" to  " Idea ."
A p h i l o s o p h i c a l  th eo ry  can o n ly  be u nd erstood  in  th e  
l i g h t  o f  th e  g e n e r a l  p h ilo so p h y  to  which i t  b e lo n g s .  To no 
p h i lo s o p h e r  i s  t h i s  s ta te m e n t  more p e r t in e n t  than to  H e g e l ,  
who s a id  t h a t  th e  t r u th  was the  whole and was o n ly  r e a l i s e d  
in  th e  form o f  a sy s tem . H is p h ilo so p h y  i s  a v a s t  system  in
which 3 ach p a r t  has i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  p l a c e ,  and i t  i s  o n ly  in
1 . Fhonomonology o f  tho Mind ( B a i l l i o ) ,  p . 17 .
2 . I b id ,  p . 2 2 .
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r e l a t i o n  to  the system  as a w h o le ,  t h a t  one can grasp  th e  s i g ­
n i f i c a n c e  o f  a s i n g l e  th e o ry  in c lu d ed  in  i t  b u t ,j is  im p o s s ib le   ^
in  a b r i e f  e s s a y  l i k e  t h i s  to attem pt to  g iv e  an y th in g  resem­
b l in g  a g e n e r a l  id e a  o f  a g r e a t  p h ilo so p h y  such as h i s .  We 
can o n ly  p o in t  o u t  t h a t  i t s  g o v ern in g  c o n c e p t io n  i s  t h a t  o f  
the N otion  in  i t s  th r e e  moments. S t a r t in g  from th e  U n iv e r s a l  
Ego o f  F i c h t e ,  K egel s e e s  in  th e  g r e a t  sp h e r e s  o f  L o g ic ,
Nature and S p i r i t ,  which form th e  main d i v i s i o n s  o f  h i s  p h i l o ­
sop h y , -  th e  th r e e  moments o f  th e  N otion  from th e  U n iv e r s a l  
through tho P a r t i c u l a r  to  tho  S in g u la r .  T h is  p r o c e s s  which  
he e x ^ r o s s u s  in  the  fonri o f  a d i a l e c t i c ,  as t h e s i s ,  a n t i t h e s i s  
and s y n t h e s i s ,  i s  f o r  Hegel th e  key to  th e  u n d er sta n d in g  o f  
tho whole p r o c e s s  o f  d evelopm en t. He a p p l i e s  i t  to  every  
d i v i s i o n  o f  h i s  p h i lo s o p h y ;  the  P h ilo so p h y  o f  R ig h t ,  under 
which p ro p erty  i s  t r e a t e d ,  i s  comprehended in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  
o f  S p i r i t ,  which aga in  has th r e e  s u b - d i v i s i o n s ,  c o rre sp o n d in g  
to  tho  th r e e  moments o f  d evelopm en t, v i z . ,  s u b j e c t i v e  s p i r i t ,  
o b j e c t i v e  s p i r i t  and a b s o lu te  s p i r i t .  Under the  f i r s t  H egel 
c o n s id e r s  man as a p a r t  o f  n a tu r e ,  in  tho  second  as em erging  
from n a tu re  in  h i s  s o c i a l  c a p a c i t y ;  the  th ir d  t r e a t s  man in
h i s  s p i r i t u a l  a s p e c t .  The P h i lo so p h y  o f  r i g h t ,  or  O b je c t iv e  
S p i r i t ,  e x e m p l i f i e s  th e  same p r o c e s s  o f  d i a l e c t i c  in  i t s  
t h r e o - f c l d  d i v i s i o n  in to  A b stra ct  R ig h t ,  M o r a lity  and E t h ic a l
l o i .
O bservance ( S i t t l i c h k e i t ) .
The I n tr o d u c t io n  to  th e  P h i lo so p h y  o f  R igh t opens  
in tho f o l lo w in g  manner: "Tho p h i lo s o p h ic  S c ie n c e  o f  R ight  
"has f o r  i t s  o b j e c t  th e  id ea  o f  R ight and i t s  r e a l i s a t i o n ;
i c K  *
"(Vorvfirk^lung) . . . I t  h a s . ,  to  d ev e lo p  th e  id ea  o u t  o f  th e  
" n o tio n ;  . . . o r ,  what i s  th e  same t h i n g ,  to  c o n s id e r  the  
" p e c u l ia r  in h e r e n t  developm ent (E n tw ick e lu n g )  o f  th e  
" o b je c t  i t s e l f . " T h is developm ent i s  th e  developm ent o f  
the w i l l ,  which i s  assumed as f r e e .  "Freedom" H egel main­
t a i n s ,  " is  g iv e n  as a f a c t  o f  c o n s c io u s n e s s ,  and must be 
" b e l ie v e d  in ."   ^ But th e  " n o tio n " , o r  c o n c e p t io n ,  o f  
freedom d i f f e r s  from the "idea" o f  freedom , as th e  freedom  
o f  the c h i ld  d i f f e r s  from the  freedom o f  th e  man. I t  i s  
m ere ly  p o t e n t i a l  and i m p l i c i t ,  and to  become a c tu a l  i t  m ust,
as I t  w ere , g iv e  i t s e l f  a body, "The w i l l . . . t o  be t r u ly
2
fr o e  . . .m u s t  have a f ix e d  c o n t e n t ."  Only th u s d oes  f r e e ­
dom become o b j e c t i v e .  "A w i l l  t h a t  r e s o l v e s  n o th in g  i s  n o t
9;
"a r e a l  w i l l .  " C onceived  a b s t r a c t e d l y ,  tho f r e e  w i l l
" c o n s i s t s  in  a n e g a t iv e  a t t i t u d e  tow ards r e a l i t y ,  and a
4
"bare r e fe r e n c e  o f  i t s e l f  to  i t s e l f . " But to  become 
r e a l  i t  must go ou t o f  i t s e l f ,  oven though such  a p r o c e s s  
means l i m i t a t i o n .  "Who w i l l  be g r e a t" ,  H egel h ere  q u o te s
Goethe, "must bo ab le  to  l i m i t  him self*" In g iv in g  to  h i s  freedom  
an ex te r n a l sphere, the person transcends the s u b je c t iv e  phase of  
freedom. "The fr e e  w i l l ,  in  order not to  remain an a b s tr a c t io n ,  
must g iv e  i t s e l f  r e a l i t y ;  the f i r s t  ta n g ib le  m a te r ia ls  o f t h i s  re­
a l i t y  are ex ter n a l ob jects*  The f i r s t  phase c f  freedom i s  what we
s h a l l  know as property, and i s  the sphere c f  formal and a b s tr a c t  
1
r i g h t . " Thus i t  i s  as a ffo rd in g  an ex tern a l sphere c f  freedom
th a t  property  f lnd d  a ^ lace  in  H e g e l's  p h ilosoph y of development.
[rhc fo l lo w in g  paragraphs are in se r te d  here, a s  g iv in g  the  
g i s t  o f  H e / e l ' s  u tter a n c es  on p r o /e r ty  in  alm ost h i s  arm words, and 
as forming the b a s is  c f  our subsequent c r i t i c i s m .  The r e fe r e n c e s  
here and throughout a ^ p lj  eq u a lly  t c  paragraphs in  Grundlinien der  
P h ilo so p h ie  des Rechts (Boiland 1902) and the Dyde's T ran s la tion  o f  
the same.
41. The r a t io n a le  of property i s  found in  i t s  transcend ing
(aufheben) the su b je c t iv e  phase of p e r s o n a l i ty .  I t  i s  in  p o sse s s io n  
th a t  the  person f i r s t  becomes r a t io n a l .
44. 1 person has vhe r ig h t  to ^ut h i s  w i l l  -n to  ctny o b je c t
( in  Jede Sache ihren B i l le n  zu le g e n ) .  In so doing he g iv e s  i t  a 
meaning and a sou l which i t  had not in  i t s e l f .  I t  i s  man's a b so lu te  
r ig h t  to  appropriate th in g s .  In appropriation  man dem onstrates the  
f a c t  th a t  a thing has no end cr independent r e a l i t y  aparÿ from him.
Tc appropriate  a t  bottom means sim ply t c  m an ifest  the su b lim ity  
( i ic h c it )  0 1  my v?iii, in  op p o sit io n  to  a "ohing", and to  prove th a t  
i t  i s  n e ith e r  a th in g  in  i t s e l f  nor an end in  i t s e l f .  A th in g  in  
becoming mine r e c e iv e s  from mo another so u l.
45# P o sse ss io n  ( B e s i t z )  means to  have a th in? in power, and
i l s  s p e c ia l  in t e r e s t  l i e s  in  the f a c t  th a t ,  by my own natu ra l want, 
impulse and ch o ic e ,  I have made a th in g  mine, my own. But the mean­
ing of property  (Eigantum) l i e s  in  the f a c t  th a t  my fr e e  w i l l  i s  
only f i r s t  a c tu a i is e d  and made re a l in p o sse s s io n .
Property i s  f i r s t  regarded as the s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  cur 
nrimary wants; but in  r e a l i t y ,  from the standp oint of freedom, prop­
er ty  i s  the f i r s t  embodiment o f  freedom (D asein) as an independent end.
1 . Philosophy o f  Right or Grundlinien der P h ilo so p h ie  des R e c h ts .33 ad.
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4G. In  p rc v .r ty  t h .  *111 I s  p e rso n a l, and tha ,.arscn i s  a par­
t i c u l a r  in d iv id u a l;  th e re fo re  p ro p erty  i s  the  personal e s ta te  o f a 
p a r t i c u la r  % ill. Since 1 give r o a l i ty  to  my w ill  through p ro p erty , 
i t  must have tho meaning of t h i s  and m int. Such i s  th e  im portant 
d o c trin e  o f ,.r iv ..te  p ro p e rty .
47. Since the  yecson^cannot be separa ted  from h is  body, my
freedom means fo r  others^xn"my body. The body i s  th e  f i r s t  poosscs- 
icn  o f th e  s p i r i t ,  and i s  the outward embodiment of freedom.
40. Ihe claim  fo r  e q u a lity  of p ro p erty  i s  su i> e rfic ia i, s ince
e q u a lity  i s  only an a b s tr a c t  id e n t i ty  s e t  up by the understand ing .
The e q u a lity  of ^ornons as such, i s  an a b s tra c t  conception , because 
in  th e i r  a c tu a l is a t io n  persons a re  unequal, and p ro p erty  i s  the  b a s is  
c f  t h i s  in e q u a li ty . P a r t ic u la r i ty  of w ealth  i s  due, no t only  to  
ac c id e n ta l circum stances, but to  th e  i n f in i t e  v a r ie ty  and d iffe re n c e  
of mind and c h a ra c te r .
The d e s ire  th a t  a l l  men should have a comi^etsncy, i s  & ' 
mor.ll and *ell-m e_ning wish, but l ik e  a l l  th e  merely well-m eaning, 
has no corresponding r e a l i ty .
51. Ihe mere re p re se n ta tio n  o f a th in g  to  m yself a s  mine does
no t c o n s t i tu te  p ro p e rty . 1 must take  a th in g  in to  my p o ssessio n ,
and th u s  re ce iv e  th e  reco g n itio n  c f  o th e rs . By so doing I make i t
my p ro p e rty .
52. Ih em ate ria l o f f e r s  mo o p p o sitio n , and in  possession  1
break down t h i s  o ,p o s it io n  and independence by making i t  serve  my 
ends. Ho* f a r  I  am ab le  to  do t h i s  depends on tho n a tu re  c f  my
o b je c t and on my s k i l l .  Ihe m astery and outward possession  of
th in g s  must remain always more o r l e s s  undetermined and incom plete.
But th e  o b je c t has ILways an e s s e n t ia l  form, and tho more I can make 
t h i s  my own th e  more I e n te r  in to  r e a l  possession  o f a th in g . Ih e  
extreme example o f t h i s  i s  seen in  th e  m astica tio n  of food, by 
which i t s  very substance i s  absorbed. T ra in ing  in  p h y sica l s k i l l
as w ell a s  the c u ltu re  of th e  m indis a more or l e s s  p e r fe c t  possession , 
i t  i s  th e  mind o r s p i r i t  th a t  I can most com pletely make my own.
53. There a re  th re e  phases o f p ro p e rty ; 1. The a c t  o f possess­
ion .
2. One. 3. Relinquishm ent.
54. A. The a c t of possession . This i s  a f fe c te d  p a r t ly  by
d i r e c t  p h y sica l p rehension , p a r t ly  by fa sh io n in g , and p a r t ly  by 
p u ttin g  a mark o r sign  upon the o b je c t. In  th ese  th re e  forms we 
can seo the p rocess from the  p a r t ic u la r  tc  the u n iv e rsa l. Ihe f i r s t  
form i s  ac tu a l and th e  th ird  symboxic. Corporeal possession  app ea ls  
to  th e  senses, and i s  th e re fo re  th e  most com plete; but i t  i s  only 
su b je c tiv e  and tem porary.
134,
57, ïhQro i s  a d i a l e c t i c  in  the  idea o f  property.  For as
i t  i s  on ly  by the t r a in in g  o f  mind and body and by the  conception  
of  h im se lf  as  f ro e ,  th a t  a man g e t s  p o s se s s io n  o f  h im se l f  and be-  
comes h i s  own property,  sc t h i s  s e l f -p o & s e s s io a  c o n s i s t s  in  h i s  
t r a n s l a t i n g  h i s  p o t e n t ia l  g o l f  in to  a r e a l i t y .  Only thus does  
he boccmo f ira J . /  e s ta b l i s h e d  h i s  own.
59, B, Use. Use i s  the r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  a want in which the  w i l l  
i s  y ^ r t i c u la r i s u d .  This t-iLcS p la ce  through change, d e s tru c t io n  
or consumption o f  an o b je c t .  The w i l l  by which I make a th in g  my 
own, i s  tho fundamental substance,  o f  which use i s  vu ly  the  appear­
ance, and p a r t i c u la r  form,
31. In use the o b je c t  i s  negated and reduced to  a means to
my ends. The r e l a t i o n  o f  use to property i s  the r e la t i o n  o f  sub­
stance  to  a cc id en t ,  of the inner to  the ou ter ,  of fo rce  to  i t s  man­
i f e s t a t i o n .  But the fo rce  must be manifested; a farm i s  on ly  a 
farm in  so far  a s  i t  bears produce.
62, N. The d i s t i n c t i o n  between the r ig h t  of  complete use and 
a b s tr a c t  property  i s  meaningless ,  s in c e  i t  d en ie s  p o s s e s s io n  as  the  
r e a l i z a t i o n  c f  the  w i l l .  That view of  property which makes t h i s  
d i s t i n c t i o n  may be c a l l e d  an aberration;  for  i t  im p l ie s  the  e x i s ­
tence  o f  a rea l  r e l a t i o n  in an empty mastery.
63, In use an o b je c t  i s  s i n g l e  and answers to  a s p e c ia l  need. 
But i t s  u s e f u l n e s s  can be compared to  th a t  o f  other o b je c t s ,  and 
t h i s  u n i v e r s a l i t y  c o n s t i t u t e s  i t s  va lue .  The essence  o f  a th ing  
l i a s  in  i t s  va lue ,  and i t  im through i t s  value th a t  i t  becomes
an o b je c t  o f  con sc iou sn ess ,
34. The form or mark we g ive  an o b je c t  are them selves  ex tern a l
d e t a i l s ,  apart from the s u b je c t iv e  presence of  the w i l l ,  which 
alone g iv e s  them meaning and value.  But the presence o f  the w i l l  
i s  shown by use or some such outward m a n ife s ta t io n .  Real owner­
ship depends for  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  on th e se ,  and here in  l i e s  the  ju s ­
t i f i c a t i o n  of p r e s c r ip t io n ,  which i s  based on the r e a l i t y  o f  pro­
p erty ,  and r e s t s  on the assumption that  I have ceased to  look  
upon a th in g  as mine,
65. C. Relinquishment. This i s  confined to  ex terna l  o b j e c t s  
and i s  not  p o s s i b l e  with regard to  the  inner p o s s e s s io n s  o f  the  
sp ir i t .S o m e  p o s s e s s io n s  are i n a l i e n a b l e . . . .  Such comprise my 
inner  p e r s o n a l i ty  and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ^  my freedom o f  w i l l .
Vhoro^as in  s u p e r s t i t i o n ,  t h i s  takes  p la ce  i t  i s  a s ign  o f  f a i ­
lu r e  to  t r u ly  p o s s e s s  o u r se lv e s .  True s e l f - p o s s e s s i o n  i s  unique 
and cannot be re l inqu ished^
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We have seen th a t  i t  i s  a s  a f fo r d in g  an ex tern a l  sphere  
fo r  freedom th a t  Hegel f in d s  a p la ce  f o r  property  in h i s  p h i lo s o ­
phy. This  idea  i s  indeed the  keynote of h i s  treatment o f  th e  
su b jec t .  The s e l f  or person i s  conceived of  a s  in th e  p r o c e ss  o f  
development from a cond it ion  o f  a b s tr a c t  formal freedom, which i s  
the mere'conception o f  freedom, to  the f u l l  freedom c f  the  s p i r i t .  
But as  such development i s  a p r o c e s s  o f  e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n ,  the  w i l l  
must go out o f  i t s e l f  and g iv e  i t s e l f  a t a n g ib le  e x i s t e n c e ,  in  
order to  a c t u a l i s e  I t s  freedom. This i s  o b je c t iv e ,  a s  opposed to  
s u b j e c t iv e ,  freedom. In the e x e r c i s e  o f  i t s  freedomthrough the
con tro l  o f  ex terna l  o b je c t s ,  the w i l l  f i r s t  becomes r a t i o n a l .  -  
ouned
The o b j e c t a i s  reg&rded in  the  l i g h t  of  a f o i l ,  which s e t s  o f f  the  
person. Contact with i t s  e x t e r n a l i t y  throws in to  r e l i e f  the  in ­
ner s p i r i t u a l  nature o f  the person, while  I t s  dependence br ings  
out the independence and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  the  l a t t e r ,  who 
u ses  i t  a s  a means to  h i s  endé. The su b l im ity  (Hoheit)  o f  the  
w i l l  i s  manifested  in  t h i s  o p p o s i t io n ,  in  which the th in g  i s  
negot:d .
Ownership, regarded from the ^ o in t  of  view o f  p o s s e s s ­
ion,  i s  a p ro g r e s s iv e  oxpericace ,  which must always remain in­
complete, s in c e  i t  depends for  i t s  f u l l  r e a l i z a t i o n  on a p e r f e c t  
mastery over the ex terna l  o b jec t .
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The more p e r f e c t  the mastery the more re a l  the p o s s e s s io n .  
Thus p h y s ic a l  and mental cu lture  are a more or l e s s  p e r f e c t  pro­
c e s s  of s e l f - p o s s e s s i o n ;  s in c e  i t  i s  mind th a t  one can most com­
p l e t e l y  make o n e 's  own. In t h i s  idea  o f  mind or s p i r i t  a s  the  
com pletest  form o f  property ,  there i s  no r ea l  co n tr a d ic t io n  o f  
H ege l ' s  concept ion  o f  property as  the  ex terna l  sphere o f  freedom.
I t  does indeed g iv e  the ex terna l  sphere, required by the  w i l l
for  i t s  r e a l i z a t i o n .  But, s in c e  "the fr e e  w i l l  i s  the  w i l l  th a t
1
" w i l l s  i t s e l f " ,  i t  f o l l o w s  th a t  to  make a th ing  r e a l l y  i t s  own,
the w i l l  must transform i t  in to  i t s  own l i k e n e s s  and nature .  &
"thing" which, as Hegel says ,  i s  ex ternal  and fo re ig n  to  w i l l ,
opposes i t s e l f  f o r  th a t  reason to  i t .  Ownership, regarded a s  a
p sy c h o lo g ic a l  p ro ce ss ,  i s  the  breaking down o f  that  o p p o s i t io n
by appropriation  and a s s i m i l a t i o n .  Herein l i e s  the d i s t i n c t i o n
between rea l  and l e g a l  ownership, to  which we have a lready r e -  
2
ferrod.  I may i n h e r i t  a l ib r a r y  f u l l  o f  p r i c e l e s s  t r e a s u r e s  o f  
a r t  and l i t e r a t u r e ;  but i f  I am i l l i t e r a t e ,  my ownership i s  l im i t e d  
tc  the  p r in t  and binding c f  tho books. They do not t r u l y  become my 
own, u n t i l  I am a t  home in t h e i r  con ten ts ;  only  then s h a l l  I have 
conquered t h e i r  f o r e ig n n e ss  and op pos i t ion  to  me.
1 , Kcttles ii ip* s  Remains 1. 2? .nd bO. queued in  Bosanquet* s  P h i lo ­
sop h ica l  Theory c f  the S ta te ,  f .  140.
2 .  Op. Pt I .  Ch. I l l  P.
137.
Tho i/ôrscM who i s  tho su b jec t  o f  r i g h t s ,  i s  tho in d iv id ­
ual in  h i s  bod i ly  org&nigm. Respect for  my freedom i s  th e re fo re  
r e sp ec t  for  my body, v/hich i s  thus the f i r s t  o b je c t  o f  p o s s e s s io n ,  
a s  w e l l  as  the con d it ion  of property in gen er a l .  We may compare
t h i s  with Locke*e statc^Lsnt th a t  "every man has a property in  h i s  
1
"own -orccn" A fu r th er  l i k e n e s s  between Locke and Hegel i s  no­
t i c e a b l e  in  t h e i r  conception  o f  an e s s e n t i a l  r e l a t i o n  between own­
ership  and a c t i v i t y .  We have seen how Locke, in  h i s  u n c r i t i c a l  
way, e s s e s  t h i s  idea  by saying th a t  labour g iv e s  a t i t l e  t o  
property .  Now Hegel ex p resses  the converse o f  the  same idea  in  
h i s  i n t e r p r é t a t i o n  o f  p r e s c r i p t io n ,  ( to  which we have a lready  
rofurrod: ) a s  being based on the r e a l i t y  o f  property ,  on the  ne­
c e s s i t y  th a t  the w i l l  should express  i t s e l f  ( s i c h  a u sn em )  in  order
6
to  keep anything*. This the a c t i v i t y  o f  the  w i l l  c o n s t i t u t e s  the  
r e a l i t y  of  property,  whoso r a t io n a le  i s  wo g iv e  i t  & sphere o f  
freedom. Therefore t c  t a l k  of  ownership apart from t h i s  a c t i v i t y  
argues a misapprehension o f  the term. This in t im ate  r e l a t i o n  i s  
an Im pl ica t ion  o f  H e g e l ' s  philosophy o f  development, and cannot  
be d i s s o c i a t e d  from h i s  view o f  property.  An a b s tr a c t  p ro p r ie to r ­
sh ip ,  which g iv e s  to  another the r ig h t  to  the f u l l  use o f  a th ing  
i s  m eaningless ,  in  t h i s  view o f  property a s  the  r e a l i s a t i o n  of  w i l l#
1 .  C i v i l  Govornmont, Chapter Y, t a r .  2 7 .
2 .  Cp. t a r t  p . 48 .
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Thus a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  th eo ry  o f  ownership  c o n t a in s  in  i t s e l f  the  
ground o f  i t s  l i c i t a t i o n s  as w e l l  as o f  i t s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
Hegel d i s t i n g u i s h e s  throe  moments or  p h a se s  in  pro­
p e r t y .  1 . D i r e c t  p o s s e s s i o n .  2 , Use. R en u n c ia t io n  or  r e l i n — 
quishm ent ,  (Vorà^sserung), which he d i s t i n g u i s h e s  as the  p o s i t i v e ^  
n e g a t i v e  and i n f i n i t e  judgments o f  the  w i l l .  In t h e s e  moments,  
which r e p r e s e n t ,  not  a t i m e - p r o c e s s , but a l o g i c a l  o rd er  o f  
th o u g h t ,  the  w i l l  i s  r e p r e s e n te d  as go ing  ou t  o f  i t s e l f  and f i n d ­
ing i t s  embodiment in som ething p o s i t i v e .  In so  do ing  i t  ne­
g a t e s  the o b j e c t  by u s in g  i t  w h i le  in  r e l in q u is h m e n t  i t  r e tu r n s  
in to  i t s e l f  from the  o b j e c t .  In h i s  i n c l u s i o n  o f  r e l in q u is h m e n t  
Hegel may seem to be s t r a i n i n g  a p o i n t  f o r  th e  sake o f  f o l l o w i n g  
h i s  p r o s c r ib e d  method. But as a m a tter  o f  f a c t  i t  i s  o n ly  in  
so f a r  as a t h in g  i s  ours  t h a t  we have the  r i g h t  to  r e l i n q u i s h  
i t  o r  the  power to  renounce i t .  R e l inqu ishm ent  th u s  becomes the  
crowning a c t  o f  ow nersh ip ,  in  which we prove o u r s e l v e s  most  
t r u l y  owners.  I t  i s  the  s p i r i t u a l  id ea  o f  ownership  brought  to  
i t s  p e r f e c t i o n .  The a c t  o f  r e l in q u is h m e n t  by which S t .  F r a n c is  
renounced h i s  r i g h t  to  h i s  patr im ony ,  was th u s  in  th e  f u l l e s t  
s e n s e  an e x o r c i s e  o f  h i s  r i g h t  o f  ow nersh ip .  The conduct  o f  
S t .  F r a n c i s  p r e s e n t s  another  p o in t  o f  i n t e r e s t  in  t h i s  connex­
io n .  In renouncing  h i s  patrimony and p o s s e s s i o n s ,  oven to  the  
very c o a t  o f f  h i s  back ,  r a th e r  than seem to  y i e l d  one j o t  o f  
h i s  c o n v i c t i o n s ,  he i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  s ta te m e n t  o f  Hegel t h a t  
ro l in q u ish m o n t  can on ly  r e f e r  to  o b j e c t s  which are in ------
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t h e i r  nature e x te r n a l .  P e r so n a l i ty ,  freedom of the w i l l ,  r e l i g i o n ,  
which are s p i r i t u a l  p o s s e s s io n s ,  are in a l i e n a b le ,  and i f ,  a s  under 
the in f lu e n c e  of s u p e r s t i t i o n  or f ea r ,  men part  with them, i t  i s  a 
proof that  they  have never r e a l l y  a t ta in e d  to  true s e l f - p o s s e s s i o n .  
In h i s  w i l l i n g n e s s  to  renounce a l l  h i s  ex ter n a l  goods, Francis  t r i ­
umphantly demonstrated the r e a l i t y  o f  h i s  held upon h i s  s p i r i t u a l  
in h e r i ta n c e .
Hegel c r i t i c e s  the Kantian conception of  w i l l  in  i t s  ex­
tern a l  r e l a t i o n s  as  mere capr ice ,  and t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  seems to  us  
j u s t i f i e d  in  tho l i g h t  of  the dualism which prevented Kant from 
bringing the r a t io n a l  w i l l  in to  any rea l  r e l a t i o n  with the empiri­
cal  world. I t  i s  not in  t h i s  sense ,  nor in  the  sense  of  s a t i s f y i n g  
more want, th a t  Hegel regards property as  r e a l i z e d  w i l l .  The w i l l  
th a t  i s  made ac tu a l  in property i s  the r a t io n a l  w i l l ,  and i t  i s  
as a n e c e s s i t y  fo r  i t s  development that he f in d s  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
of  property .  In such a view we have reached a more sure foundation  
for  the  r i g h t  o f  property than in  the  c o n s id er a t io n so f  u t i l i t y  
and happiness  which s a t i s f i e d  the English E m p ir ic i s t s .  Property,  
or the  r ig h t  t o  contro l  ex ternal  o b j e c t s ,  f o r  the ends o f  s e l f ,  
i s  thus an im p l ica t io n  of  the mandate. Be a person, and re sp ec t  
oth ers  as  persons.  For i t  i s  a s  being a necessary  s tage  in  the  
p ro cess  of  s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ,  which, in H e g e l ' s  view i s  a p ro cess  
of  e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n  th a t  the r ig h t  i s  e s ta b l i s h e d .
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I f  wo were to  mako the chapter e n t i t l e d  P rop erty  th e  s o l e  
b a s i s  o f  our c r i t i c i s m ,  we should regard Lis  treatment as  c u r io u s ly  
on e-s id ed .  For i t  i s  confined throughout to  that  a sp ec t  o f  proper­
ty  which concerns the r e l a t i o n  of  the  w i l l t o  the ex ter n a l  o b je c t ,  
to  the’ e x c lu s io n  of  the important aspectfrom which i t  i s  regarded  
as a r e l a t i o n  between persons through the medium o f  ex tern a l  t h in g s .  
This impress ion i s  strengthened by H ege l ' s  a p p l i c a t io n  o f  th e  term 
"rxght" to the r e l a t i o n  between the person and the th in g ,  as ,  fo r  
in s ta n c e ,  when he speaks o f  mankind having an ab so lu te  r i g h t  of  
appropriat ion  over a l l  uhings. As i t  stands such an u t terance  i s  
m isleading ,  s in ce  i t  i d e n t i f i e s  the cond it ion  o f  o b j e c t iv e  freedom 
with the  r ig h t  to  i c .  But as wo have a lready seen, no statement  
o f  H e g e l ' s  can oe understood in i s o l a t i o n  from xhe ahole,  and we 
must c o r re c t  our impression of  on e-s id ed ness  by a re feren ce  to  
the  s e t t i n g  of the chapter.  Ihe d e f e c t  we have noted i s  in  part  
due to the r i g id  metnod of d i a l e c t i c  which Hegel pursued, and 
which IS ex em p li f ied  in  h i s  d i v i s i o n  o f  A ostract  Right in to  three  
p a r t s ,  each rep rese n t in g  phases o f  the development o f  freedom.
These are comprehended under the headings o f  1. property,  2. Con­
t r a c t ,  3 . Wrong or Crime, represen t in g  the three moments o f  de­
velopment from the a b s tr a c t  to  the con crete .  Thus in  property  
freedom i s  regarded as  the phase o f  the a b s tr a c t  w i l l ,  o f  the
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person,who’ r e l a t e s  h im se l f  only  to h im se l f ,  whereas con tract  repre­
s e n t s  the  s tage  in  which a man, by d i s t in g u i s h in g  h im se lf  from him­
s e l f ,  becomes r e la t e d  to  another person. I t  must be admitted th a t  
in  thus fo r c in g  h i s  method upon every branch o f  h i s  treatment,
Hegel has been l e d  in to  a s e r io u s  error .  For in  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between property  and co n tra ct  ho has separated elements which are  
e s s e n t i a l  c o n s t i t u e n t s  o f  a r i g h t .  We maintain th a t  property i s  
a r e l a t i o n  between persons and not between a person and an ezter^  
nal o b jec t ;  and th a t  i t  i s  only  in  the l i g h t  of such a r e l a t i o n  
th a t  appropriat ion  r i s e s  to  the  l e v e l  o f  a r ig h t  o f  ownership.
The w i l l ,  says  Hegel, i s  r a t i o n a l i s e d  in  property; but t h i s  does  
not take p la c e  by the  mere e x e r c i s e  of freedom on ex ter n a l  o b je c t s .  
I t  i s  the s o c i a l  f a c t  o f  property with  a l l  th a t  i t  im p l ie s  o f  re­
c o g n i t io n  fo r  the s e l f  th a t  counts in the p rocess .  The ex tern a l  
Sphere o f  freedom i s  not merely the actual  m ateria l  o f  cur poss­
e s s io n s ;  i t  i s  t h i s ,  but i t  i s  a l so  a sphere, whose form i s  deter­
mined by the  mind and by the soc iax  r e l a t i o n s  in to  which the mind 
i s  brought through property.
Hegex docs indeed supply the c o r r e c t iv e  to  the  o n o - s id e -  
edness  o f  h i s  treatment in the passage where he d e a ls  with the  
t r a n s i t i o n  from property to  c o n tra c t .  He sa y s  : "Property, as  a 
" v i s ib le  ex terna l  th ing ,  i s  determined by i t s  r e l a t i o n s  to  o ther
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«external t h i n g s . . . .  But property i s  a l so  a m an ifes ta t io n  o f  w i l l ,  
"and the o ther ,  fo r  which i t  e x i s t s ,  i a  th e  w i l l  o f  another person.  
**l h i s  re fe re n c e  o f  w i l l  to  w i l l  i s  the true  and p e c u l ia r  ground on 
"Which freedom i s  r e a l i s e d . The means by which I hold property,  
"not by v ir tu e  of  the r e l a t i o n  of  an o b je c t  to  my s u b je c t iv e  w i l l ,
"but by v ir tu e  of  another w i l l ,  and hence share in  a common w i l l ,
1
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"is  co n tr a c t ."  This statement however i s  on ly  one, as  opposed t o
the whole treatment o f  property in  the former chapter, and i t  does
not e f f a c e  from our minds the impression that H eg e l ' s  a t t e n t io n
was concentrated  on the value o f  property fo r  tho in d iv id u a l ,  to
the n o g le c t  c f  the  soc iax  r e l a t i o n s  involved in  such a r i g h t .
We have underlined the above statement a s  in d i c a t in g  
j u s t  th a t  a sp ec t  o f  property, which H ege l ' s  general treatment  
s lu r s  over.  P r a c t i c a l  s o c i a l  problems may not come w ith in  the  
range o f  philosophy pure and s imple,  but tho "reference o f  w i l l  
"tc w i l l " ,  implied  in  property,  may Iiave im p l ic a t io n s  which w i l l  
r e a c t  upon the  r i g h t  i t s e l f ,  and th ere fo re  demanding a t t e n t io n .
The r ig h t  o f  property i s  indeed based on the  f a c t  that  i t  i s  
"rea l ized  w i l l " ,  but H e g e l ' s  conception o f  what c o n s t i t u t e s  r e -  
a l i a  cd w i l l  needs tc  be exp indod and supplemented before  the  
statement can be accepted  in i t s  e n t i r e t y .
1. 71.
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Ownership in r e l a t i o n  to  the  Common Good; -  Green.
Green i s  in  fundamental agreement w ith  Hegel  in
r e g a r d in g  p ro p e r ty  as r e a l i z e d  w i l l ,  and has n o th in g  in com­
mon w ith  tho E m p i r i c i s t s ,  who sou ght  f o r  th e  moral c r i t e r i o n  
o f  ow nersh ip  in  h a p p in es s  and u t i l i t y .  I t  i s  n o t  to  t h e s e ,  
but to  Kant and th e  l a t e r  German I d e a l i s t s  t h a t  h i s  p h i l o ­
s o p h ic  th o u g h t  i s  a k in .  The b a s i s  o f  h i s  p h i lo s o p h y  i s  th e  
c o n c e p t io n  o f  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  as the  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t ^  and 
g o a l  o f  human endeavour.  As a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t ,  the  c o n s c i o u s ­
n e s s  o f  s e l f  as opposed to o b j e c t s  i s  th e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  a l l  
d i s t i n c t i v e l y  human a c t i v i t y ;  as a g o a l  i t  i s  th e  end o f  a l l  
man's s t r i v i n g .  The c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  th e  o p p o s i t i o n  o f  
o b j e c t s , which i s  th e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  our b e in g  c o n s c io u s  o f  
o u r s e l v e s ,  i s  a t  th e  same time a s ig n  o f  the  f a i l u r e  to  
a t t a i n  to  f u l l  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  T h is  im p e r f e c t io n  con­
s t i t u t e s  want,  th e  s e n s e  o f  f a i l u r e  in  b e in g  and d o in g ,  and 
g i v e s  r i s e  to  tho e f f o r t  to  remove i t .  P ro g r o ss  or  d e v e l ­
opment i s  th u s  th e  p r o c e s s  by which we approximate to  the  
i d e a l  o f  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  by overcoming the  o p p o s i t i o n  
between o u r s e l v e s  and the  o b j e c t ,  in  o t h e r  words, th e  p r o c e s s
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by which we apj^roach to t r u e  s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n .  S in c e  we arc  
l i m i t e d  and our v;ants p a r t i c u l a r ,  we seek  s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n  
in  o b j e c t s  which can n ever  s a t i s f y  the  s e l f  as a w hole .  But 
i m p l i c i t  in a l l  p a r t i c u l a r  s t r i v i n g s  a f t e r  good,  i s  th e  id e a  
o f  a supreme good 'w hich  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  d e s i r a b l e ,  but which  
cannot  be i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  any p a r t i c u l a r  o b j e c t  o f  d e s i r e .  
This  id ea  o f  a supreme good t a k e s  e x p r e s s i o n  in a system  o f  
r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s ,  a system  which i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  s o c i a l ,  
s i n c e  we cannot  c o n c e iv e  o f  a supreme good f o r  o u r s e l v e s  
apart  from o t h e r  p e r s o n s .  The c o n c e p t io n  o f  a common good 
i s  i m p l i c i t  in  t h a t  o f  a supreme good f o r  the  s e l f ,  which i s  
t h u s ,  in  i t s  inmost n a t u r e ,  s o c i a l .  P r o g r e s s ,  in t h i s  l i g h t ,  
r e c e i v e s  a new c o n t e n t ,  and the  p r o c e s s  by which the  s e l f  
s e e k s  i t s  h i g h e s t  s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  seen  to  be synonymous w ith  
th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  th e  common good.
I t  i s  in  t h i s  c o n c e p t io n  o f  tho  common good t h a t  
Green r e p r e s e n t s  an advance upon H e g e l ,  w ith  whose v iew  o f  
p r o p e r ty  as " r e a l i z e d  w i l l " ,  he i s ,  as  we have s a i d ,  in  
fundamental agreem ent.  This  may be seen  from th e  f o l l o w i n g  
p a s s a g e :
"The v a lu e  o f  the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  c i v i l  l i f e  l i e s  in  t h e i r  
" o p er a t io n  as g i v i n g  r e a l i t y  to  th o s e  c a p a c i t i e s  o f  w i l l
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"and r e a s o n ,  and e n a b l in g  them to  be r e a l l y  e x e r c i s e d . . . .
"So f a r  as th ey  do in f a c t  o p e r a te  they  are m o ra l ly  
« 1j u s t i f i e d .  The d i f f e r e n c e  be tween Green and Hegel
may bo i l l u s t r a t e d  by comparing t h e i r  t rea tm en t  o f  r i g h t s .
" P e r s o n a l i t y "  s a y s  Hegel " im p l ie s  a c a p a c i t y  to  p o s s e s s  
„ 2
r i g h t s .  R ight  i s  th e  c o n c r e t e  e x i s t e n c e  which f r e e -
2  w h i c k  v e s 'a
dom g i v e s  i t s e l f ,  T^id t a k e s  the  form o f  p r o p e r ty ^ in  th e  
main as a r e l a t i o n  between a person  and a t h i n g , s l u r r i n g  
o v er  th e  more im portant  a s p e c t  o f  i t  as a " re fer en ce  o f  
" w i l l  to  w i l l . "  Green on th e  o t h e r  hand em p h a s ises  th e  
e s s e n t i a l l y  s o c i a l  na tu re  o f  r i g h t s ,  m a in ta in in g  t h a t  th e  
c a p a c i t y  f o r  b e in g  determ ined by a common good i s  what con­
s t i t u t e s  p e r s o n a l i t y  in  the  e t h i c a l  s e n s e ,  and " c o n v e rse ly  
"everyone cap ab le  o f  be ing  determined by the  c o n c e p t io n
"of a common good as h i s  own i d e a l  g o o d , . . i n  o t h e r  words,
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"every moral p e r s o n ,  i s  capab le  o f  r i g h t s . "  Bo a g r e e s  
w ith  Hegel in  re g a r d in g  r i g h t s  as n e c e s s a r y  f o r  th e  moral  
developm ent o f  p e r s o n a l i t y .  "There ought to  be r i g h t s , "  he 
s a y s  "because t h e i f  moral p e r s o n a l i t y  ought to  be d e v e lo p e d ,"
1 .  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  O b l i g a t i o n ,  Par.  7 .
2 . P h i lo s o p h y  o f  R ight  3 6 .
3 .  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  O b l i g a t i o n ,  p a r .2 5 .
4 .  I b i d ,  2 6 .
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but ho e n p h a s i s o s  t h a t  a s p e c t  o f  r i g h t s  in  which tho porson  
i s  brought in t o  r e l a t i o n  w ith  s o c i e t y ,  -  an a sp e c t  w hich ,  
a t  l e a s t  in  h i s  d i r e c t  t rea tm en t  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  Hegel ign ores*  
The fo u n d a t io n  o f  th e  r i g h t  t o  l i f e , o f  which p ro p er ty  i s  
an in s t r u m e n t ,  i s ,  f o r  Green, a man's c a p a c i t y  f o r  member­
s h ip  o f  s o c i e t y .  Thus Green a c c e p t s  H e g e l ' s  d o c t r in e  t h a t  
th e  fo u n d a t io n  o f  r i g h t s  o f  p ro p er ty  l i e s  in th e  w i l l ,  t h a t  
p ro p e r ty  i s  " r e a l i z e d  w i l l " ,  w ith  the  important  m o d i f i c a t i o n ,  
t h a t  by w i l l  i s  understood  a permanent p r i n c i p l e  "in v i r t u e  
"of which each s e e k s  to  g iv e  r e a l i t y  to  the  c o n c e p t io n  
"of a w e l l  b e i n g ,  which he regard s  as common to h i m s e l f  
"and o t h e r s . "  ^
Like Locke, Green b a s e s  the  r i g h t  to  p ro p er ty  on
th e  r i g h t  to  f r e e  l i f e , which he reg a rd s  as based on the
c o n c e p t io n  o f  an i d e n t i t y  o f  good between the  members o f
.
s o c i e t y .  T h is  c o n c e p t io n  r u l e s  out o f  co u r t  as m e a n i n g l e s s , 
such  a q u e s t i o n  as S p e n c e r ' s  o f  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e r e  
b e in g  r i g h t s  a g a i n s t  s o c i e t y .  The r a t i o n a l e  o f  p ro p e r ty  
i s  t h a t  i t  s e c u r e s  to  the  i n d i v i d u a l  th e  means o f  r e a l i z i n g  
h i s  w i l l ,  which i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  a w i l l  d i r e c t e d  to  th e  com­
mon good. I t s  moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n  l i e s  in the  n e c e s s i t y  o f  
an e x t e r n a l  sp h ere  f o r  freedom, w hich ,  to  become a c t u a l ,
1 .  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  O b l i g a t i o n ,
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must oxtond beyond the  body to  e x t e r n a l  o b j e c t s .  V?ithout such  
a sp here  o f  a c t i v i t y ,  the  w i l l  would remain f r e e  in  v a cu o ,  not  
in  r e a l i t y .  Green f u r t h e r  a g r e e s  w ith  Hegel t h a t ,  regarded  
as the  means o f  ad ap t in g  e x t e r n a l  o b j e c t s  to  our e n d s ,  p ro p er ­
t y  must bo u n eq u a l ,  s i n c e  freedom to  e x e r c i s e  power w i l l  in ­
e v i t a b l y  b r in g  ou t  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  men's q u a l i t i e s  and g i f t s .
Green d i s c u s s e s  th e  p r a c t i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  o f  freedom  
o f  trad e  and b e q u e s t ,  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between p ro p erty  in  land  
and o t h e r  forms o f  p r o p e r t y ,  on th e  ground th a t  land i s  l im ­
i t e d  and d e f i n i t e  in  amount. The g e n e r a l  d r i f t  o f  G reen 's  
th o u g h t  i s  t h a t  th e  a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n  which to -d a y  o b t a i n s ,  
v i z . , tho  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a p r o l e t a r i a t e  f o r  whom p ro p e r ty  has  
no r e a l  moaning, i s  n o t  th e  n e c e s s a r y  r e s u l t  o f  th e  d e v e lo p ­
ment o f  the  r i g h t  o f  accum ulat ion  and b e q u e s t .  Ho does not  
e x p r e s s  h i m s e l f  d e f i n i t e l y  on the  need f o r  the  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  
p r o p er ty  w ith  a v iew  to the common good; but h i s  whole con­
c e p t io n  o f  s o c i e t y  l o a d s  l o g i c a l l y  to  the  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  
tho c o n d i t i o n s  o f  ownersh ip  must be c o n t r o l l e d , so t h a t  the  
moans o f  a good l i f e  may bo w i t h in  reach o f  a l l .  T h is  i s  
not th e  s u b v e r s a l ,  but th e  outcome, o f  the  r i g h t  to  p r o p er ty  
as " r e a l i z e d  w i l l "  in tho s o c i a l  s e n s e  t h a t  Green und erstan d s  
th e  e x p r e s s i o n .
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Tho importance o f  G reen 's  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  th e  
t r e a tm e n t  o f  p ro p er ty  s ta n d s  ou t  in c l e a r  r e l i e f  i f  vre con­
t r a s t  h i s  v iew s  w ith  t h o s e ,  say o f  S p en cer ,  who comes near­
e s t  him in  p o i n t  o f  t i n e . The i n t e n s e  i n d i v i d u a l i s m ,  which  
re g a r d s  p r o p er ty  as a n a t u r a l  r i g h t  and a l l  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  
as in e v i l ,  though a n o co ssa r y  e v i l ,  has g iv en  way to  the  
c o n c e p t io n  o f  a common good,  in  which i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  are  
com p rised ,  and apart  from which they  do not  e x i s t .
C h a p t e r  V I I I .
Ownership as a B a s i s  o f  U n i t y : -  Bosanquet
B osanquet ,  l i k e  G reen , i s  the  l i n e a l  descen dan t  o f
th e  Gorman I d e a l i s t s ,  and s ta n d s  in sharp c o n t r a s t  t o  the
e a r l i e r  E n g l i s h  p h i l o s o p h e r s , whom we have been c o n s i d e r i n g .  
Both he and Green r e p r e s e n t  tho swing o f  thou ght  in  t h i s  
cou n try  from th e  a t o m i s t i c  v iew o f  s o c i e t y ,  which was the  
n a t u r a l  outcome o f  Em pir ic ism , to  the  c o n c e p t io n  o f  a com­
mon good, which i s  regarded as the  foun dat ion  o f  r i g h t s .
I t  i s  in  B o sa n q u o t 's  v iew o f  the  s e l f  as a s u b j e c t  o f  r i g h t s  
and freedom t h a t  the  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  most c l e a r l y  s e e n .
R ig h ts  are a c o n d i t i o n  o f  tho  common good and as
such are en fo r c e d  by th e  S t a t e .  Every r i g h t  has t h e r e f o r e
both  a moral and a l e g a l  r e f e r e n c e ;  f o r  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a 
conmon good i m p l i e s  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  c la im  
to  c o n t r i b u t e  to  t h a t  good, and S t a t e  a c t io n  in th e  m ainten ­
ance o f  r i g h t s  i s  tho  p r e v e n t io n  and removal o f  h in d r a n ce s  
to t h i s  end. I t  i s  nogatitrC- in  i t s  immediate b e a r i n g ,  but  
i t  h i s  a p o s i t i v e  a im , v i a . ,  t h a t  o f  g iv i n g  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  
th e  i n d i v i d u a l  o f  making h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  th e  w hole .
'R ig h t s  are c la im s  r e co g n iz e d  by tho S t a t e ,  i . e . ,  by
15C,
' S o c i e t y  a c t i n g  as u l t i m a t e  a u t h o r i t y ,  to  the  m aintenance
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*of c o n d i t i o n s  fa v o u r a b le  to  the  b e s t  l i f e . *  They may be 
regarded both from tho p o i n t  o f  v iew o f  th e  community, as the  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  o rd er  and o f  tho promotion o f  the  b e s t  
l i f e ,  and from the  p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f  the  p erso n s  who make up 
the community. Both s t a n d p o i n t s  are n e c e s s a r y ;  the  f i r s t  to  
c o r r e c t  the  f a l s e  id e a  t h a t  r i g h t s  b e lon g  to  the  i n d i v i d u a l  
in  h i s  i s o l a t i o n ,  tho s e co n d ,  because  the  s o c i a l  good i s  on ly  
a c t u a l i s e d  in the  i n d i v i d u a l  members o f  the  community.
Prom the  p o in t  o f  v iew o f  th e  whole community, r i g h t s
à
aro "the o r g a n ic  whole o f  the  outward c o n d i t i o n s  n e c e s s a r y  to
2
tho r a t i o n a l  l i f e . " The S ta t e - m a i n t a in e d  ord er  i s  thus  
th e  p a r t i a l  erbodimont o f  th e  cor iron good. Prom the  p o in t  o f
f
view o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  in  whom the  s o c i a l  good i s  a c t u a l ,  
rigiktc arc "the o x t o r n i l  i n c i d e n t s  o f  a man's p o s i t i o n "  in  
which he f u l f i l s  h i s  f u n c t io n  o f  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  th e  common 
good. A r i g h t  i s  n o t . som ething  prim ary,  but i s  a way o f  
l o o k i n g  a t  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  which are n e c e s s a r y . I t  
em p h a s i se s  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  s e l f  and o t h e r s ,  and 
always i m p l i e s  an o b l i g a t i o n  on tho p a r t  o f  o t h e r s . But t h i s  
c o u n te r  s i d e  o f  r i g h t  f a l l s  upon tho s u b j e c t  o f  the r i g h t  as
1 .  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Theory o f  th e  S t a t e ,  p. 2C3#
2 .  I b i d ,  p.  2 0 8 .
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w e l l  as upon o t h e r s ;  i t  does  t h i s  in th e  form o f  th e  o b l i g a ­
t i o n  and duty to  carry  out the  p o s i t i v e  ond, o f  which the  
r i g h t  i s  a c o n d i t i o n .  Thus the  r i g h t  to  l i f e  i n v o l v e s  not  
o n ly  the  o b l i g a t i o n  to l i v e ,  but to  l i v e  w e l l .  The b e s t  
l i f o  i s  th u s  th e  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  r i g h t s ,  which can n ev er  be 
based on th e  d e s i r e  to  do as one l i k e s .  They are c o n d i­
t io n e d  by th e  w hole ,and  are n ever  a b s o lu te  or detached from i t  
th e  if ho 1-e ; they  havo t h e i r  warrant in  the  aim o f  th e  whole^ 
and must be a d ju s t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  to  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s .
In h i s  t r e a tm e n t  o f  freedom Bosanquet comes in to  
d i r e c t  antagonism w ith  tho v ie w s  o f  the  E m p ir ica l  s c h o o l ,  
as r e p r e s e n t e d  by Bentham, Spencer., and J .  S. M i l l .  We have  
soon how Bentham and S pencer ,  s t a r t i n g  from a p u r e ly  e x t e r n a l  
c o n c e p t io n  o f  th e  s e l f  are l e d  to  c o n c l u s i o n s  which reduce  
freedom t o  a more n e g a t i v e  q u a n t i t y .  For them the  s e l f  i s  
o n ly  f r e e  w i t h in  the  fo u r  w a l l s  o f  i t s  s e l f h o o d ,  and a l l  
s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  i m p l i e s  l o s s  o f  l i b e r t y . The f r e e  s e l f  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  the s e l f  in  i s o l a t i o n  from o t h e r s .  But i t  i s  in  
j u s t  such t o n r s  t h a t  wc have had o c c a s i o n  to  d e s c r ib e  the
moral s e l f  o f  Kant,  than which n o th in g  cou ld  be more a n t i t h ­
e t i c a l  to  the  E m p i r i c i s t s '  c o n c e p t io n .  I t  i s  an example  
o f  the r o o t i n g  o f  two oxtror .es  o f  an a n t i t h e s i s ,  and b r in g s
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to  l i g h t  the  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n  in v o lv e d  in  a o n e - s id e d  t r e a t ­
ment o f  tl.^ z e i f ,  whether  i t  be as w h o l ly  e x t e r n a l  or  as  
T/holly i n t e r n a l .  In his^ c o n c e p t io n  o f  th e  s e l f  as n e i t h e r  
w h o l ly  e x t e r n a l ,  nor as l i v i n g  in  a moral i s o l a t i o n ,  but as  
f i n d i n g  i t s  r e a l i t y  in  th e  common good, Bosanquet e s c a p e s  th e  
ex tre m e s  o f  th e  a n t i t h e s i s ,  and f i n d s  a foun dat ion  f o r  moral
and s o c i a l  r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s .  He has no p la c e  in h i s
p h i lo s o p h y  f o r  the  fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n ,  between the  i n d i ­
v i d u a l  and s o c i e t y ,  which i s  a x io m a t ic  f o r  Spencer and Bentham
T h e o r ie s  based on t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  he d e s i g n a t e s  as " t h e o r i e s  
o f  the  f i r s t  l o o k " ,  o r  "prima f a c i e  t h e o r i e s " ,  "because they  
"are guided by th e im p r e s s io n  o f  th e  n a tu r a l  s e p a r a t e n e s s  
"of th e  human u n i t . "   ^ They in v o lv e  the  assumption t h a t  
th e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  a whole in h i m s e l f  w ith  on ly  e x t e r n a l  r e l a ­
t i o n s  to  o t h e r s ,  a l l  r e s t r a i n t  b e in g  t h e r e f o r e  regarded as  
a d e t r a c t i o n  from freedom. R ig h t s ,  b e lo n g in g  to  tho i n d i v i d ­
u a l  regarded  in  t h i s  l i g h t ,  are i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  w ith  freedom  
d i r e c t l y  they  c o l l i d e ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  no c o n ce p t io n  o f  a com­
mon good by r e f e r e n c e  to  which they  can be a d j u s t e d .  The 
i d e a l  o f  f ree d o m , in  such a v iew ,w ould  c o n s i s t  in th e  absence  
o f  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l ;  Now f o r  Bosanquet the  problems o f  freedom
1 .  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  T h eo r y  o f  t h e  S t a t e ,  p .  8 0 .
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and c o n t r o l  are transform ed  by h i s  way o f  r e g a rd in g  the  i n d i ­
v i d u a l  and s o c i e t y ,  between whom in h i s  v ie w ,  th e r e  i s  no 
fundamental an tagon ism , re n d er in g  th e  problem o f  freedom  
i n s o l u b l e .  For him freedom i s  not  "the arrangement by w hich ,  
"at a s a c r i f i c e  o f  some o f  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i t  ( th e  s e l f )
1
" is  enab lod  to  d i s p o r t  i t s e l f  in vacuo w ith  the  rem ainder ,"  
but  the  o c c a s i o n  f o r  c a r r y in g  out  th e  p o s i t i v e  aims which  
b e lo n g  to  a man's p o s i t i o n  in  tho whole .  In t h i s  s e n s e ,  as  
tho c o n d i t i o n  o f  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  h i s  quota to  the common 
good ,  the  system  o f  r i g h t s  guaranteed  by th e  S ta t c ^  i s  the  
p a r t i a l  embodiment o f  freedom.
As tho bare p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  becoming our tru e  s e l v e s ,
freedom i s  however l i t t l e  c o r e  than form al^or ,  what Hegel
\
would c a l l  th e  bare c o n c e p t io n  o f  freedom. I t  on ly  becomes  
a c t u a l  in  so f a r  as i t  g i v e s  e f f e c t  t o  th e  s e l f  as a whole^as
opposed to th e  s e l f  o f  th e  moment. Proedon to  do as one l i k e s
i s  not  froodom but c a p r i c e .  True freedom i s  a p r o g r e s s  from 
tho f r a g n o n t a r i n o s s  o f  th e  l i f e  o f  impulse  or  mere i n c l i n a t i o n ,  
to  a l i f e  which co m p r ise s  a w o r l d , S u c h  a l i f e  i s  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s e d  by an i n c r e a s i n g  u n i t y .
I t  i s  as  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  th e  u n i t y  o f  l i f e  t h a t
1 .  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  T h eo r y  o f  t h e  S t a t e ,  p .  1 3 5 .
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Bosanquet j u s t i f i a s  tho p r i n c i p l e  o f  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r ty .  He 
f o l l o w s  Hegel in  a l l  e s s e n t i a l s  in  h i s  b r i e f  t rea tm en t  o f  the  
. ^ u b j o c t ,  though h i s  a s s i m i l a t i o n  o f  the  co n c e p t io n  o f  the
common good,  as w e l l  as h i s  g e n e r a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  l e a d  him to
/
l a y  g r e a t e r  em phasis  on th e  s o c i a l  a s p e c t  o f  p r o p e r ty .
The p r o g r e s s  o f  the  s e l f , i s ,  as we have s e e n ,  a lways in  th e  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  g r e a t e r  u n i t y ,  in s e e k in g  which the c e n t r e  o f  
g r a v i t y  i s  thrown o u t s i d e  the  e m p ir i c a l  s e l f ,  in som ething  
which re are not  y e t ,  but which we f e e l  i t  im p e r a t iv e  f o r  us  
to  become. Wow t h i s  p r o c e s s  in  which th e  s o l i  i s  d r iv en  
f o r t h  from i t s  s e l f - c e n t r e d n e s s  to  seek  a h ig h e r  u n i t y  i s  ’ 
what i s  r o a n t  by d eve lopm ent ,  and i t  i s  in  the  t r a n s i t i o n  
from the  f r a g m e n ta r in e s s  o f  tho momentary s e l f ,  to  the  s e l f  
which coiTiprises a system  and a world t h a t  p ro p erty  has i t s  
v a l u e .  For p ro p e r ty  " r e s t s  on th e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  the  inward 
"and moral l i f e  cannot be a u n i t y  u n l e s s  tho outward
1
" l i f e  -  th e  d e a l i n g  w ith  t h i n g s  -  i s  a l s o  a u n i t y . "
ii^ vTcUIn o t h c r ^ m o r a l i ty  i m p l i e s  the  means o f  outward e x p r e s s i o n .  
T h is  in  i l l u s t r a t e d  in  th e  c o n t r a s t  between a d u l t  human and
animal l i f e ,  and aga in  between a d u l t  and c h i l d  l i f e .  In our  
t r e a tm e n t  o f  an im als  a l l  t h a t  we c o n s id e r  i s  th e  removal o f  
t h e i r  w ants;  t h e i r  l i f e  i s  indood a s u c c e s s i o n  o f  mere wants
1 .  A spects  o f  the  S o c i a l  Problem, p* 3 1 0 .
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and s a t i s f a c t i o n s ,  which nevor r i s e  to  becoming means o f  
s o l f - o x p r o s s i o n .  V/c have a lrea d y  had o c c a s io n  to make the  
samo d i s t i n c t i o n  in  our former s e c t i o n ,  where we saw t h a t  
tho d i s t i n c t i v e  f e a t u r e  o f  human a c t io n  was a r e f e r e n c e  to  
th e  s e l f .  »Vhat i s  t r u e  o f  animal l i f e  h o ld s  to  some e x t e n t  
in  c h i l d  l i f o ,  in  w hich ,  though th e r e  i s  a r e f e r e n c e  o f  
a c t i o n s  to  tho s e l f ,  t h e r e  i s  not  y e t  any l a r g e  degree  o f  
co rrespon d en ce  between tho in n e r  world o f  th e  s e l f  and the  
o u t e r  world o f  f a c t s .  The l o a f  upon th e  t a b l e  j u s t  "comes",  
and t h i n g s  "happen" w i th o u t  any apparent c a u s a l  u n i t y  ; or  
r a t h e r  the  c a u s a l  u n i t y  i s  n o t  apprehended by the c h i l d ,  
f a l l i n g  o u t s i d e  h i s  ken. He l i v e s  w i t h in  a s h e l t e r e d  world  
in  which "h is  r e l a t i o n  to  t h i n g s  has no u n i ty  co rresp o n d in g  
to  h i s  moral n a tu r e ."   ^ He i s  g iv e n  what i s  thought  b e s t  
f o r  him, h i s  d r e s s ,  h i s  p l a y t h i n g s ,  hi^ s u r r o u n d in g s , are  
an e x p r e s s i o n  not  o f  h i m s e l f ,  but o f  h i s  p a r e n t s .  -  This  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h i n g s  n a t u r a l l y  undergoes  m o d i f i c a t i o n ,  as  
l i t t l e  by l i t t l e  th e  c h i l d ' s  l i f e  becomes a u n i ty  in which  
h i s  wants  and a c t i v i t i e s  arc the  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  h i s  own 
n a tu r e .  Now p r o p e r ty ^ a s  one moans by which t h i s  i s  brought  
ab o u t ,  i s  "tho un ity  o f  l i f e  in  i t s  e x t e r n a l  or  m a t e r i a l
form."  ^ From t h i s  a s p e c t  i t  i s  a c a u s a l  u n i t y , i n  which
1 .  A sp ects  o f  tho S o c i a l  Froblem, p. 310 .
2 .  I b i d ,  p .  3 1 1 .
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Gvory a c t i o n  has i t s  o f f e c t  and i n f l u e n c e s  the  power o f  fu tu r e  
a c t i o n .  The c h i l d  who spends  h i s  weekly pocket-money on 
Monday, knows t h a t  he cannot  buy what ho wants on Thursday.
Tho l i t t l e  g i r l  who in  a f i t  o f  tamper c u t s  her d o l l ' s  fro ck  
in  p i e c e s  , c o n n e c t s  her  momentary a c t io n  w ith  th e  permanent  
r e s u l t .  Thus by e n t a i l i n g  co n seq u en ces  t h a t  are f e l t  by th e  
c h i l d ,  p ro p er ty  comes to  be more than tho  p r o v i s i o n  o f  wants  
as they  a r i s e ;  i t  becomes the  "means o f  p o s s i b l e  a c t i o n  and 
" e x p r e s s io n  c o r r e sp o n d in g  t c  the moral s e l f  t h a t  l o o k s  
"before  and a f t e r . "  ^ The c a u s a l  u n i ty  which i s  e n t a i l e d  
in  the  freedom to  handle  e x t e r n a l  o b j e c t s ,  becomes a b a s i s  
from which l i f e  appears  as a whole w ith  i n t e r r e l a t e d  p a r t s ,  
i n s t e a d  o f  as  a s u c c e s s i o n  o f  mere " h a p p e n in g s ."
But th e  u n i t y  to  which p ro p er ty  c o n t r i b u t e s ,  i s
more than th e  c a u s a l  u n i t y  o f  the e x t e r n a l  w orld ,  to  which
the  s e l f  l e a r n s  to  adapt i t s e l f  ; t c  regard i t  as such would
bo to  f a l l  in t o  the E m p i r i c i s t s '  e r r o r  o f  t r e a t i n g  the  mind
as the  p a s s i v e  r e c i p i e n t  o f  im p r e s s io n s .  For the r in d  has
i t s  own u n i t y  which i t  im p r e s s e s  upon the  e x t e r n a l  w or ld ,
the  e l e m e n ts  o f  which thereb y  c e a s in g  to  be w hol ly  e x t e r n a l ly : .
h a /o  a lr e a d y  seen  how p rop orty  can be cone th e  in s tru m en t
2
o f  w i l l  t o  t h i s  and.
1 .  A spocts  o f  the  S o c i a l  Problem, p. 311 .
2 .  CP. P art  1 ,  Ohaptor II
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The %:rogro33 o f  the  s e l f  towards u n i ty  i s  a c o n d i­
t i o n  o f  i t s  f u l f i l l i n g  i t s  p o s i t i o n  in th e  w hole ,  o r ,  in  
o t h e r  words,  o f  i t s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  the  common good, and 
th e  e t h i c a l  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  p ro p er ty  l i e s  in t h i s  f a c t  t h a t  
in e n a b l in g  th e  s e l f  t o  c r e a t e  a "world" com pris ing  system  
and o r d e r ,  i t  i s  f u l f i l l i n g  tho purpose o f  the  w hole .
•
C h a p t e r  IX.
C o n c l u s i o n : -  Ownership as a S tew a rd sh ip .
Our b r i e f  survey  has been f r u i t f u l  t o  the e x t e n t  o f  
b r in g in g  ou t  some o f  the  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  the  t e r n s  o f  owner­
s h ip  and p e r s o n a l i t y .  For vfo have seen  th a t  f o r  Locke owner­
s h ip  means p r im a r i l y  the  o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  the  a c t i v i t y  o f  the  
s e l f  regarded  in a p u r e ly  e x t e r n a l  manner; w h i le  fo r  Bentham 
i t  i s  a b a s i s  o f  e x p e c t a t i o n ,  and fo r  Spencer a n a t u r a l  r i g h t  
Kant lo o k s  upon i t  as th e  " e x te r n a l  mine and th in e"  secu red  
by tho S t a t e ,  F i c h t e  as th e  instrum ent  o f  the  s e l f ,  w h i le  
Hegel s e e s  in  i t  the  sphere  o f  o b j e c t i v e  freedom, a concep­
t i o n  which Groon e l a b o r a t e s  by in tr o d u c in g  the  id ea  o f  the  
common good as a r e g u l a t i v e  p r i n c i p l e .  V/e have l a s t l y  in  
Bosanquet the  c o n c e p t io n  o f  p r o p er ty  as "the u n i ty  o f  l i f e  
"in i t s  e x t e r n a l  form." There i s  an unm istakable  d e v e l ­
opment in  t h o s e  i d e a s  o f  ow n ersh ip ,  one which moreover  
im p l i e s  a co r r e sp o n d in g  development in  th e  c o n c e p t io n  o f  
the  moral s e l f .  The. two ex trem es  o f  th e  a n t i t h e s i s  meet in  
the  v ie w s  o f  Kant and o f  th e  E m p i r i c i s t s ,  and F ic h t e  i s  th e  
f i r s t  t o  combine the  id e a  o f  p r o p er ty  as an instrur^ont o f  
froodom, w ith  t h a t  o f  th e  s e l f  as a c t u a l l y  and not on ly  
i d e a l l y ,  or  m erely  e x t e r n a l l y ,  f r e e .  In the  v iew s  o f  H eg e l ,
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Green and Bosanquet we a r r i v e  a t  l e n g t h  at  a th eo ry  o f  moral  
p e r s o n a l i t y  which i s  adequate to  the  co rresp o n d in g  th e o r y  o f  
p r o p e r t y .  The t r u t h  in  both  s i d e s  o f  the  a n t i t h e s i s  p r e s e n t ­
ed by Locke and Kant, i s  harmonised in  t h e s e  l a t e r  v iev /s ,  
which t r e a t  p r o p er ty  as an in s tru m ent  o f  w i l l  e x p re s se d  in  
e x t e r n a l  form and as c r e a t i v e  o f  a world com pris ing  system  
and u n i t y .
There i s  a f u r t h e r  view o f  ownership  which, though  
i m p l i c i t  in  most o f  the  t h e o r i e s  we have been c o n s i d e r i n g ,  
i s  nowhere e x p l i c i t l y  drawn o u t  in  them. The main emphasis  
o f  t h i s  v iew i s  upon o w n ersh ip ,  regarded as a r i g h t  which i s  
in  i t s  very  na tu re  an o b l i g a t i o n ,  a v iew v;hich may be summed 
up in  th e  p h r a s e ,  ow n e rsh ip ,  or  p r o p e r t y ,  as a s t e w a r d sh ip .
\io have s e en  t h a t ,  as a l e g a l  r i g h t ,  ownership  c o n s t i t u t e s  
th e  bare p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  the common good,  and 
t h a t  as such i t  imposes o b l i g a t i o n s  on o t h e r s .  But the  
c o u n t e r s i d c  o f  a r i g h t  f a l l s  a l s o  upon the s u b j e c t  o f  i t ,  
and though our way o f  sp ea k in g  o f  the  r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s  
o f  ow nersh ip  i s  rendered  n e c e s s a r y  by the  o rd in ary  o p p o s i t i o n  
im p l ied  in  th e  term s ,  from the  , o i n t  o f  view taken here t h e s e  
j j^ass o v e r  in t o  one a n o th er .  To make our.m eaning c l e a r  we may 
quote  some words o f  H e g e l ' s  used ?fith r e f e r e n c e  to  the  tonr.s
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• o b j o c t i v e *  and ' s u b j e c t i v e ' ,  but e q u a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  to  
' r i g h t s '  and ' o b l i g a t i o n s . *  He s a y s ,  ' I t  happens w ith  them 
as w i th  o t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n s  and opposed a s p e c t s  o f  r e f l e x i o n ;
I
t h e y ,  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  f i n i t e  and d i a l e c t i c  c h a r a c t e r ,  p a ss  
o v e r  i n t o  t h e i r  o p p o s i t e s .  For im a g in a t io n  and u n d ers tan d in g  
th e  meanings o f  a n t i t h e t i c  p hases  are not  c o n v e r t i b l e  b ecause  
’t h o i r  i d e n t i t y  i s  s t i l l  i n t e r n a l .  But in w i l l ,  on th e  con­
t r a r y  , those  p h a s e s ,  which ought to  be at  once a b s t r a c t  and 
at  tho same time a s p e c t s  o f  th a t  which can bo known o n ly  as 
c o n c r e t e , I c a S f t h e m s e l v e s  to  i d e n t i o / ,  and to  an exchange o f  
m e a n i n g s . '  ^ Now i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  f o r  the  u n d er s ta n d in g ,  
the  meaning o f  r i g h t  and o b l i g a t i o n  are a n t i t h e t i c ,  and t h a t  
the  l e g a l  r i g h t  o f  ow nersh ip  i s  t h e r e f o r e ,  on ly  the  bare con­
d i t i o n  o f  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  the  common good. But fo r  tho w i l l  
the o p ^ o r tu n i ty  f o r  a good l i f o  becomes an o b l i g a t i o n  to  the  
sar.e,  and the  r i g h t  o f  ownersh ip  i s  th u s  transform ed in t o  an 
o b l i g a t i o n  to  make our c o n t r o l  o f  e x t e r n a l  t h i n g s  a c o n t r i ­
b u t io n  to  tho common good.
Thus b e g in n in g  from th e  ' c o n c r e te  fac t*  o f  owner­
s h i p  wo havo been l e d  by gradual  s t a g e s  to  s e e  in  i t  the
moaning o f  s t e w a r d s h ip .  Th is  c o n c e p t io n  o f  i t  as i t  wore the
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tho c o r n e r  s to n o  o f  our b u i l d i n g ,  w i th o u t  which tho whole  
would bo in c o r .p lo to .  I t  i s  a view t o r o o v e r ,  which w i l l  boar  
c r i t i c i s r . , such as wo have a p p l i e d  to  forr>cr v ie w s .  For 
s t e w a r d s h ip  i m p l i e s  a theory  o f  r o r a l  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  f r e e  from 
the  e r r o r s  o f  o n e - s i d e d  t rc a tm o n ts  o f  tho s e l f ,  such  as we 
havo c o n s id e r e d .  I t  prosu pp osos  froodom, and im p l i e s  a l s o  
an e x t e r n a l  sp h ere  f o r  i t s  oxorcisodr, s i n c e  s t ew a r d sh ip  i s  
o f  outward t h i n g s .  I t  i s  not  th e  freedom o f  c a p r i c e  but  
t h a t  which i s  l i m i t e d  and d i r e c t e d  by r e s p o n s i b i l i t y j  o r  
r a t h e r ,  tho freedom im p l ied  in s tew a rd sh ip  i s  i t s e l f  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , j u s t  as a r i g h t  i s  in i t s  nature  an o b l i g a -  . 
t i o n .  Tho s e l f  to  which i t  has r o f e r c n c c  i s  o s s o n t i a l l y  
s o c i a l ,  and s t a n d s  in  no m erely  e x t e r n a l  o r  n e g a t i v e  r e l a ­
t i o n  to  the  community which i s  th e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  i t s  r i g h t s  
and o b l i g a t i o n s .
T h is  c o n c e p t io n  o f  ownership  l a y s  bare the  v i t a l  
t r u t h  t h a t  the  u l t i m a t e  ground o f  tho j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
ow nersh ip  i s  o n ly  reached  on th e  h i g h e s t  e t h i c a l  p l a n e ,  on 
which a r i g h t  i s  rogardod f i r s t  and forem ost  as an o b l i g a t i o n  
to  c o n t r i b u t e  to  the  comnon good. For i t  i s  o n ly  in  th e  pos­
i t i o n  o f  a s e r v a n t  t h a t  ownersh ip  can c la im  a la w f u l  p la c e  
in  th e  moral and s o c i a l  o rd o r .
